Knowledge that Transforms

Short-term collateralized debt, private money, is efficient if agents are willing to lend without producing costly information about the collateral backing the debt. When the economy relies on such informationally insensitive debt, firms with low quality collateral can borrow, generating a credit boom and an increase in output. Financial fragility is endogenous; it builds up over time as information about counterparties decays. A crisis occurs when a ( possibly small) shock causes agents to suddenly have incentives to produce information, leading to a decline in output. A social planner would produce more information than private agents but would not always want to eliminate fragility.

Takahashi (2014) has uncovered coding errors in our paper, Chang and Kim (2007)—henceforth, CK. We acknowledge and are embarrassed by these mistakes. We are grateful to Takahashi for uncovering them. While the correction decreases the volatility of the labor market wedge, we find that the main message of CK remains valid: the measured labor market wedge arises endogenously in an economy with incomplete capital markets and indivisible labor supply. For example, our model accounts for 18 percent of the volatility in the labor market wedge in the data; it was 43 percent in CK.

This paper studies an optimal renegotiation protocol designed by a benevolent planner when two countries renegotiate with the same lender. The solution calls for recoveries that induce each country to default or repay, trading off the deadweight costs and the redistribution benefits of default independently of the other country. This outcome contrasts with a decentralized bargaining solution where default in one country increases the likelihood of default in the second country because recoveries are lower when both countries renegotiate. The paper suggests that policies geared at designing renegotiation processes that treat countries in isolation can prevent contagion of debt crises.

We propose a continuous time model to investigate the impact of inflation credibility on sovereign debt dynamics. At every point in time, an impatient government decides fiscal surplus and inflation, without commitment. Inflation is costly, but reduces the real value of outstanding nominal debt. In equilibrium, debt dynamics is the result of two opposing forces: (i) impatience and (ii) the desire to conquer low inflation. A large increase in inflation credibility can trigger a process of debt accumulation. This rationalizes the sovereign debt booms that are often experienced by low inflation credibility countries upon joining a currency union.

Elderly individuals exhibit wide disparities in their sources of income. For those in the bottom half of the income distribution, Social Security is the most important source of support; program changes would directly affect their well-being. Income from private pensions, assets, and earnings are relatively more important for higher-income elderly individuals, who have more diverse income sources. The trend from private sector defined benefit to defined contribution pension plans has shifted responsibility for retirement security to individuals. A significant subset of the population is unlikely to be able to sustain their standard of living in retirement without higher pre-retirement saving.

Large exporters are simultaneously large importers. We show that this pattern is key to understanding low aggregate exchange rate pass-through as well as the variation in pass-through across exporters. We develop a theoretical framework with variable markups and imported inputs, which predicts that firms with high import shares and high market shares have low exchange rate pass-through. We test and quantify the theoretical mechanism using Belgian firm-product-level data on imports and exports. Small nonimporting firms have nearly complete pass-through, while large import-intensive exporters have pass-through around 50 percent, with the marginal cost and markup channels contributing roughly equally.

Bauer, Rudebusch, and Wu (2014) advocate the use of bias-corrected estimates in their comment on Wright (2011). Econometric estimation of a macro-finance VAR provides quite imprecise estimates of future short-term interest rates. Nonetheless, comparison with survey responses indicates that the proposed bias-corrected point estimates are less plausible than their maximum-likelihood counterparts.

In Mexico, as in most Latin American countries with indigenous populations, it is commonly believed that European phenotypes are preferred to mestizo or indigenous phenotypes. However, it is hard to test for such racial biases in the labor market using official statistics since race can only be inferred from native language. The experiment consisted on sending fictitious curriculums responding to job advertisements with randomized information of the applicants. The resumes included photographs representing three distinct phenotypes: Caucasian, mestizo, and indigenous. We find that indigenous looking females are discriminated against, but the effect is not present for males.

We examine the evolution of real per capita GDP around 100 systemic banking crises. Part of the costs of these crises owes to the protracted nature of recovery. On average, it takes about 8 years to reach the pre-crisis level of income; the median is about 6.5 years. Five to six years after the onset of crisis, only Germany and the United States (out of 12 systemic cases) have reached their 2007-2008 peaks in real income. Forty-five percent of the episodes recorded double dips. Post-war business cycles are not the relevant comparator for the recent crises in advanced economies.

The mobile applications (apps) industry has exhibited rapid entry and growth in the midst of a recession. Using unique data from the iPhone application ecosystem, we examine how the development of 'killer apps' (apps appearing in the top grossing rank) varies by market and app characteristics. We find that previous app experience and no updating increase the likelihood of becoming a killer game app, while more updates increase the likelihood of becoming a non-game killer app. Development opportunities, level of competition, and demand preferences are possible drivers of the opposing innovation process results in game and non-game markets.