A new wave of bank privatizations in the past decade has significantly changed the ownership structure of banking systems around the world. This paper explores how these changes affect the allocation of capital within countries. Increases in domestic blockholder ownership of banks adversely affect the allocation of capital through increased lending activity to less productive industries and to those with less dependence on external finance. This result is more pronounced in countries with higher levels of corruption. I find some evidence that foreign presence improves capital allocation efficiency by increasing lending to more productive industries, primarily in common law countries.

[Some argue too-big-to-fail (TBTF) status increases the value of the largest banks. In contrast, we find that the value of the largest banks is negatively related to asset size in normal times, but much less so during the crisis. Further, shareholders lose when large banks cross a TBTF threshold through acquisitions. The negative relation between bank value and bank size for the largest banks cannot be explained by differences in ROA, ROE, equity volatility, tail risk, distress risk, or equity discount rates, but it can be partly explained by the market’s discounting of trading activities.]

We find that heightened cross-border bank flows are associated with lower systemic risk in a target country’s banking system. The reductions in systemic risk are stronger for flows coming from source countries with stronger regulatory oversight than the target country. Such cross-border bank flows linked to regulatory arbitrage are also associated with improvements in target banking sector profitability, asset quality, and efficiency. We assess several alternative channels of influence for cross-border bank flows but interpret the evidence on these flows as mostly consistent with a benign form of regulatory arbitrage.

We examine the valuation impact of an employee-friendly (EF) culture. Using a sample of 3446 firms from 43 countries for the period 2003 to 2014, we show that firms with a more EF culture are valued higher and perform better (ROA, ROE). Consistent with the good governance view, the impact is stronger for firms in countries with better investor protection and for firms with better governance and lower agency costs. We further document a positive valuation associated with the enactment of laws aimed at improving parental leave policies. The impact on valuation stems from improved technical efficiency. Using various approaches, our results suggest that the impact of an EF culture on firm value is causal.

ABSTRACT We study how differences in bank regulation influence cross‐border bank acquisition flows and share price reactions to cross‐border deal announcements. Using a sample of 7,297 domestic and 916 majority cross‐border deals announced between 1995 and 2012, we find evidence of a form of “regulatory arbitrage” whereby acquisition flows involve acquirers from countries with stronger regulations than their targets. Target and aggregate abnormal returns around deal announcements are positive and larger when acquirers come from more restrictive bank regulatory environments. We interpret this evidence as more consistent with a benign form of regulatory arbitrage than a potentially destructive one.

ABSTRACT We examine whether and how an exogenous shock to the information environment changes insiders’ ability to learn from outsiders. We document three main findings. First, we find an increase in investment‐to‐price sensitivity following the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Second, we show that the relation between the market reaction to M&A deal announcements and the likelihood of deal completion becomes stronger after IFRS adoption. Third, we find significant improvements in post‐acquisition operating and stock return performance post‐IFRS adoption. These results are more pronounced for firms that experienced significant increases in foreign institutional ownership around IFRS adoption, especially when these foreign investors are from countries that matter for the firm’s growth opportunities. Taken together, our findings suggest that insiders’ ability to learn from outsiders improves post‐IFRS, and this improved ability to learn from outsiders leads to real economic gains.

We examine the impact of the enactment of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) and the Prospectus Directive (PD) across 18 EU countries on seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Using a difference-in-differences methodology, we document a significant reduction in earnings management, improved post-SEO stock return performance, and a decline in the adverse reaction to SEO announcements following the enactment of MAD. We find similar, albeit weaker, results post-PD. The impact is stronger in countries with high ex-ante institutional quality. Our results suggest that the enactment of these directives leads to improvements in information quality, which reduces information asymmetry around SEOs.

We assess the effects of board gender quota laws using a sample of banks from 39 countries. We document an increase in both stand-alone and systemic risk post-quota among banks that did not meet the quota pre-reform; the effect is stronger for banks in countries with a smaller pool of women in finance and low gender equality. We find that the propagation of poor governance practices by overlapping female directors and deterioration in the information environment post quota are likely channels driving the results. The evidence is consistent with some banks “gaming” the reform by strategically appointing insiders, which weakens the board's monitoring function. Our results have policy implications and suggest that supply-side factors are key determinants of the outcome of mandated quotas.

We examine the impact of corporate board reforms on firm value in 41 countries. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that board reforms increase firm value. Reforms involving board and audit committee independence, but not reforms involving separation of chairman and chief executive officer positions, drive the valuation increases. In addition, while comply-or-explain reforms result in a greater increase in firm value than rule-based reforms, the effects of reforms are similar across civil law and common law countries. Further investigation shows that the subsequent change in board independence plays an important role in explaining the effectiveness of the reforms.