The influence of external institutional environments on the internal functioning of business groups remains a critical yet underexplored area of research. In this paper, we focus on China's pro-market judicial reforms and examine how these reforms affect internal product and service transactions within business groups, finding that such reforms significantly reduce intra-group transactions. We further demonstrate that this decline reflects a strategic substitution toward external market transactions rather than an overall contraction in firm operations, and that the effect is not driven by managerial self-dealing but aligns with institutional voids theory. The effect is particularly pronounced in regions with underdeveloped product markets and weaker informal institutions, and in firms with lower reputations and stronger political connections. Moreover, our results hold consistently across various transaction types, whether seller- or buyer-initiated, service- or goods-related, and remain robust across alternative regression models, explanations, and regardless of the geographic proximity of group firms. These findings contribute to understanding the role of internal transactions within business groups in addressing institutional voids and add to the broader literature on how business groups emerge and adapt in response to gaps in institutional frameworks.

Abstract We find a robust negative relation between skewness/lottery-like features, proxied by maximum return (MAX) over the last month, and future returns for stocks preferred by individual investors. This negative relation is nonexistent for the rest of stocks. We identify stocks preferred by individual investors through bundling ten stock characteristics associated with their stock preferences. The negative relation between MAX and future return is produced by the stocks preferred by individuals that account for less than 5% of the overall market capitalization. Our results are robust to alternative definitions of MAX and lottery-like features such as total, idiosyncratic, and expected skewness.

We propose a new notion of credibility for Bayesian persuasion problems. A disclosure policy is credible if the sender cannot profit from tampering with her messages while keeping the message distribution unchanged. We show that the credibility of a disclosure policy is equivalent to a cyclical monotonicity condition on the policy’s induced distribution over states and actions. We also characterize how credibility restricts the sender’s ability to persuade under different payoff structures. In particular, when the sender’s payoff is state independent, all disclosure policies are credible. We apply our results to the market for lemons and show that no useful information can be credibly disclosed by the seller.

Abstract Using a unique proprietary account-level trading dataset in China, we investigate how active information acquisition alleviates price-based return comovement, a typical anomaly in stock splits. We find that: 1) individual trading drives the comovement and the trading correlation between split stocks and the low-price portfolio increases significantly after splits; 2) individuals can learn the firm fundamentals through information acquisition, which effectively alleviates their categorized bias; and 3) the role of information acquisition is more significant in environments characterized by greater uncertainty. Our results are robust to different specifications and alternative measures. Taken together, this paper emphasizes the important role of information acquisition in alleviating behavioral bias and improving decision-making.

Using the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) as a laboratory, this paper examines the impacts of bank bailouts on bank-dependent clients. We find that large TARP recipient banks reduce credit supply to dependent borrowers in the post-TARP period. A large fraction of credit supply reduction is due to regulatory uncertainty on account of an increased likelihood of fines. Liquidity hoarding by TARP banks also drives part of the reduction in credit supply. Relationship borrowers experience a valuation loss around the announcements of their main banks’ TARP approvals consistent with a credit supply reduction.

Using a large sample of block acquisitions, this paper examines the governance role of customers that acquire block ownership in supplier shares. We find that compared to targets acquired by noncustomers, those acquired by customers experience higher abnormal announcement returns, larger increases in post-acquisition long-term operating performance, and higher non-routine turnover of poorly performing CEOs. These results are evident when target managerial agency problems are highly detrimental to the supplier–customer relationship. The results support the view that customers’ nonfinancial claims in targets provide customers strong incentives to monitor target managers above and beyond previously documented monitoring by large shareholders.

We investigate housing market distortions with the collusion of agents. The agency problem where agents sell clients' houses with price discounts while selling their own homes with price premiums is quite straightforward. However, the issue that agents collude with each other to further maximize their own interests is elusive. When agents collude, the resulting market distortions may even be worse than previous studies suggested. Indeed, this paper finds that the agency problem and market distortions are much more severe with agent collusion, as both the discounts associated with clients' houses and the premiums with agents' own homes become much larger when the two agents collude.

Using a sample of bank loan announcements in Japan, we examine whether or not banks have incentives to engage in suboptimal lending that results in wealth transfer from the banks to the borrowing firms. We find that abnormal returns for borrowing firms are significantly positive, but those for lending banks are sometimes significantly negative. Furthermore, the announcement returns for borrowing firms are negatively related to those for lending banks, especially when poorly performing firms borrow from financially healthy (low-risk) banks. Our results suggest that the positive valuation effect of bank loan announcements for borrowing firms is mainly due to a wealth transfer from lending banks.