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Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement

American Economic Review 2009 99(3), 750-768
The cornerstone of cartel enforcement in the United States and elsewhere is a commitment to the lenient prosecution of early confessors. A burgeoning game-theoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the impacts of leniency. I develop a theoretical model of cartel behavior that provides empirical predictions and moment conditions, and apply the model to the complete set of indictments and information reports issued over a 20-year span. Statistical tests are consistent with the notion that leniency enhances deterrence and detection capabilities. The results have implications for market efficiency and enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of organized crime.

Automakers' Short-Run Responses to Changing Gasoline Prices*

The Review of Economics and Statistics 2013 95(4), 1198-1211
We provide empirical evidence that automobile manufacturers use cash incentives to offset how gasoline price fluctuations affect the expected fuel expenses of automobile buyers. Regressions based on a database of incentives over 2003 to 2006 suggest that on average, manufacturers offset 40% of the change in relative fuel costs between vehicles due to gasoline price fluctuations. The results highlight that carbon taxes and emissions trading programs likely would generate substantial substitution within vehicle classes, and studies that ignore manufacturer discounting likely underestimate consumer demand for fuel economy. The results also have implications for the optimal design of feebate programs.

Understanding the Price Effects of the MillerCoors Joint Venture

Econometrica 2017 85(6), 1763-1791
We document abrupt increases in retail beer prices just after the consummation of the MillerCoors joint venture, both for MillerCoors and its major competitor, Anheuser‐Busch. Within the context of a differentiated‐products pricing model, we test and reject the hypothesis that the price increases can be explained by movement from one Nash–Bertrand equilibrium to another. Counterfactual simulations imply that prices after the joint venture are 6%–8% higher than they would have been with Nash–Bertrand competition, and that markups are 17%–18% higher. We relate the results to documentary evidence that the joint venture may have facilitated price coordination.

Why do borrowers pledge collateral? New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information

Journal of Financial Intermediation 2011 20(1), 55-70 open access
An important theoretical literature motivates collateral as a mechanism that mitigates adverse selection, credit rationing, and other inefficiencies that arise when borrowers have ex ante private information. There is no clear empirical evidence regarding the central implication of this literature – that a reduction in asymmetric information reduces the incidence of collateral. We exploit exogenous variation in lender information related to the adoption of an information technology that reduces ex ante private information, and compare collateral outcomes before and after adoption. Our results are consistent with this central implication of the private-information models and support the economic importance of this theory.

Oligopolistic Price Leadership and Mergers: The United States Beer Industry

American Economic Review 2021 111(10), 3123-3159
We study a repeated game of price leadership in which a firm proposes supermarkups over Bertrand prices to a coalition of rivals. Supermarkups and marginal costs are recoverable from data on prices and quantities using the model’s structure. In an application to the beer industry, we find that price leadership increases profit relative to Bertrand competition by 17 percent in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, and by 22 percent in 2010 and 2011, with the change mostly due to consolidation. We simulate two mergers, which relax binding incentive compatibility constraints and increase supermarkups. These coordinated effects arise even with efficiencies that offset price increases under Bertrand competition.

Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information

Journal of Finance 2005 60(6), 2895-2923 open access
We test the implications of Flannery's (1986) and Diamond's (1991) models concerning the effects of risk and asymmetric information in determining debt maturity, and we examine the overall importance of informational asymmetries in debt maturity choices. We employ data on over 6,000 commercial loans from 53 large U.S. banks. Our results for low‐risk firms are consistent with the predictions of both theoretical models, but our findings for high‐risk firms conflict with the predictions of Diamond's model and with much of the empirical literature. Our findings also suggest a strong quantitative role for asymmetric information in explaining debt maturity.

Rising Markups and the Role of Consumer Preferences

Journal of Political Economy 2025 133(8), 2462-2505 open access
We analyze the evolution of markups for consumer products in the United States from 2006 to 2019. Using detailed data on prices and quantities for products in more than 100 distinct categories, we obtain a panel of markups, marginal costs, and flexible consumer preferences. Our empirical strategy uses separate random coefficients logit models for each category and year and an assumption that firms set prices to maximize profits. We find that markups increased by about 30% on average over the sample period. We attribute this change to decreases in marginal costs and a decline in consumer price sensitivity.

Does function follow organizational form? Evidence from the lending practices of large and small banks

Journal of Financial Economics 2005 76(2), 237-269
Theories based on incomplete contracting suggest that small organizations have a comparative advantage in activities that make extensive use of “soft” information. We provide evidence consistent with small banks being better able to collect and act on soft information than large banks. In particular, large banks are less willing to lend to informationally “difficult” credits, such as firms with no financial records. Moreover, after controlling for the endogeneity of bank-firm matching, we find that large banks lend at a greater distance, interact more impersonally with their borrowers, have shorter and less exclusive relationships, and do not alleviate credit constraints as effectively.