Velocity Changes and the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy, 1951-57
T1~HIS paper will analyze changes in income velocity from I95I through I957. Velocity changes are, of course, the composite of the various leakages to monetary policy, perhaps best interpreted, in Keynesian terms, as a shift of money from inactive to active balances (dishoarding). Indeed, it could be argued that the large increases in interest rates during the tight money policy of I955-57 served as the incentive to bring into play alternate sources of credit sources which were not directly subject to control by the Federal Reserve. The attempt to cut off the peak via general monetary controls did not prove effective. Under the circumstances, a re-evaluation of indirect controls may be in order. The usual arguments in support of general monetary controls turn on the supposed impersonality of such controls and their compatibility with the principles of democracy and free enterprise. General monetary controls may be defined as those which affect the environment within which individual decisions are made without consciously singling out any particular individual; the impact on individuals depending on the states of individual asset preferences or the changes induced in such preferences by changes in the intensity of general controls. The definition, of course, does not exclude the likely probability that the impact of a change in general controls will be unequal in its effects on different individuals, particularly when differences in individual market power exist. That is, as long as either (i) market power is unequally distributed, or (ii) asset preferences differ, general controls will be selective in their impact. It can be argued, further, that the patterns of asset preferences are not independent of the power constellations in the economy. And if the effects of general controls are not randomly distributed, they must follow the existing channels of power, with the consequence that the power differences are further reinforced. There is no such thing as a neutral monetary policy. An additional point concerns the dilemma of the general controls approach. Monetary policy, by design, does not intervene selectively in particular markets or sectors of the economy. The Central Bank does not have the power, in other words, to encourage expansion in depressed sectors and restrain other sectors or markets where expansion would result in economic disharmonies.' If an excessive rate of growth in one or more sectors of the economy introduces distortions which threaten the stability of the whole, indirect controls, in their general approach, are faced with a dilemma. Either they permit the disequilibrating expansion to continue, or general restraints are introduced which affect other sectors of the economy as well. If these other sectors were initially in a depressed condition, their situation worsens. If, on the other hand, they were expanding at a reasonable rate, they should have been left alone. In either case the results are not conducive to stability. And if general controls have only a minimal effect on the unduly expanding sectors because of their over-riding profit expectations, the net result is worse than if nothing at all had been done. It may be that if monetary policy is to be made an effective instrument for economic stability and growth, direct and purposefully selective financial controls are needed. This, however, is beyond the immediate scope of this paper.