I. FOUNDATIONS. 1. Introduction and Overview. 2. The Financial Environment: Concepts and Principles. 3. Accounting, Cash Flows, and Taxes. II. VALUE AND CAPITAL BUDGETING. 4. The Time Value of Money. 5. Valuing Bonds and Stocks. 6. Business Investment Rules. 7. Capital Budgeting Cash Flows. 8. Capital Budgeting in Practice. III. RISK AND RETURN. 9. Risk and Return: Stocks. 10. Risk and Return: Asset Pricing Models. 11. Risk, Return, and Capital Budgeting. 12. Risk, Return, and Contingent Outcomes. 13. Risk, Return, and Agency Theory. IV. CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND DIVIDEND POLICY. 14. Capital Market Efficiency: Explanation & Implications. 15. Capital Structure Policy. 16. Managing Capital Structure. 17. Dividend Policy. V. LONG-TERM FINANCING. 18. Issuing Securities and the Role of Investment Banking. 19. Long-Term Debt. 20. Leasing and Other Asset-Based Financing. 21. Derivatives and Hedging. VI. WORKING CAPITAL MANAGEMENT. 22. Cash and Working Capital Management. 23. Accounts Receivable and Inventory. 24. Financial Planning. VII. SPECIAL TOPICS. 25. Mergers and Acquisitions. 26. Financial Distress. 27. International Corporate Finance.

This article examines incentives for adopting antitakeover charter amendments (ATAs) that are associated with compensation contracts. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that antitakeover measures such as ATAs help managers protect above‐market levels of compensation. Chief executive officers (CEOs) of firms that adopt ATAs receive higher salaries and more valuable option grants than CEOs at similar firms that do not adopt them. Furthermore, the magnitude of this difference increases following ATA adoption. The evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that ATAs facilitate the writing of efficient compensation contracts.

This article examines incentives for adopting antitakeover charter amendments (ATAs) that are associated with compensation contracts. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that antitakeover measures such as ATAs help managers protect above-market levels of compensation. Chief executive officers (CEOs) of firms that adopt ATAs receive higher salaries and more valuable option grants than CEOs at similar firms that do not adopt them. Furthermore, the magnitude of this difference increases following ATA adoption. The evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that ATAs facilitate the writing of efficient compensation contracts.

Applying Fishburn's [4] conditions for convex stochastic dominance, exact linear programming algorithms are proposed and implemented for assigning discrete return distributions into the first‐ and second‐order stochastic dominance optimal sets. For third‐order stochastic dominance, a superconvex stochastic dominance approach is defined which allows classification of choice elements into superdominated, mixed, and superoptimal sets. For a choice set of 896 security returns treated previously in the literature, 454, 25, and 13 distributions are in the first‐, second‐, and third‐order convex stochastic dominance optimal sets, respectively. These optimal sets compare with admissible first‐, second‐, and third‐order stochastic dominance sets of 682, 35, and 19 distributions, respectively. The applicability of superconvex stochastic dominance for continuous distributions defined over a bounded interval is then shown. The difficulties in identifying the elements of the superdominated set for distributions defined over the entire real line are demonstrated in the determination of the dominated choices for a set of normally distributed mutual fund returns previously examined by Meyer [9]. Specifically, we find that the dominated set determined by Meyer is too large.

We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other. We define the concept of ex ante vote-trading equilibrium and show by construction that an equilibrium exists. The equilibrium we characterize always results in dictatorship if there is any trade, and the market for votes generates welfare losses, relative to simple majority voting, if the committee is large enough or the distribution of values is not very skewed. We test the theoretical implications in the laboratory using a continuous open-book multiunit double auction.

This paper presents a new model of political competition in which candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party to the allocation of resources. In doing so, the model provides a unified explanation of two prominent features of public resource allocations: the persistence of (possibly inefficient) policies and the tendency of public spending to favor incumbent party strongholds over swing constituencies.

This paper examines the EPA's decision to cancel or continue the registrations of cancer-causing pesticides that went through the special review process between 1975 and 1989. Despite claims to the contrary, our analysis indicates that the EPA indeed balanced risks against benefits in regulating pesticides: Risks to human health or the environment increased the likelihood that a particular pesticide use was canceled by the EPA; at the same time, the larger the benefits associated with a particular use, the lower was the likelihood of cancellation. Intervention by special-interest groups was also important in the regulatory process. Comments by grower organizations significantly reduced the probability of cancellation, whereas comments by environmental advocacy groups increased the probability of cancellation. Our analysis suggests that the EPA is fully capable of weighing benefits and costs when regulating environmental hazards; however, the implicit value placed on health risks--$35 million per applicator cancer case avoided--may be considered high by some persons.

We show that kidney exchange markets suffer from market failures whose remedy could increase transplants by 30 to 63 percent. First, we document that the market is fragmented and inefficient; most transplants are arranged by hospitals instead of national platforms. Second, we propose a model to show two sources of inefficiency: hospitals only partly internalize their patients’ benefits from exchange, and current platforms suboptimally reward hospitals for submitting patients and donors. Third, we calibrate a production function and show that individual hospitals operate below efficient scale. Eliminating this inefficiency requires either a mandate or a combination of new mechanisms and reimbursement reforms.