[We investigate the effect of a stock market liberalization on industry growth in emerging markets. Consistent with the view that liberalization reduces financing constraints, we find that industries that are more externally dependent and face better growth opportunities grew faster following liberalization. However, this growth increase appears to come from an expansion in the size of existing firms rather than through the entry of financially constrained new firms. We show that following liberalization, new firm growth occurs in countries and industries with lower entry barriers. Hence, liberalization has a more uniform growth impact if accompanied by competition-enhancing reforms.]

We examine whether the stock market considers corporate lobbying to be value enhancing, using an event that potentially limited the ability of firms to lobby but was exogenous to their characteristics and prior lobbying decisions. The results show that this exogenous shock negatively affects the value of firms that lobby. In particular, we estimate that a firm that spends 100,000 more on lobbying in the 3 years before the shock (where sample average lobbying expenses are about 4 million), experiences a loss of about $1.2 million in shareholder value on average. We also examine the channels through which lobbying may create value for firms.

ABSTRACT Most privatization programs begin with a period of partial privatization in which only non‐controlling shares of firms are sold on the stock market. Since management control is not transferred to private owners it is widely contended that partial privatization has little impact. This perspective ignores the role that the stock market can play in monitoring and rewarding managerial performance even when the government remains the controlling owner. Using data on Indian state‐owned enterprises we find that partial privatization has a positive impact on profitability, productivity, and investment.

We investigate the effect of a stock market liberalization on industry growth in emerging markets. Consistent with the view that liberalization reduces financing constraints, we find that industries that are more externally dependent and face better growth opportunities grew faster following liberalization. However, this growth increase appears to come from an expansion in the size of existing firms rather than through the entry of financially constrained new firms. We show that following liberalization, new firm growth occurs in countries and industries with lower entry barriers. Hence, liberalization has a more uniform growth impact if accompanied by competition-enhancing reforms.

Comparing coverage of the same corporate financial news by the conservative Wall Street Journal and the liberal New York Times , we find strong evidence of political polarization in their reporting on both the intensive and extensive margins of coverage. We show that this politics-induced disagreement in corporate financial news leads to an increase in abnormal trading volume for the most politically extreme firms. Our results highlight a new source of investor disagreement, arising out of polarized reporting of corporate financial news, that generates trade among investors.

We examine whether the stock market considers corporate lobbying to be value enhancing, using an event that potentially limited the ability of firms to lobby but was exogenous to their characteristics and prior lobbying decisions. The results show that this exogenous shock negatively affects the value of firms that lobby. In particular, we estimate that a firm that spends $100,000 more on lobbying in the 3 years before the shock (where sample average lobbying expenses are about $4 million), experiences a loss of about $1.2 million in shareholder value on average. We also examine the channels through which lobbying may create value for firms. Received September 27, 2012; accepted June 23, 2015 by Editor Laura Starks.

ABSTRACT We investigate the influence of political and financial factors on the decision to privatize government‐owned firms. The results show that profitable firms and firms with a lower wage bill are likely to be privatized early. We find that the government delays privatization in regions where the governing party faces more competition from opposition parties. The results also suggest that political patronage is important as no firm located in the home state of the minister in charge is ever privatized. Using political variables as an instrument for the privatization decision, we find that privatization has a positive impact on firm performance.

This paper investigates the influence of incumbent firms on the decision to allow foreign direct investment into an industry. Using data from India's economic reforms, the results show that firms in concentrated industries are more successful at preventing foreign entry, state-owned firms are more successful at stopping foreign entry than privately-owned firms, and profitable state-owned firms are more successful at stopping foreign entry than unprofitable state-owned firms. The pattern of foreign entry liberalization supports the private interest view of policy implementation and suggests that it may be necessary to reduce the influence of state-owned firms to optimally enact reforms.

Does financial development facilitate micro-entrepreneurship? Using randomized surveys of over 1 million Indian households and bank-branch location as predetermined by government policy, we find that access to finance shifts workers from informal micro-entrepreneurship into formal employment. Financial access reduces the likelihood of being self-employed but benefits micro-enterprises with employees, as well as formal firms. Using data on 400,000 firms, we find that in districts with more banks, firms have higher loans, productivity, employment, and wages than firms in less banked districts. This evidence suggests a labor-market mechanism by which financial development facilitates growth: by shifting workers from unproductive micro-entrepreneurship into productive employment.

Pursuing delinquent borrowers requires considerable effort, and creditors may lack the incentive to exert this costly effort in uncompetitive banking sectors. To examine this, we use a uniquely large data set of public and private corporate bankruptcy filings spanning a banking-sector reform that deregulated bank entry across different regions of India. We find that increased banking competition is associated with more firms seeking a stay on assets, a decline in bankruptcy duration, and a shift toward workouts rather than liquidations. The results are consistent with creditors exerting greater effort to pursue delinquent firms and resolve bankruptcies more quickly when competition increases.