Using 2000 Census data, we describe the relationship between women’s education and marriage outcomes. Women’s education is strongly related to husband's income and marital status. This relationship is highly nonlinear and varies across the distribution of husband's earnings. Roughly half of the correlation between women’s education and consumption operates through the marriage market. Using 1980 Census data and the quarter of birth instruments proposed by Angrist and Krueger, we find that women's education may have a positive causal effect on husband's earnings, though not on probability of marriage.

We examine how well principals can distinguish between more and less effective teachers. To put principal evaluations in context, we compare them with the traditional determinants of teacher compensation—education and experience—as well as value‐added measures of teacher effectiveness based on student achievement gains. We present “out‐of‐sample” predictions that mitigate concerns that the teacher quality and student achievement measures are determined simultaneously. We find that principals can generally identify teachers who produce the largest and smallest standardized achievement gains but have far less ability to distinguish between teachers in the middle of this distribution.

As standards and accountability have become increasingly prominent features of the educational landscape, educators have relied more on remedial programs such as summer school and grade retention to help low-achieving students meet minimum academic standards. Yet the evidence on the effectiveness of such programs is mixed, and prior research suffers from selection bias. However, recent school reform efforts in Chicago provide an opportunity to examine the causal impact of these remedial education programs. In 1996, the Chicago Public Schools instituted an accountability policy that tied summer school and promotional decisions to performance on standardized tests, which resulted in a highly nonlinear relationship between current achievement and the probability of attending summer school or being retained. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that the net effect of these programs was to substantially increase academic achievement among third-graders, but not sixth-graders. In addition, contrary to conventional wisdom and prior research, we find that retention increases achievement for third-grade students and has little effect on math achievement for sixth-grade students.

We introduce a test of the rank invariance or rank similarity assumption common in treatment effects and instrumental variables models. The test probes the implication that the conditional distribution of ranks should be identical across treatment states using a regression-based test statistic. We apply the test to data from the Tennessee STAR class-size reduction experiment and show that systematic slippages in rank can be important statistically and economically.

This paper examines the short-term effect of school on juvenile crime. To do so, we bring together daily measures of criminal activity and detailed school calendar information from 29 jurisdictions across the country, and utilize the plausibly exogenous variation generated by teacher in-service days. We find that the level of property crime committed by juveniles decreases by 14 percent on days when school is in session, but the level of violent crime increases by 28 percent on such days. Our findings suggest that both incapacitation and concentration influence juvenile crime.

We construct a simple model, consistent with Becker and Tomes, that decomposes the intergenerational income elasticity into the causal effect of financial resources, the mechanistic transmission of human capital, and the role that human capital plays in the determination of fathers’ permanent incomes. We show how a particular set of instrumental variables could separately identify the money and human capital transmission effects. Using data from a 35 percent sample of Swedish sons and their fathers, we show that only a minority of the intergenerational income elasticity can be plausibly attributed to the causal effect of fathers’ financial resources.

We propose a nonparametric test for the exclusion and monotonicity assumptions invoked in instrumental variable (IV) designs based on the random assignment of cases to judges. We show its asymptotic validity and demonstrate its finite-sample performance in simulations. We apply our test in an empirical setting from the literature examining the effects of pretrial detention on defendant outcomes in New York. When the assumptions are not satisfied, we propose weaker versions of the usual exclusion and monotonicity restrictions under which the IV estimator still converges to a proper weighted average of treatment effects. (JEL H76, K41)