Contracting for research is often infeasible because research inputs are unobservable and research outcomes cannot be verified by a court. Sponsoring a research tournament can resolve these problems. A model is presented in which contestants compete to find the innovation of highest value to the tournament sponsor. The winner receives a prespecified prize. The tournament game has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Free entry is not optimal because equilibrium effort by each researcher decreases in the number of contestants. An optimally designed research tournament balances the probability of overshooting the first-best quality level against the probability of falling short.

A market in which the owner of a durable good, X, contracts with an expert for diagnostic and treatment services is studied. Good X may be in one of three states: "health," "disease," or "failure." Only experts can determine whether X is healthy or diseased and perform treatment. The owner cannot tell whether recommended treatment is really needed. This creates an information-based demand for health insurance by risk-neutral consumers. Imperfections in the market for spot insurance may give rise to free diagnostic checks, strategic procrastination, and long-term health maintenance agreements.

We study how supply disruptions interact with monopoly pricing, inventory management, and consumer stockpiling in a continuous-time model. Preemption incentives—consumers prefer to stock up before a price hike while the firm prefers to hike before consumers stock up—lead to an equilibrium with gradual stockpiling and endogenous uncertainty over the timing of a price hike, which can trigger a run at the disruption onset. Consumer storage introduces welfare losses from randomized pricing, but can also strengthen the firm’s incentive to hold buffer stock. Rationing, price controls, and reserve mandates can each improve welfare, but only strategic government reserves can implement the social optimum.

The inferences a prospective home buyer can make about the quality of a house from the amount of time it spends on the market and the seller"s optimal strategy in light of these inferences are investigated. Depending upon the information structure, the seller may have an incentive to post an inordinately high initial price (in order to "dampen" the signal transmitted to future prospective buyers) or an inordinately low initial price (in order to make an early sale and avoid consumer "herding"). It is shown that the sellers of high-quality homes do best when inspection outcomes are publicly recorded and do worst when inspection outcomes are not public and the price history is not observable. Costly inspections create more adverse selection but deter consumer herding.

Two fundamentally different subcontracting systems arise as distinct solutions to the quality control problem facing an input buyer. The "American" system involves competitive bidding on each contract, large orders, and inspections. The "Japanese" system involves repeat purchases from a supplier who earns a premium, small orders, and no inspections. Both systems may coexist as local solutions, but the global optimum is determined by the ratio of set-up to inspection costs. This suggests that the adoption of flexible manufacturing equipment and rising product complexity may be responsible for the shift from the American to the Japanese system observed in many industries.

A market in which the owner of a durable good, X, contracts with an expert for diagnostic and treatment services is studied. Good X may be in one of three states: "health," "disease," or "failure." Only experts can determine whether X is healthy or diseased and perform treatment. The owner cannot tell whether recommended treatment is really needed. This creates an information-based demand for health insurance by risk-neutral consumers. Imperfections in the market for spot insurance may give rise to free diagnostic checks, strategic procrastination, and long-term health maintenance agreements.

We study the optimal incentive scheme for a multistage project in which the agent privately observes intermediate progress. The optimal contract involves a soft deadline wherein the principal guarantees funding up to a certain date—if the agent reports progress at that date, then the principal gives him a relatively short hard deadline to complete the project—if progress is not reported at that date, then a probationary phase begins in which the project is randomly terminated at a constant rate until progress is reported. We explore several variants of the model with implications for optimal project design. In particular, we show that the principal benefits by imposing a small cost on the agent for submitting a progress report or by making the first stage of the project somewhat “harder” than the second.

We study a dynamic game in which all players initially possess the same information and coordinate on a high level of activity. Eventually, players with a long string of bad experiences become inactive. This prospect can cause a coordination avalanche in which all activity in the population stops. Coordination avalanches are part of Pareto-efficient equilibria; they can occur at any point in the game; their occurrence does not depend on the true state of nature; and allowing players to exchange information may merely hasten their onset. We present applications to search markets, organizational meltdown, and inefficient computer upgrades.

We investigate optimal project management in a setting plagued by an indefinite number of setbacks that are discovered en route to project completion. The contractor can cover up delays in progress due to shirking either by making false claims of setbacks or by postponing the reports of real ones. The sponsor optimally induces work and honest reporting via a soft deadline and a reward for completion that specifies a bonus for early delivery. Late‐stage setbacks trigger randomization between minimally feasible project extension and (inefficient) cancellation. Because extensions may be granted repeatedly, arbitrarily large overruns in schedule and budget are possible after which the project may still be canceled.