Increasing manufacturing flexibility is a key strategy for efficiently improving market responsiveness in the face of uncertain future product demand. Process flexibility results from being able to build different types of products in the same plant or production facility at the same time. In Part I of this paper, we develop several principles on the benefits of process flexibility. These principles are that 1) limited flexibility (i.e., each plant builds only a few products), configured in the right way, yields most of the benefits of total flexibility (i.e., each plant builds all products) and 2) limited flexibility has the greatest benefits when configured to chain products and plants together to the greatest extent possible. In Part II, we provide analytic support and justification for these principles. Based on a planning model for assigning production to plants, we demonstrate that, for realistic assumptions on demand uncertainty, limited flexibility configurations (i.e., how products are assigned to plants) have sales benefits that are approximately equivalent to those for total flexibility. Furthermore, from this analysis we develop a simple measure for the flexibility in a given product-plant configuration. Such a measure is desirable because of the complexity of computing expected sales for a given configuration. The measure is ∏(M*), the maximal probability over all groupings or sets of products (M) that there will be unfilled demand for a set of products while simultaneously there is excess capacity at plants building other products. This measure is easily computed and can be used to guide the search for good limited flexibility configurations.

This paper tests models of mutual fund market timing that allow the manager's payoff function to depend on returns in excess of a benchmark, and distinguish timing based on publicly available information from timing based on finer information. We simultaneously estimate parameters which describe the public information environment, the manager's risk aversion, and the precision of the fund's market-timing signal. Using a sample of more than 400 U.S. mutual funds for 1976–94, our findings suggest that mutual funds behave as highly risk averse, benchmark investors. Conditioning on public information improves the model specification. After controlling for the public information, we find no evidence that funds have significant market-timing ability.

This paper presents a series of simple but realistic examples in which common algebraic indexing conventions are not so convenient. In particular, it analyzes the difficulties caused by the conventions that each model component must have a fixed number of indices and that the order of the indices is significant to their meaning. To deal with these difficulties compensating extensions to algebraic notation are proposed. The proposed notation is compared to existing notation in terms of the human abilities to understand, maintain and verify model descriptions.

The first major experimental comparison of approval voting with regular plurality voting occurred in the 1985 annual election of The Institute of Management Sciences (TIMS). In approval voting a person votes for (approves of) as many candidates as desired, the winner being the candidate with the most votes. By permitting more votes than the number of positions to be filled, approval voting collects more information from the voter than does plurality voting. This can make a difference, for example, when three candidates compete for a single office. In such situations two candidates with wide but similar appeal sometimes split a majority constituency so that, under plurality voting, a minority candidate is elected. By contrast, approval voting is likely to identify the candidate who is most broadly acceptable to the electorate as a whole. In the TIMS experiment society members received an experimental approval ballot along with their official plurality ballot. Two contests involved three candidates running for a single office and a third, five candidates for two positions. Surprisingly, in two of the three contests, approval voting would have produced different winners and neither of the changes was of the type usually emphasized in the approval voting literature. The experiment demonstrated the practicality of approval voting and showed that it can elect a set of candidates different from that which plurality voting would. Direct comparison of ballots makes it possible to determine why the experimental switches occurred. It is shown that in each reversal the approval winner had broader support in the electorate than the plurality winner. The experiment also provided empirical data on how voters distribute approvals across candidates and indicated that, in this case, their behavior was roughly, but not exactly, consistent with theoretical analyses of voting efficacy.

The analysis of economic phenomena at the wholistic (aggregative) level 11l8intains a long tradition that assumes the neoclassical production function Q-f(K,L) (i.e., output as a function of capital and labor) satisfies the condition of constant returns to scale.The assumed absence of any (dis-)economies of scale renders the production function useless, when the scale effect is as pronounced as is typically found at the less aggregative levels of individual firm or industry analvsis.. .The purpose of this paper is to deduce new classes of production functions that are not limited to the constant returns to scale characteristic.Hore specifically, the scale effect is described by an arbitrary function of one of the factors of production, capital in this paper.This class of production functions exhibi-ts scale sensitivity with respect to capital (SSWK).The paper shows how different fmidlies of production functions can be derived from two basic .. building blocks," a :wage share function and a scale functitm.The Cobb-])ouglas, CES and VES production fmu:tions are special cases.~e Cobb-Douglas and CES functions can be expanded to incorporate non-constant returns to scale.A smnple of firms from Taiwan is used to test among various derived functional specifications.An interesting diversity of preferred specifications was found among three industries.

I introduce and study dynamic persuasion mechanisms. A principal privately observes the evolution of a stochastic process and sends messages over time to an agent. The agent takes actions in each period based on her beliefs about the state of the process and the principal wishes to influence the agent’s action. I characterize the optimal persuasion mechanism and show how to derive it in applications. I then consider the extension to multiple agents where higher-order beliefs matter. (JEL D82, D83)

This article provides direct empirical evidence on the relationship between technology and firms’ global sourcing strategies. Using new data on U.S. firms’ decisions to contract for manufacturing services from domestic or foreign suppliers, I show that a firm’s adoption of communication technology between 2002 and 2007 is associated with a 3.1 point increase in its probability of fragmentation. The effect of firm technology also differs significantly across industries; in 2007, it is 20% higher, relative to the mean, in industries with production specifications that are easier to codify in an electronic format. These patterns suggest that technology lowers coordination costs, though its effect is disproportionately higher for domestic rather than foreign sourcing. The larger impact on domestic fragmentation highlights its importance as an alternative to offshoring, and can be explained by complementarities between technology and worker skill. High technology firms and industries are more likely to source from high human capital countries, and the differential impact of technology across industries is strongly increasing in country human capital.

Abstract Analysis of daily reported incidents of major crimes in twelve U.S. cities reveals an increase in crime over the course of monthly welfare payment cycles. This increase reflects an increase in crimes that are likely to have a direct financial motivation as opposed to other kinds of crime. Temporal patterns in crime are observed in jurisdictions in which disbursements are focused at the beginning of monthly welfare payment cycles and not in jurisdictions in which disbursements are relatively more staggered. These findings indicate that welfare beneficiaries consume welfare-related income quickly and then attempt to supplement it with criminal income.