Knowledge that Transforms

This paper evaluates the economies of scale and scope in the French mutual funds (SICAV) industry. This segment of the financial sector offers the unique characteristic that some firms specialize, while others supply several products. The results suggest economies of scale and scope for small institutions and diseconomies for larger firms. An appropriate size for a diversified company is in the range of FF 2.9 billion.

This paper develops a model of security broker behavior under price uncertainty. The model examines the process of matching orders and the determinants of equilibrium brokerage commission rates. Institutional arrangements, search efficiency, execution costs, volume, risk, and the unit price of the security are shown to affect equilibrium brokerage commission rates. Some stylized facts of security brokerage are explained.

The commitment value of financial contracts is limited by the ability of contracting parties to renegotiate them away, if it becomes mutually beneficial to do so. When debt contracts are used by oligopolistic firms to commit to aggressive output strategies as in Brander-Lewis, we show that renegotiation may undermine commitment under symmetric information, but not generally under asymmetric information. Lasting contracts that survive renegotiation are proposed. It is shown that there exist lasting debt contracts which preserve the commitment value and in which not all debt is renegotiated away.

We examine the design of compensation contracts and determination of investment policies when a manager has private information regarding the effect of investment on both the firm's cash flows and the private benefits she is able to extract from employment. We show that, in general, the optimal mechanism is characterized by a menu of salary and option contracts. When the manager's private information relates only to the firm's cash flows, the firm overinvests relative to the Pareto optimal level. On the other hand, if the private information relates only to private benefits, the firm will underinvest.

This paper demonstrates that market makers have the ability and incentive to facilitate price discovery in securities markets. Market makers can expedite the process of intertemporal price formation by setting prices to induce statistically more informative order flow. Such actions constitute an investment in the production of information. Under certain conditions, market makers can recoup the cost of this investment by making better pricing decisions in the future with more precise information. These conditions are analyzed in a general model and several examples that illustrate the complex nature of price discovery are presented.

We analyze how the anonymous trading of uninformed agents affects the characterization of security market equilibrium. We show that the degree of anonymity provided by a market alters the distribution of wealth across agents, the depth of the market, and the incentive agents have to acquire private information about a security's fundamental value. Moreover, the nature of these effects depends on the type of information about uninformed trading that is revealed to market participants. Our results have implications for sunshine trading, dual trading, brokerage relationships, automation and decentralization of markets, and firms' security listing choices. G10, L10.

This paper shows that a debt contract with warrants for the lender and cash/equity settlement options for the entrepreneur-borrower is the optimal contract in a setting with moral hazard and unverifiable states of nature. This contract makes it possible to contract optimally ex ante on unverifiable states; debt obligations are adjusted to state realizations so that debt is made safer. Moral hazard is reduced as a result.

This paper offers a model of intermediation in the Diamond-Dybvig tradition in which both fiat currency and bank deposits are present. The behavior of the economy's price level, deposit-currency ratio, and money supply is compared across equilibria in which bank runs do and do not occur. It is shown that the behavior of these variables in the presence and absence of runs is consistent with that observed in the United States during the period from 1929 to 1933.