This paper studies the strategic use and timing of share repurchases by insiders for personal gain. Using grant-level compensation data and a hand-collected sample of monthly repurchases, I find a positive causal relation between executive equity sales and share repurchases. I identify the relation using the vesting schedule of equity grants as an instrument for equity sales. This behavior is persistent across firm, executive, and governance characteristics. Both CFO and CEO vesting schedules impact repurchases, suggesting the CFO may also have influence over the execution of the repurchase program. There is minimal evidence of long-term value destruction. The results indicate executive contracts impact the execution of share repurchase programs.

We use firm-level data to provide some early evidence on the effectiveness of COVID-19 economic policy packages. Our empirical strategy relies on the varying degree of vulnerability to the pandemic across industries. We find a robust association of fiscal support with changes in firm performance indicators (as measured by sales-to-assets ratio, profit margin, interest coverage ratio as well as probability of default) in pandemic-prone sectors. We also observe marginal effects of monetary policy on the sales-to-assets ratio and of foreign exchange intervention on the interest coverage ratio in the hardest-hit firms. These results broadly survive a battery of exercises to address endogeneity. Additionally, we show that firms with a better financial position are more likely to take advantage of the support packages to withstand the pandemic shock. Overall, this preliminary evidence suggests that policy interventions have bought time for the hardest-hit industries, by supporting turnover and improving liquidity.

This paper examines the resilience of banks as perceived by market participants during the COVID-19 crisis. We analyse how bank stock returns during January-March 2020 relate to the pre-crisis activation of macroprudential policy across 52 countries in a cross-sectional dimension. We find that, overall, a tighter macroprudential policy stance is beneficial for bank systemic risk, as assessed by equity market investors. A robust finding is that a perceived decrease in bank risk stems primarily from the use of credit growth limits, reserve requirements, and dynamic provisioning. By contrast, a pre-crisis build-up of capital surcharges on systemically important financial institutions seems to lower bank stock returns. Alternative bank risk indicators suggest that the latter is likely to be driven by concerns about profits rather than the probability of default.

We show that higher payments from US Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) reduce mortality. Using administrative data on new DI beneficiaries, we exploit discontinuities in the benefit formula through a regression kink design. We estimate that $1,000 more in annual DI payments decreases the annual mortality rate of lower-income beneficiaries by approximately 0.18–0.35 percentage points, implying an elasticity of mortality with respect to DI income of around −0.6 to −1.0. We find no robust evidence of an effect of DI income on the mortality of higher-income beneficiaries.