Knowledge that Transforms

The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive analysis of corporate valuation around the world. Specifically, we (i) document and compare corporate valuation around the world, and (ii) identify the key factors that drive cross-country differences in valuation. In doing so, we utilize the country-level Tobin’s q (CTQ), computed as the ratio of the aggregate market value to book value of all assets held by all public firms domiciled in a country, which amounts to the Tobin’s q for the ‘market portfolio’ of the country. The key findings of the paper are: First, CTQ varies greatly across countries, ranging from 0.73 for Venezuela to 2.11 for Finland, with the international mean of 1.30 during our sample period 1999–2004. Despite the steady integration of the world economy in recent years, corporate valuation remains starkly different across countries. Second, apart from the effect of corporate governance, cross-country differences in corporate valuation are significantly driven by the growth options of countries represented by the R&D intensities, capital expenditures, and GDP growth. In addition, the degree of capital market openness has a significant, independent effect on valuation. Third, our regression analyses show that CTQ varies directly with shareholder rights, enforcement of insider trading laws, GDP growth, R&D intensity, and the degree of capital market openness. The key findings remain robust to the inclusion of inflation and industry effects.

This paper studies how the cost of switching banks affects the profits available from relationship based lending when the relationship produces inside information. Lower switching cost compounds the adverse selection problem, discouraging outsider banks to depress loan rates. The adverse selection effect eases off along with higher switching cost, leading to more aggressive bidding and thereby reduction in insider profits. Above a certain threshold, however, the adverse selection effect vanishes completely and the insider profits turn increasing in the switching cost. The model predicts that the availability of relationship credit is non-monotonously related to the magnitude of the switching cost.

National banks and Financial Holding Companies (FHC) solicited permission from the Federal Reserve Board and the Treasury Department to add real estate brokerage and management services to list of permissible business activities under the 1999 Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLB). To date, permission has been denied due to the Community Choice in Real Estate Act, HR 111 and S 98. This study offers a method of combining the financial data of two independent industries. Additionally, this study identifies the scale returns and cost complementarities that may occur if banks offered real estate brokerage services under a single organization. Considerable evidence suggests that joining bank and real estate activities under a single organization would continue to generate increasing returns to scale for banks even when large levels of real estate brokerage services are offered by the joint institution. In addition, the results indicate evidence that bank acquisitions of real estate brokerages do create some cost saving synergies from cost complementarities between product lines. Finally, complementarities exist between traditional bank services and real estate services most at low levels of real estate outputs.