Knowledge that Transforms

We study reputation formation where a long‐run player repeatedly observes private signals and takes actions. Short‐run players observe the long‐run player's past actions but not her past signals. The long‐run player can thus develop a reputation for playing a distribution over actions, but not necessarily for playing a particular mapping from signals to actions. Nonetheless, we show that the long‐run player can secure her Stackelberg payoff if distinct commitment types are statistically distinguishable and the Stackelberg strategy is confound‐defeating . This property holds if and only if the Stackelberg strategy is the unique solution to an optimal transport problem. If the long‐run player's payoff is supermodular in one‐dimensional signals and actions, she secures the Stackelberg payoff if and only if the Stackelberg strategy is monotone. Applications include deterrence, delegation, signaling, and persuasion. Our results extend to the case where distinct commitment types may be indistinguishable, but the Stackelberg type is salient under the prior.

Transparency versus opacity is an important dimension of college admission policy. Colleges may gain useful information from a holistic review of applicants' materials, but in doing so may contribute to uncertainty that discourages potential applicants with poor information. This paper investigates the impacts of admissions transparency in the context of Texas' Top Ten Percent Plan, using survey and administrative data from Texas and a model of college applications, admissions, enrollment, grades, and persistence. I estimate that two thirds of the plan's 9.1 point impact on top‐decile students' probability of attending a flagship university was due to information rather than mechanical effects. Students induced to enroll are more likely to come from low‐income high schools, and academically outperform the students that they displace. These effects would be larger if complemented by financial‐aid information, and are driven by transparency, not misalignment between the rules used for automatic and discretionary admissions.

This paper shows that product design shapes search frictions and that intermediaries leverage this channel to increase their rents in the context of the U.S. municipal bond market. The majority of bonds are designed via negotiation between a local government and its underwriter. They are then traded in a decentralized market, where the underwriter often also acts as an intermediary. Exploiting variations in state regulations that limit government officials' conflicts of interest, we provide evidence that the underwriter benefits from designing and trading complex bonds, which induces an increase in search frictions. Interestingly, a simpler bond may not necessarily benefit the government, as bond complexity affords flexibility in debt repayment. Motivated by these findings, we build and estimate a model of bond origination and trading to quantify the welfare implications of a policy mandating bond standardization.

We offer a theory of changing dimensions of political polarization based on endogenous social identity. We formalize voter identity as in Bonomi, Gennaioli, and Tabellini (2021), but add parties that compete on policy and spread stereotypes to persuade voters. Parties are historically connected to different social groups, whose members are more receptive to the party messages. An endogenous switch from class to cultural identity accounts for three major changes: (i) growing cultural conflict between voters and parties; (ii) dampening of redistributive conflict, despite rising inequality; (iii) a realignment of lower class voters from the left to the right. The incentive of parties to spread stereotypes is a key driver of identity‐based polarization. Using survey data and congressional speeches, we show that—consistent with our model—there is evidence of (i) and (ii) in the voting realignment induced by the “China Shock” (Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Majlesi (2020)).

A principal can restrict an agent's information (the persuasion problem) or discretion (the delegation problem). We study these two problems under standard single‐crossing assumptions on the agent's marginal utility. We show that these problems are equivalent on the set of monotone stochastic mechanisms, implying, in particular, the equivalence of deterministic delegation and monotone partitional persuasion. We also show that the monotonicity restriction is superfluous for linear persuasion and linear delegation, implying their equivalence on the set of all stochastic mechanisms. Finally, using tools from the persuasion literature, we characterize optimal delegation mechanisms, thereby generalizing and extending existing results in the delegation literature.

International audience

I investigate the link between access to the contraceptive pill, mental health, education, and labor market outcomes. Liberalizing education and labor market effects of access to the pill via its fertility control function are well established. More recently, however, a medical literature suggests a link between hormonal contraception and depression. Exploiting variation in access to the pill, I document substantial mental health effects of the pill. These mental health effects are driven by individuals with a genetic predisposition for depression who then do not experience the positive effects on education and labor market outcomes.

Domestic outsourcing has grown substantially in developed countries over the past two decades. This paper addresses the question of the technological drivers of this phenomenon by studying the impact of the staggered diffusion of broadband internet in France during the 2000s. Our results confirm that broadband technology increases firm productivity and the relative demand for high-skill workers. Further, we show that broadband internet led firms to outsource some non-core occupations to service contractors, both in the low and high-skill segments. In both cases, we find that employment related to these occupations became increasingly concentrated in firms specializing in these activities, and was less likely to be performed in-house within firms specialized in other activities. As a result, after the arrival of broadband internet, establishments become increasingly homogeneous in their occupational composition. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence that high-skill workers experience salary gains from being outsourced, while low-skill workers lose out.

Most studies on the labor market effects of immigration use repeated cross-sectional data to estimate the effects of immigration on regions. This paper shows that such regional effects are composites of effects that address fundamental questions in the immigration debate but remain unidentified with repeated cross-sectional data. We provide a unifying empirical framework that decomposes the regional effects of immigration into their underlying components and show how these are identifiable from data that track workers over time. Our empirical application illustrates that such analysis yields a far more informative picture of immigration's effects on wages, employment, and occupational upgrading.

Children’s and parents’ incomes are highly correlated, yet little is known about how early-career shocks contribute to this correlation. This paper focuses on a consequential labor market shock: job loss. We document three new results. First, adult children born into the bottom 20% of the income distribution have double the unemployment following job loss compared with those from the top 20% and 154% higher earnings losses. Second, this increases the rank-rank correlation 30% for those impacted. Third, richer parents provide career opportunities to their adult children after job loss, consistent with advantages from wealthy parents persisting well into adulthood.