When sustained growth depends on establishing an indivisible infrastructure for directly productive activities (DPAs) both discrete and marginal departures from optimal growth can undermine the dynamic efficiency of the market. Producers' anticipations of paying monopoly fees for infrastructure services dampen their incentive to invest in DPAs and may prevent the economy from reaching a minimal level of activity that would justify investment in a large indivisible infrastructure; and potential investors in infrastructure may be intimidated by the prospect of expropriatory regulation. Thus a credible prior commitment to effective but fair regulation is necessary for achieving optimal growth. But it may not be sufficient. Low-level expectations before the infrastructure is established can be self-fulfilling, indicating a role for coordinative industrial policy. Investment subsidies, even in conjunction with regulation, cannot induce an efficient equilibrium.

This paper compares the geographic dispersion of employment in manufacturing industries across U.S. metropolitan areas with an imputed measure of local industry demand. The results indicate that local demand has significant long-term and short-term location effects in many industries, including some with negligible transportation costs. Variation in location patterns across industries indicates that demand-side agglomeration economies and technological intensity strengthen the pull of local demand, while supply-side economies of scale and agglomeration effects weaken it. Implications are discussed with regard to international trade, technological change, industrialization and development, urban and regional issues, and industrial organization.

Our analysis of the contribution of education to growth recognizes its dual role of building human capital and promoting a common culture. It indicates that when different cultural groups separately determine the cultural orientation of their school curricula this may result in excessive polarization and sub-optimal growth. The optimal trajectory involves a gradual, reciprocal convergence of school curricula towards the middle, but may be difficult to implement in a political context in which curricula are determined by legislative bargaining. Coercive centralization then results in overly rapid homogenization and may not be superior to a decentralized school system.