Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT Despite the growing use of subjective performance incentives used in executive bonuses, empirical evidence on their effectiveness remains inconclusive. This study explores three aspects of subjective metrics in bonus plan design: their prevalence, the goals they target, and their impact on managerial behavior and firm outcomes. First, I document 53.8 percent of CEO bonus plans include at least one subjective performance measure, and among these plans, an average of 38.9 percent of total bonus weight is allocated to these measures. Using machine learning, I show subjective metrics target incentives related to employees, firm culture, and executive performance. Second, using the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act as a quasi-exogenous shock to contract design, I find firms increase the number and weight of subjective metrics by 22.9 percent and 10.4 percent, respectively. Finally, I find the increasing prevalence of subjective performance measures positively influences CEO effort, corporate culture, and innovation. Data Availability: The data used in this study are from public sources and available upon request. JEL Classifications: M12; J33; G38; M41; H2.

ABSTRACT Technological advances are reshaping the business landscape, yet their use in financial reporting has been slow. We develop a model in which auditors and companies make technology investment decisions and examine their impact on audit fees and outcomes. Our analysis shows that auditors and companies may fail to invest in mutually beneficial technology that would enhance audit quality, resulting in coordination failure. We also demonstrate how legal liability, client business risk, and auditor pricing power affect the conditions under which such coordination failure occurs. Furthermore, technology investments can either increase or decrease audit fees. When companies can choose among projects with varying risk levels, technology investments can increase audit failure risk while improving welfare by enabling them to pursue riskier but more profitable projects. Our results provide a rationale for regulatory intervention to facilitate technology investments in the financial reporting environment and offer empirical predictions. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M48.

ABSTRACT Addressing income inequality is crucial for ensuring equitable and prosperous societies. This study examines the impact of the local press on intrafirm pay disparity. By using recently mandated disclosures of CEO-worker pay ratios and analyzing the staggered shutdown of local newspapers, we find that within-firm pay disparity increases by 8.2 percent following local newspaper closures. Further analysis suggests that this post-closure increase in pay disparity ratio is unlikely to be driven by either CEO compensation or worker pay alone or underlying economic conditions but instead reflects reduced concerns over reputational damage. Overall, our findings are consistent with local newspapers’ playing an important role in disseminating CEO-worker pay ratios and amplifying their reputational effects, thereby shaping and monitoring within-firm pay disparity. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: G38; J31; M12; L82.

ABSTRACT We examine whether the adoption of the current expected credit losses (CECL) model, which incorporates forward-looking information in loan loss provisions (LLPs), enhances banks’ information production. Consistent with better information production, we document significant changes in both financial reporting and operational outcomes following CECL adoption. First, CECL banks’ LLPs become timelier and better reflect future local economic conditions. Second, CECL banks experience lower rates of loan defaults. These improvements are more pronounced among banks that invest more in CECL-related information systems and human capital, and are especially salient for larger banks. Our findings suggest that forward-looking accounting standards can enhance banks’ information environments. JEL Classifications: E32; G2; G28; M4; M48.

ABSTRACT We examine how the Big 4 responded to evolving partner qualification requirements in China. By 2017, at least 80 percent of the Big 4 partners were required to hold CICPA qualifications, a requirement that did not apply to local firms. Using data from a 14-year window around the reform, we document that the Big 4 expanded their partnership and primarily complied through internal promotion of locally licensed auditors, often into junior signing roles and serving new clients. Our analyses of audit outcomes yield mixed and time-varying evidence: although we observe relative increases in restatements in selected periods, the triangulated evidence does not suggest a pervasive deterioration in audit quality. However, we find a decline in the Big 4’s market share and audit fee premium. Overall, our findings shed light on how regulatory interventions targeting auditor qualifications reshape audit firms and market competition. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M4; M40; M41; M42; M49.

ABSTRACT This study advances our understanding of firms’ incentives to disclose aggregate information. In standard product and supply market settings, firms prefer to either provide detailed information or make no disclosure at all. However, this paper shows that the confluence of product market competition and supply market investments creates a distinct ex ante preference for aggregate disclosures. Firm disclosures encourage supply market investments. Supply market decisions are made at the firm level rather than at the product level, implying that aggregate disclosures are sufficient for the supplier’s decisions while simultaneously obfuscating information from rivals. The results highlight how the divergent informational needs of external parties shape firms’ disclosure decisions. Specifically, our analysis shows that when supplier investments are critical and information is industry-specific, firms prefer aggregate disclosures. This preference persists even in industries characterized by private communication between firms and suppliers: aggregation emerges in both public disclosures and private communications. JEL Classifications: D43; D82; L13; M41.

ABSTRACT I examine how mandatory ESG disclosure regulations transmit to unregulated firms through ESG rating agencies’ peer benchmarking. Using the United Kingdom’s 2017 gender pay gap (GPG) disclosure mandate with its expected positive rating consequences for regulated U.K. firms, I show that unregulated firms with similar Refinitiv ESG ratings are significantly more likely to voluntarily disclose GPG information after the mandate. The effect is more pronounced when peers are defined by ESG rating similarity rather than market capitalization and is not driven by industry affiliation alone. Consistent with ESG ratings creating competitive pressures, spillovers are strongest when U.K. peers were initially lower ranked and when unregulated firms can report relatively better GPG performance. Further analyses show that these spillovers extend to other social disclosures and generalize to the European Union’s Non-Financial Reporting Directive. Overall, the paper highlights how ESG rating structures extend the reach of disclosure regulations beyond their formal scope. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M14; M48; D70.

ABSTRACT I examine the association between data visualizations in earnings conference call presentations and contemporaneous disclosure processing outcomes. I find that the use of data visualizations in this setting is associated with decreases in abnormal information asymmetry and increases in abnormal market liquidity. In addition, I find that data visualizations help investors process information when investors face greater acquisition and integration costs. Finally, I find that data visualizations are associated with increased trading activity and trade profitability for less-sophisticated investors. Overall, my results suggest that the use of data visualizations in earnings conference calls can reduce investors’ processing costs and improve market outcomes. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text. JEL Classifications: D83; G14; M41.

ABSTRACT Using data from a large telecom service provider in China between 2014 and 2019, we examine the impact of being passed over for promotion on subsequent performance for middle managers. Specifically, we find that there is a negative association between high promotion probability and post-pass over performance changes. Such negative association is less pronounced when bonus incentives are stronger and when promotions are more predictable. Our research highlights a hidden cost of promotion incentives and strategies organizations can use to mitigate this unintended negative effect for promotion pass over on high performers. Data Availability: The data used in this study are proprietary. Access to the data may be granted upon request, subject to the approval of the data providers and compliance with confidentiality agreements. JEL Classifications: M41.

ABSTRACT The recent influx of deals between accounting and private equity (PE) firms has raised concerns regarding potential implications for the attest profession. We interview 20 attest partners from PE-backed accounting firms, along with four experienced professionals, to examine how these partnerships affect the attest practice. Using Freidson’s (2001) theory of professional autonomy as a theoretical lens, we find that despite independence requirements mandating PE-backed firms separate from their attest function, firms largely retain a one-firm mentality. Moreover, although attest firms retain responsibility for audit execution, PE firms influence attests’ strategic priorities through ROI targets, increased strategic acquisitions, evolved compensation structures, and reevaluated client portfolios. These dynamics underscore a PE-driven shift toward commercialism, potentially eroding—although not eliminating—the attest profession’s professional ideals of public service. This stifling of professionalism raises ethical concerns about PE-driven commercialism amid the growing uncertainty raised by respondents around the future of PE-backed firms. Data Availability: Available upon request. JEL Classifications: M4; M40.