In this article we investigate the disincentive effects of shortening the potential duration of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. We identify these disincentive effects by exploiting changes in Slovenia’s unemployment insurance system—a “natural experiment” that involved substantial reductions in the potential duration of benefits for four groups of workers plus no change in benefits for another group (which served as a natural control). We find that the change had a positive effect on the exit rate from unemployment—to new jobs and other options—for unemployment spells of various lengths and for several categories of unemployed workers.

We develop a model for the use of stock options in compensation agreements based on a financing explanation. Our model is consistent with the extensive use of options for non-executive employees. Simulation results from our model show an optimal use of options of about 9.3% of total compensation for a non-executive employee with a compensation of US$50,000. Finding an optimal level of options as part of compensation in this context requires a balancing of two opposing factors—the benefit of a lower capital issuance cost versus a higher compensation cost as a result of the discount that an employee places on options because of an undiversified position.

The existence of counteroffers can lead to a variety of important labor‐market features. This article develops a model of the selective use of counteroffers in which a firm decides whether to extend counteroffers after a worker informs the firm of an alternative offer. We outline factors that can influence the employer’s net value of making a counteroffer and, thus, affect the likelihood of a counteroffer. We provide a new empirical analysis that examines whether proxies for these factors do, in fact, influence the likelihood that a firm would consider a counteroffer to an employee with a competing offer.

We study a sample of 178 firms that changed from a one-share one-vote into a dual-class common stock structure during 1979–1998. We find that dual-class recapitalizations are shareholder value enhancing corporate initiatives. Using accounting data, Lehn et al. (1990) [Lehn, K., Netter, J., Poulsen, A., 1990. Consolidating corporate control: dual-class recapitalizations versus leveraged buyouts. Journal of Financial Economics 27, 557–580] provide evidence that dual-class recapitalizing firms grow faster than firms in a control group and undertake secondary equity offerings (SEOs) to finance growth. We show that growth is indeed beneficial to the shareholders. The stockholders, on average, earn significant positive abnormal returns of 23.11% in a period of 4 years following the announcement month. Furthermore, abnormal returns are even larger (52.61%) for the dual-class firms that issue equity. This evidence is especially supportive of the value enhancing hypothesis as it is contrary to the prevailing result that SEOs are generally followed by large negative returns. We do not find any evidence of managerial entrenchment.

Following George Stigler (1964), many economists assume that incentive problems undermine attempts b firms to collude to raise prices and restrict output. But the potential profits from collusion can create a powerful incentive as well. Theory cannot tell us, a priori, which effect will dominate: whether or when cartels succeed is thus an empirical question. We examine a wide variety of empirical studies of cartels to answer the following questions: (1) Can cartels succeed? (2) If so, for how long? (3) What impact do cartels have? (4) What causes cartels to break up? We conclude that many cartels do survive, and that the distribution of duration is bimodal. While the average duration of cartels across a range of studies is about five years, many cartels break up very quickly (i.e., in less than a year). But there are many others that last between five and ten years, and some that last decades. Limited evidence suggests that cartels are able to increase prices and profits, to varying degrees. Cartels can also affect other non-price variables, including advertising, innovation, investment, barriers to entry, and concentration. Cartels break up occasionally because of cheating or lack of effective monitoring, but the biggest challenges cartels face are entry and adjustment of the collusive agreement in response to changing economic conditions. Cartels that develop organizational structures that allow them the flexibility to respond to these changing conditions are more likely to survive. Price wars that erupt are often the result of bargaining issues that arise in such circumstances. Sophisticated cartel organizations are also able to develop multipronged strategies to monitor one another to deter cheating and a variety of interventions to increase barriers to entry.

I worked as a consultant in the Financial Stability Department (FSD) of the Bank of England for several years (2002–2004). In this paper I reflect on issues relating to the work of such an FSD, starting with the difficulty of defining or measuring ‘financial stability’. Stress tests are commonly used, but, for an FSD, should relate to the system as a whole, not just to individual institutions. FSDs need to assess the probability, virulence and speed of occurrence of potential shocks. There is a need to develop appropriate analytical models. The focus on capital adequacy has diverted attention from concern about having sufficient liquidity.

Since the seminal work of Krugman, product variety has played a central role in models of trade and growth. In spite ofthe general use oflove-of-variety models, there has been no systematic study of how the import of new varieties has contributed to national welfare gains in the United States. In this paper we show that the unmeasured growth in product variety from U. S. imports has been an important source of gains from trade over the last three decades (1972–2001). Using extremely disaggregated data, we show that the number of imported product varieties has increased by a factor of three. We also estimate the elasticities of substitution for each available category at the same level of aggregation, and describe their behavior across time and SITC industries. Using these estimates, we develop an exact aggregate price index and find that the upward bias in the conventional import price index over this time period was 28 percent or 1.2 percentage points per year. We estimate the value to U. S. consumers of the expanded import varieties between 1972 and 2001 to be 2.6 percent of GDP.

Using a unique sample, we attempt to identify the consequence of the separation between inside ownership and control for firm performance. We exploit the fact that banking institutions may hold their own shares in trust to construct a clean measure of the wedge between inside voting control and cash flow rights. These shares provide managers with no monetary incentives, since their dividends accrue to trust beneficiaries. However, managers may have the authority to vote these shares. Contrary to the belief that managerial control is purely detrimental, we find that it has positive effects on performance over at least some range.

This paper analyzes endogenous variations in aggregate liquidity that arise in standard representative-agent endowment economies. I introduce a natural definition of liquidity, essentially a shadow elasticity, that characterizes the price impact function or bid/ask spread that a small trader would experience. I compute this quantity for some tractable examples and uncover a rich variety of predictions that, in some cases, appear consistent with levels and covariations observed in the data. The results have important implications for the pricing and hedging of liquidity risk.

This note revisits the identification theorems of Brown (1983) and Roehrig (1988). We describe an error in the proofs of the main identification theorems in these papers, and provide an important counterexample to the theorems on the identification of the reduced form. Specifically, the reduced form of a nonseparable simultaneous equations model is not identified even under the assumptions of these papers. We provide conditions under which the reduced form is identified and is recoverable using the distribution of the endogenous variables conditional on the exogenous variables. However, these conditions place substantial limitations on the structural model. We conclude the note with a conjecture that it may be possible to use classical exclusion restrictions to recover some of the key implications of the theorems in more general settings.