Despite debate on the desirability of rules‐based standards, no studies provide evidence on why accounting standards take on rules‐based characteristics. We identify and test five theories from prior research (litigation risk, constraining opportunism, complexity, transaction frequency, and age) that could explain why some U.S. accounting standards contain rules‐based characteristics. Litigation risk and complexity are most consistently related to cross‐sectional and time‐series variation in rules‐based characteristics. We find more limited evidence that frequent transactions, age, and desires by regulators to constrain opportunistic reporting are related to rules‐based standards. We note, however, that our findings are necessarily descriptive because standards arise endogenously from market and political forces, limiting causal interpretation. Further, it is difficult to perfectly separate rules‐based characteristics of the standard from both the complexity of the standard and the characteristics of the underlying transaction, including the complexity of the transaction.

A heated debate exists as to whether discontinuities in earnings distributions are indicative of earnings management. While many studies attribute discontinuities in earnings distributions to earnings management, other studies argue that earnings discontinuities are artifacts of sample selection and research design. Overall, there is limited direct evidence of a connection between earnings discontinuities and earnings management. In this study, we provide direct evidence linking earnings management to earnings discontinuities for a sample of firms that settle securities class action lawsuits and restate earnings from the alleged GAAP violation period. We compare the distribution of restated (“unmanaged”) earnings to originally reported (“managed”) earnings. We find that discontinuities are not present in the distribution of analyst forecast errors and earnings changes using unmanaged earnings but are present using managed earnings. The discontinuity in the earnings level distribution is attenuated, but not eliminated, on an unmanaged basis. These shifts among our sample of firms are caused by earnings management and cannot be explained by sample selection or research design issues. Our findings are important because many studies use earnings discontinuities as a proxy for intentional earnings manipulations and we provide the first direct evidence of a link between these two phenomena.

This study examines whether acquirers make better acquisition decisions when target firms’ financial statements exhibit greater comparability with industry peer firms. We predict and find that acquirers make more profitable acquisition decisions when target firms’ financial statements are more comparable—as evidenced by higher merger announcement returns, higher acquisition synergies, and better future operating performance. We also find that post‐acquisition goodwill impairments and post‐acquisition divestitures are less likely when target firms’ financial statements are more comparable. Finally, we find that acquirers benefit most from comparability when acquirers’ ex ante information asymmetry is higher, acquirers operate in volatile operating environments, and management knows relatively less about the target. In total, our evidence suggests targets’ financial statement comparability helps acquirers make better acquisition‐investment decisions and fosters more efficient capital allocation.

We examine the effect of fair value standards on firms' litigation risk. The discretion required by fair value allows plaintiffs to “second guess” managers' judgments, potentially increasing litigation risk. Alternatively, the complexity of fair value may decrease litigation risk if it's more difficult to demonstrate scienter. Our evidence suggests firms that rely more on fair value standards are relatively less likely to be sued. We find no evidence of a relation between fair value and the risk of misstatements or fraud, but do find evidence of a slight increase in firms' litigation risk via an increase in volatility. However, the primary effect of fair value standards in reducing litigation risk dominates the volatility effect. Finally, we find average litigation rates increase after the passage of new standards, but less so for fair value standards. On balance, our evidence suggests fair value is a relatively low litigation risk area in GAAP.

We investigate whether PCAOB-identified audit deficiencies lead to higher audit fees or turnover likelihood for clients of Big 4 auditors. To examine this, we identify areas of GAAP related to PCAOB deficiencies for each auditor. We then use textual analysis to identify how important the deficiencies are to clients to measure each client's exposure to deficient auditing. We find that this measure positively relates to audit fees and that this association is moderated by client bargaining power. Auditor turnover is also higher when deficiency exposure is high relative to what it would be for peer auditors, but we only observe this relation for smaller clients and do not find it is affected by client bargaining power. Finally, we find that companies switching Big 4 auditors tend to select an auditor resulting in lower deficiency exposure. These results have implications for understanding how PCAOB inspection reports affect the market for audit services. JEL Classifications: M41; M42. Data Availability: We obtain all data from publicly available sources.

Some claim that rules-based accounting standards shield firms from litigation, while others argue that violations of detailed rules give plaintiffs a “roadmap” to successful litigation. We inform this debate by investigating whether rules-based standards are associated with the incidence and outcome of securities class action litigation. Overall, our results suggest that rules-based standards are associated with a lower incidence of litigation but are not associated with litigation outcomes. These results are of interest in the debate regarding the switch from a more rules-based U.S. GAAP to a more principles-based IFRS.

We examine the influence of investor sentiment on managers’ discretionary disclosure of “pro forma” (adjusted) earnings metrics in earnings press releases. We find that managers’ propensity to disclose an adjusted earnings metric (especially one that exceeds the GAAP earnings number) increases with the level of investor sentiment. Furthermore, our analyses suggest that, as investor sentiment increases, managers: (1) exclude higher levels of both recurring and nonrecurring expenses in calculating the pro forma earnings number and (2) emphasize the pro forma figure by placing it more prominently within the earnings press release. Additional analyses indicate that the association between investor sentiment and managers’ pro forma disclosure decisions at least partly reflects opportunistic motives. Finally, we find that managers’ own sentiment‐driven expectations also play a role in their pro forma disclosure decisions.

We examine whether managers provide more voluntary disclosure when GAAP limits their reporting discretion in financial statements. We find managers are more likely to disclose non‐GAAP earnings, issue more management forecasts, and provide longer yet more readable management discussion and analysis (MD&A) disclosures when GAAP limits their discretion. These effects are stronger when there is greater demand for information and better monitoring. In contrast, these effects are weaker when managers have incentives to manage earnings. Difference‐in‐differences analyses around standard changes provide further evidence that managers make more non‐GAAP adjustments and are more likely to discuss the standard and its underlying transaction in the MD&A when a new standard limits their discretion more than its predecessor. Collectively, our results suggest managers use voluntary disclosure channels to convey information when GAAP limits their ability to recognize such information in financial statements.

Cash flows play an important role in the accounting and finance literature. They are a major component of earnings, serve as a benchmark for earnings and accruals, and are an input to firm valuation. Although accrual measurement has been extensively studied, research on cash flow measurement remains limited. We review cash flow proxies researchers use in prior literature and highlight the importance of (1) identifying and defining the cash flow construct of interest based on the underlying research question and other constructs of interest and (2) selecting a cash flow proxy that minimizes measurement error and maps well into its construct. We also examine the challenges researchers face in measuring cash flows and demonstrate how measurement choices can affect the magnitude of coefficient estimates and statistical inferences. Finally, our study provides a framework researchers can follow to strengthen the construct validity of cash flow proxies.

This study investigates whether the timely revelation of bad earnings news is associated with a lower incidence of litigation. The timeliness of earnings news is captured by a new measure based on the evolution of the consensus analyst earnings forecast. Holding total bad earnings news and other determinants of litigation constant, we find that earlier revelation of bad earnings news lowers the likelihood of litigation. This result holds for both settled and dismissed lawsuits. Further, we reconcile our findings with prior work that measures timeliness using managerial warnings via press releases. These tests suggest our findings are attributable to the ability of our timeliness measure to capture bad earning news revealed through disclosure channels beyond press releases. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the paper.