The Effect of Migration on Wages: Evidence from a Natural Experiment by Dakshina G. De Silva, Robert P. McComb, Young-Kyu Moh, Anita R. Schiller and Andres J. Vargas. Published in volume 100, issue 2, pages 321-26 of American Economic Review, May 2010

Principal-agent relationships are typically assumed to be motivated by efficiency gains from comparative advantage. However, principals may also delegate tasks to avoid taking direct responsibility for selfish or unethical behavior. We report three laboratory experiments in which principals repeatedly either decide how much money to share with a recipient or hire agents to make sharing decisions on their behalf. Across several experimental treatments, recipients receive significantly less, and in many cases close to nothing, when allocation decisions are made by agents.

Information Aggregation and Strategic Abstention in Large Laboratory Elections by Marco Battaglini, Rebecca B. Morton and Thomas R. Palfrey. Published in volume 98, issue 2, pages 194-200 of American Economic Review, May 2008

Social Capital and Contributions in a Public-Goods Experiment by Lisa R. Anderson, Jennifer M. Mellor and Jeffrey Milyo. Published in volume 94, issue 2, pages 373-376 of American Economic Review, May 2004

New Evidence on the Money's Worth of Individual Annuities by Olivia S. Mitchell, James M. Poterba, Mark J. Warshawsky and Jeffrey R. Brown. Published in volume 89, issue 5, pages 1299-1318 of American Economic Review, December 1999

We study the effect of subjective mortality beliefs on life‐cycle behavior. With new survey evidence, we document that survival is underestimated (overestimated) by the young (old). We calibrate a canonical life‐cycle model to elicited beliefs. Relative to calibrations using actuarial probabilities, the young undersave by 26%, and retirees draw down their assets 27% slower, while the model's fit to consumption data improves by 88%. Cross‐sectional regressions support the model's predictions: Distorted mortality beliefs correlate with savings behavior while controlling for risk preferences, cognitive, and socioeconomic factors. Overweighting the likelihood of rare events contributes to mortality belief distortions.

Firms’ inability to commit to future funding choices has profound consequences for capital structure dynamics. With debt in place, shareholders pervasively resist leverage reductions no matter how much such reductions may enhance firm value. Shareholders would instead choose to increase leverage even if the new debt is junior and would reduce firm value. These asymmetric forces in leverage adjustments, which we call the leverage ratchet effect, cause equilibrium leverage outcomes to be history-dependent. If forced to reduce leverage, shareholders are biased toward selling assets relative to potentially more efficient alternatives such as pure recapitalizations.

This paper establishes a causal relation between an individual's decision whether to own stocks and average stock market participation of the individual's community. We instrument for the average ownership of an individual's community with lagged average ownership of the states in which one's nonnative neighbors were born. Combining this instrumental variables approach with controls for individual and community fixed effects, a broad set of time‐varying individual and community controls, and state‐year effects rules out alternative explanations. To further establish that word‐of‐mouth communication drives this causal effect, we show that the results are stronger in more sociable communities.

While current audit standards explicitly state engagement partner tenure requirements, firms have flexibility in managing the rotation process. We conduct semi-structured interviews with 20 U.S. audit firm partners who share their experiences on topics including how they identify appropriate candidate partners and what efforts they undertake to manage relationships with clients post-rotation. We investigate firms' motivation to manage the auditor-client relationship through the lens of Social Exchange Theory (SET), and we consider how likely outcomes of this rotation process map onto regulators' intent that a newly rotated partner provides a fresh perspective to the audit. Our study informs regulators and investors about the process by which engagement partners are selected for rotation, documenting that partner assignment is typically not random. Further, our finding that partner rotation is an extended process (rather than a single discrete event) has implications for audit researchers investigating the effects of partner rotation.