This paper introduces the concept of standard risk aversion. A von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function has standard risk aversion if any risk makes a small reduction in wealth more painful (in the sense of an increased reduction in expected utility) also makes any undesirable, independent risk more painful. It is shown that, given monotonicity and concavity, the combination of decreasing absolute risk aversion and decreasing absolute prudence is necessary and sufficient for standard risk aversion. Standard risk aversion is shown to imply not only Pratt and Zeckhauser's 'proper risk aversion" (individually undesirable, independent risks always being jointly undesirable) , but also that being forced to face an undesirable risk reduces the optimal investment in a risky security with and independent return. Similar results are established for the effect of broad class of increases in one risk on the desirability of (or optimal investment in) a second, independent risk.

This paper analyzes the effects of governeent debt and income taxes on consumption and saving in a world of infinitely-lived households having uncertain and heterogeneous incomes. The special structure of the model allows exact aggregation across households despite incomplete mmrkets. The effects of government debt are shown to be substantial, roughly comparable to those resulting from finite horizons, and crucially dependent on the length of time until the debt is repaid. Also, anticipated changes in taxes are shown to cause anticipated changes in consumption. Finally, an index of fiscal stance is derived.

Risk Preferences in the PSID: Individual Imputations and Family Covariation by Miles S. Kimball, Claudia R. Sahm and Matthew D. Shapiro. Published in volume 99, issue 2, pages 363-68 of American Economic Review, May 2009

This paper proposes foundations and a methodology for survey-based tracking of well-being. First, we develop a theory in which utility depends on "fundamental aspects" of well-being, measurable with surveys. Second, drawing from psychologists, philosophers, and economists, we compile a comprehensive list of such aspects. Third, we demonstrate our proposed method for estimating the aspects' relative marginal utilities-a necessary input for constructing an individual-level well-being index-by asking ~4,600 U.S. survey respondents to state their preference between pairs of aspect bundles. We estimate high relative marginal utilities for aspects related to family, health, security, values, freedom, happiness, and life satisfaction.

We survey 561 students from US medical schools shortly after they submit choice rankings over residencies to the National Resident Matching Program. We elicit (i) these choice rankings, (ii) anticipated subjective well-being (SWB) rankings, and (iii) expected features of the residencies (such as prestige). We find substantial differences between choice and anticipated-SWB rankings in the implied trade-offs between residency features. In our data, evaluative SWB measures (life satisfaction and Cantril's Ladder) imply trade-offs closer to choice than does affective happiness (even time-integrated), and as close as do multimeasure SWB indices. We discuss implications for using SWB data in applied work.

We propose a social choice rule for aggregating preferences elicited from surveys into a marginal adjustment of policy from the status quo. The mechanism is: (i) symmetric in its treatment of survey respondents; (ii) ordinal, using only the orientation of respondents' indifference surfaces; (iii) local, using only preferences in the neighborhood of current policy; and (iv) what we call “first-order strategy-proof,” making the gains from misreporting preferences second order. The mechanism could be applied to guide policy based on how policy affects responses to subjective well-being surveys.