This paper assesses the impact of the ownership structure of banks and shareholder protection laws on bank valuations while controlling for differences in bank regulations. Except in a few countries with very strong shareholder protection laws, banks are not widely held. Rather, families or the State control banks. Furthermore, (i) larger cash-flow rights by the controlling owner boost valuations, (ii) stronger shareholder protection laws increase valuations, and (iii) greater cash-flow rights mitigate the adverse effects of weak shareholder protection laws on valuations. These results suggest that ownership structure is an important mechanism for governing banks.

This paper investigates whether the diversity of activities conducted by financial institutions influences their market valuations. We find that there is a diversification discount: The market values of financial conglomerates that engage in multiple activities, e.g., lending and non-lending financial services, are lower than if those financial conglomerates were broken into financial intermediaries that specialize in the individual activities. While difficult to identify a single causal factor, the results are consistent with theories that stress intensified agency problems in financial conglomerates engaged in multiple activities and indicate that economies of scope are not sufficiently large to produce a diversification premium.

We investigate how the benefits of international portfolio diversification differ across countries from the perspective of a local investor. We find that the benefits of investing abroad are largest for investors in developing countries, including when controlling for currency effects. Most of the benefits are obtained from investing outside the region of the home country. These global diversification benefits remain large when controlling for short-sales constraints in developing stock markets. The gains from international portfolio diversification appear to be largest for countries with high country risk. In addition to this cross-sectional evidence, we also provide evidence that diversification benefits vary over time as country risk changes. We find that diversification benefits have decreased for most countries in our sample over the past two decades.

We show that firm size is increasing with the quality of the legal system in Mexico. A 1-standard-deviation improvement in the quality of the legal system is associated with a 0.15–0.30 standard deviation increase in firm size. We also show that the legal system affects firm size by reducing the idiosyncratic risk faced by firm owners. The legal system has a smaller impact on partnerships and corporations than on proprietorships, where risk is concentrated in a single owner. All of the findings are robust to instrumenting for legal quality using historical conditions. By focusing on firms in a single country, the data draw attention to the importance of informal institutions.