We show that economic conditions when managers enter the labor market have long-run effects on their career paths and managerial styles. Managers who began their careers during recessions become CEOs more quickly, but at smaller firms. They also have more conservative styles, such as lower investment in capital expenditures and research and development, more cost cutting, and lower leverage and working capital needs. These recession effects appear to be largely driven by the characteristics of the CEO's first job (recession CEOs tend to start in smaller or private firms), which suggests that the early work environment is important to the formation and selection of managers.

Using management earnings forecasts over the period 1996–2010, I find that the sensitivity of forecast revisions to contemporaneous stock returns is increasing in the amount of investors’ private information in prices. This effect remains after controlling for various confounds and is robust to the use of mutual fund redemptions as a shock to price changes that is exogenous to fundamental news. Furthermore, investors’ private information helps managers improve their forecast accuracy. Together, these findings suggest that stock prices contain information that managers do not otherwise have regarding firms’ fundamentals, and that managers incorporate this information in their earnings forecasts.

We show that economic conditions when managers enter the labor market have long-run effects on their career paths and managerial styles. Managers who began their careers during recessions become CEOs more quickly, but at smaller firms. They also have more conservative styles, such as lower investment in capital expenditures and research and development, more cost cutting, and lower leverage and working capital needs. These recession effects appear to be largely driven by the characteristics of the CEO’s first job (recession CEOs tend to start in smaller or private firms), which suggests that the early work environment is important to the formation and selection of managers. Received June 30, 2015; editorial decision August 5, 2016 by Editor Francesca Cornelli.

We study how investors perceive the skill set that different types of CEOs bring into their companies. We compare CEOs who started their careers during a recession with other CEOs. We show that the announcement return around the appointment of a recession CEO is very significant and positive, and this positive market reaction is driven by cases where a recession CEO replaces a non-recession CEO. Our results indicate that the market assigns a positive and economically meaningful value to a recession CEO, suggesting that there is a limited supply of these types of CEOs in the executive labor market.

We study whether relative optimism leads to home bias in portfolio holdings by looking at two novel databases: a survey that includes expectations of identified professional asset management companies for equity, bonds, and currencies, and the International Monetary Fund portfolio holdings data for equity and bonds. We document that relative optimism for equity is persistent over the period 1997–2012, but relative optimism for bonds and currencies exhibits more time-series variation. Moreover, we show that relative optimism is an economically significant variable that helps explain home bias in portfolio holdings, not only for equity, but also for bonds.

We argue that relative performance evaluation (RPE) contracts introduce a tournament among the focal firm and peer firms. We test whether a firm's riskiness is altered by its CEO's incentive to win the tournament. We find that a firm that performed poorly relative to its peers during an interim period takes more risk in the remainder of the evaluation period than a firm with better interim performance. This effect is stronger when the interim assessment date is closer to the end of the evaluation period and when winning the competition is more important to the CEO. Together, our results suggest that RPE contracts create tournament incentives for CEOs and significantly affect corporate risk taking.

ABSTRACT We investigate whether shared auditors promote the dissemination of innovative knowledge among their clients, thereby fostering follow‐on innovation. We find that a company cites more patents from another company when they are audited by the same audit office. To address concerns about potential confounding factors stemming from commonalities in the fundamentals of the two companies, we leverage a quasi‐exogenous shock to auditor sharing: the demise of Arthur Andersen and the subsequent increase in auditor switching in 2002. Further analysis reveals that the effect of a shared auditor on cross‐client patent citations is stronger when both clients engage in intensive innovation activities. Additional evidence suggests that shared auditors exert more influence on the citations of recent patents and patents that are easier for outsiders to utilize. Overall, our findings suggest that auditors affect corporate innovation by facilitating the transfer of innovative knowledge among their clients.

ABSTRACT Using the implementation of the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system from 1993 to 1996 as a shock to information dissemination technologies, we examine how a significant reduction in disclosure processing costs affects the real economy. We find that the EDGAR implementation leads to an increase in corporate investment and that this effect is concentrated in value firms. We provide evidence that improved equity financing and enhanced managerial incentives are likely the underlying mechanisms. Specifically, the EDGAR implementation leads to an increase in a firm's stock liquidity, a decrease in the cost of equity capital, and an increase in the level of equity financing. Consistent with the monitoring effect of broad information dissemination, the EDGAR implementation leads to an increase in a firm's operating performance. Our findings suggest that it is important to consider information dissemination beyond information production when examining the real effects of corporate disclosures.

Using 113 staggered changes in corporate income tax rates across U.S. states, we provide evidence on how taxes affect corporate risk-taking decisions. Higher taxes reduce expected profits more for risky projects than for safe ones, as the government shares in a firm's upside but not in its downside. Consistent with this prediction, we find that risk taking is sensitive to taxes, albeit asymmetrically: the average firm reduces risk in response to a tax increase (primarily by changing its operating cycle and reducing R&D risk) but does not respond to a tax cut. We trace the asymmetry back to constraints on risk taking imposed by creditors. Finally, tax loss-offset rules moderate firms’ sensitivity to taxes by allowing firms to partly share downside risk with the government.