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How Do Individuals Repay Their Debt? The Balance-Matching Heuristic

American Economic Review 2019 109(3), 844-875 open access
We study how individuals repay their debt using linked data on multiple credit cards. Repayments are not allocated to the higher interest rate card, which would minimize the cost of borrowing. Moreover, the degree of misallocation is invariant to the economic stakes, which is inconsistent with optimization frictions. Instead, we show that repayments are consistent with a balance-matching heuristic under which the share of repayments on each card is matched to the share of balances on each card. Balance matching captures more than half of the predictable variation in repayments and is highly persistent within individuals over time. (JEL D14, D15, D91, G41)

The Impact of Media Censorship: 1984 or Brave New World?

American Economic Review 2019 109(6), 2294-2332 open access
Media censorship is a hallmark of authoritarian regimes. We conduct a field experiment in China to measure the effects of providing citizens with access to an uncensored internet. We track subjects’ media consumption, beliefs regarding the media, economic beliefs, political attitudes, and behaviors over 18 months. We find four main results: (i) free access alone does not induce subjects to acquire politically sensitive information; (ii) temporary encouragement leads to a persistent increase in acquisition, indicating that demand is not permanently low; (iii) acquisition brings broad, substantial, and persistent changes to knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, and intended behaviors; and (iv) social transmission of information is statistically significant but small in magnitude. We calibrate a simple model to show that the combination of low demand for uncensored information and the moderate social transmission means China’s censorship apparatus may remain robust to a large number of citizens receiving access to an uncensored internet. (JEL C93, D72, D83, L82, L86, L88, P36)

The Dynamic Effects of Personal and Corporate Income Tax Changes in the United States: Comment

American Economic Review 2019 109(7), 2655-2678 open access
Mertens and Ravn (2013) estimate impulse response functions (IRFs) from income tax changes in a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) by using narrative accounts of tax liability changes as proxy variables. To produce confidence intervals for their IRFs, they use a residual-based wild bootstrap, which has subsequently become popular in the proxy SVAR literature. We argue that their wild bootstrap is not valid, producing confidence intervals that are much too small. Using a residual-based moving block bootstrap that is proven to be asymptotically valid, we reestimate confidence intervals for Mertens and Ravn’s (2013) IRFs and find no statistically significant effects of tax changes on output, labor, and investment. (JEL E23, E62, H24, H25, H31, H32)

Disability Benefits, Consumption Insurance, and Household Labor Supply

American Economic Review 2019 109(7), 2613-2654 open access
There is no evaluation of the consequences of Disability Insurance (DI) receipt that captures the effects on households’ net income and consumption expenditure, family labor supply, or benefits from other programs. Combining detailed register data from Norway with an instrumental variables approach based on random assignment to appellant judges, we comprehensively assess how DI receipt affects these understudied outcomes. To consider the welfare implications of the findings from this instrumental variables approach, we estimate a dynamic model of household behavior that translates employment, reapplication, and savings decisions into revealed preferences for leisure and consumption. The model-based results suggest that on average, the willingness to pay for DI receipt is positive and sizable. Because spousal labor supply strongly buffers the household income and consumption effects of DI allowances, the estimated willingness to pay for DI receipt is smaller for married than single applicants. (JEL D12, D14, H55, I38, J14, J22)

Does Helping John Help Sue? Evidence of Spillovers in Education

American Economic Review 2019 109(3), 1080-1115 open access
Does the impact of teachers extend beyond the students in their classroom? Using the natural transitions of students from multiple elementary schools into a single middle school, this paper provides a new method for isolating and quantifying peer spillover effects of teaching and shows that ignoring these spillovers underestimates a teacher’s value by at least 30 percent. Because the spillovers also affect teacher value-added estimates, I develop a method of moments estimator of teacher value-added and show that accounting for the spillovers does not have a large impact on the ranking of teachers in New York City. I conclude by showing that the spillovers occur within groups of students who share the same race and gender, which suggests that social networks play a critical role in disseminating the effect. (JEL H75, I21, J15, J16, J45, Z13)

Can We Control Carbon Dioxide? (from 1975)

American Economic Review 2019 109(6), 2015-2035 open access
In recent years, the concern about the tradeoffs between economic growth and environmental quality have been paramount. To a large extent, the energy sector has been the locus of the major battles. For the most part, the concerns have been with local environmental problems such as disputes over air and water quality, nuclear accidents, and radioactive wastes. Although these problems have not been solved, it appears that as a result of considerable technical work that techniques exist (even if political will does not) to reduce most local environmental problems to a tolerable level. There remain on the agenda, however, a number of global environmental problems, and again these relate mainly to the energy sector. In particular, it appears that emissions of carbon dioxide particulate matter, and waste heat may, at some time in the future, lead to significant climatic modifications. Of these, it appears that carbon dioxide will probably be the first man-made emission to affect climate on a global scale, with a significant temperature increase by the end of the century.

How Efficient Is Dynamic Competition? The Case of Price as Investment

American Economic Review 2019 109(9), 3339-3364
We study industries where the price that a firm sets serves as an investment into lower cost or higher demand. We assess the welfare implications of the ensuing competition for the market using analytical and numerical approaches to compare the equilibria of a learning-by-doing model to the first-best planner solution. We show that dynamic competition leads to low deadweight loss. This cannot be attributed to similarity between the equilibria and the planner solution. Instead, we show how learning-by-doing causes the various contributions to deadweight loss to either be small or partly offset each other. (JEL D21, D25, D43, D83, L13)

Consumers as Tax Auditors

American Economic Review 2019 109(9), 3031-3072 open access
To investigate the enforcement value of third-party information on potentially collusive taxpayers, I study an anti-tax evasion program that rewards consumers for ensuring that firms report sales and establishes a verification system to aid whistle-blowing consumers in São Paulo, Brazil (Nota Fiscal Paulista). Firms reported sales increased by at least 21 percent over 4 years. The results are consistent with fixed costs of concealing collusion, increased detection probability from whistle-blower threats, and with behavioral biases associated with lotteries amplifying the enforcement value of the program. Although firms increased reported expenses, tax revenue net of rewards increased by 9.3 percent. (JEL D22, H25, H26, L25, O14, O17)

Equilibrium Provider Networks: Bargaining and Exclusion in Health Care Markets

American Economic Review 2019 109(2), 473-522 open access
We evaluate the consequences of narrow hospital networks in commercial health care markets. We develop a bargaining solution, "Nash- in-Nash with Threat of Replacement," that captures insurers' incentives to exclude, and combine it with California data and estimates from Ho and Lee (2017) to simulate equilibrium outcomes under social, consumer, and insurer- optimal networks. Private incentives to exclude generally exceed social incentives, as the insurer benefits from substantially lower negotiated hospital rates. Regulation prohibiting exclusion increases prices and premiums and lowers consumer welfare without significantly affecting social surplus. However, regulation may prevent harm to consumers living close to excluded hospitals.