This paper investigates whether shareholder lockup agreements in France and Germany mitigate problems of agency and asymmetric information. Despite minimum requirements in terms of the length and percentage of shares locked up, lockup agreements are not only highly diverse across firms but also across the different shareholders of a single firm as most firms have different agreements in place for executives, non-executives and venture capitalists. The diversity across firms and types of shareholders can be explained by firm characteristics—such as the level of uncertainty—as well as the type and importance of each shareholder within the firm.

We investigate loan price in mergers and acquisitions (M&As), using hand-matched loan information for a sample of 512 U.S. M&A transactions. We find the relative size of a deal constitutes a prominent determinant of the loan price measured by the all-in spread drawn (AISD). This result is robust to several specifications that address endogeneity concerns. Cross-sectional analyses show that aggravated credit risk and information uncertainty after M&A go some way towards explaining lenders' concerns over large relative deal size. Further analysis demonstrates higher AISD is associated with lower post-transaction performance, indicating loan price factors in the risk of poor post-transaction performance correctly.

We examine the use of warrants as a part of underwriter compensation in IPOs listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the London Stock Exchange. Our results show that, though warrant-issuing IPO firms are riskier, they are usually underwritten by reputable underwriters. Firms that are cash constrained at the time of their IPO are more likely to use warrants. Both market volatility and hot issue markets increase the likelihood of firms issuing warrants. We also find that warrant issuers are able to minimise their total costs of going public, even under a very light regulatory setting with regards non-cash compensation. They incur actual costs of 29.1%, but would have incurred greater costs of 33.8% had they not issued warrants to their underwriters. Overall, our results support the cost minimisation explanation of the use of warrants by UK IPO firms.

We show that public suppliers extend more trade credit than their private counterparts. The impact of stock market listing on accounts receivable is more pronounced among firms that are financially more constrained or more reliant on external finance. Moreover, firms significantly increase their trade credit provision following equity issuances in stock exchanges. These results are consistent with the argument that stock market listing status improves firms' access to external sources of financing, especially equity capital, thus enhancing their ability to offer more trade credit to customers.

Can companies reduce the volatility and increase the liquidity of their stocks by trading them? In the context of the Italian stock market, where companies have far more leeway to sell as well as buy their own stocks than in the U.S., the answer is yes. We examine the effects of trading (open-market share repurchases and treasury shares sales) on liquidity (bid–ask spread) and volatility (return variance). Further, we examine the impact of shareholder approvals of repurchase programs on liquidity and volatility. We find clear evidence that trading increases liquidity and reduces volatility. These results are consistent with our analysis of the motives Italian companies give for making share repurchases.

We compare and contrast the performance of cross-border and domestic venture capital (VC) investments in terms of the time it takes VC backers to exit portfolio companies through initial public offering (IPO), trade sale (M&A), or other routes. Initial analysis suggests that cross-border investments are exited more quickly than domestic investments, and this difference is driven by the cross-border investments in North America. We explore whether the difference between domestic and cross-border exits can be explained by regional variations in economic/market activity and legal systems. We find it is important to allow for the impact of these macro variables on the time to VC exit to vary across regions. This is crucial not just to capture the full impact of the macro factors, but also to explain the differences in time to exit between domestic and cross-border investments.

We examine the determinants of an IPO firm's decision to trade on a when-issued market and find that better quality firms are more likely to trade on this market. Our ‘what-if’ analysis shows that for companies that choose to have when-issued trading, the actual offer price is almost 26% higher than it would have been had these firms chosen not to trade on this market. We interpret this higher offer price as a ‘rent’ that investors pay to acquire shares of such companies. We also show that the informational accuracy of the UK when-issued market is better than that of continental European when-issued markets.

We study how investors respond to ‘superficial’ mutual-fund name changes that occur for no fundamental reasons. We find that such name changes remain widespread even after regulation to curb potentially misleading name changes (SEC Rule 35d-1). Superficial changes are more widespread than previously studied ‘misleading’ changes that are not accompanied by corresponding portfolio adjustments reflecting the investment style suggested by the new name. Superficial changes appear to be driven by managerial incentives. Investors react to superficial changes with increased fund flows but appear to gain no benefit through improved performance or lower fees. On the contrary, name-change funds underperform as a group. Our findings highlight inefficiencies in the mutual-fund market and hold important implications for the stakeholders involved.

We use India's unique regulatory design to test sentiment-based models of IPO initial returns. Using a sample of 362 Indian offerings from 2003 to 2014, we find that the traditional measure of IPO underpricing averages 23%. We decompose the traditional underpricing measure into two components: one related to voluntary underpricing by the underwriter and the other component related to the IPO's first-day trading activity. We find minimal levels of voluntary underpricing. However, initial returns on the first day average 14% and are primarily driven by the unmet demand of non-institutional investor groups. Overall, our results support sentiment-based models of IPO initial returns.

This paper examines differences in the use of trade credit by publicly listed firms and their privately held counterparts. We show that public firms maintain a significantly lower level of trade credit than private firms. This finding is consistent with the argument that public firms rely less on supplier financing because of their greater access to cheaper and less risky sources of external capital. We further find that while public and private firms actively seek to adjust toward their optimal trade credit levels, the former firms experience faster adjustment. The recent financial crisis had differential effects on the trade credit ratios of public and private firms.