We study how financial distress of a significant customer impacts capital structure of suppliers. Using a sample of U.S. firms that filed for Chapter 11 between 1980 and 2013, we find that the suppliers of these firms increase their leverage ratio over the two years prior to the filing date. This change is economically significant and consistent with the bargaining power theory, which states that an increase in suppliers' debt decreases the surplus available for negotiations. Therefore, suppliers increase their financing leverage to fortify their bargaining power with significant, distressed customers. We also find evidence that suppliers reduce their leverage after the customer reorganizes its liabilities and capital structure in the Chapter 11 process, indicating a return to a previous status quo.

Prior research documents that suppliers with higher sales concentration have lower leverage ratios, consistent with lenders’ heightened concerns about a large customer switching suppliers. We study whether a supplier's binding ties to its significant customers help mitigate these concerns. We assess the supplier-customer bond using the age of the relationship and the presence of professional network links between directors and officers of the two firms. We find evidence that binding ties boost suppliers’ leverage ratios suggesting that they reassure lenders about the stability of the supplier's operations. We also find that the effect of relationship age is more relevant for suppliers that operate in more competitive industries and have low levels of relationship specific investments, thus exposing them to higher switching risks.