Abstract People’s value of their own time is a key input in public policy evaluations—these evaluations should account for time taken away from work or leisure as a result of policy. Measuring this value for the self-employed is challenging, as, by definition, it is not priced by the market. Using rich choice data collected from farming households in western Kenya, we show that households exhibit non-transitive preferences. As a result, neither market wages nor standard valuation techniques correctly measure participants’ value of time. Using a structural model, we identify the behavioural wedges in participants’ choices and find that distortions appear when households exchange cash either for time or for goods. Our model estimates suggest that valuing the time of the self-employed at 60% of the market wage is a reasonable rule of thumb.

Abstract How does persecution affect who migrates? We analyze migrants' self-selection out of the USSR and its satellite states before and after the collapse of Communism using census microdata. We find that migrants arriving before and around the time of the collapse (who were more likely to have moved because of persecution) were more educated and obtained better labor market outcomes than those arriving later. This change is not fully explained by the removal of Communist-era emigration restrictions. Instead, we show both theoretically and empirically that this pattern is consistent with more positive self-selection of migrants who are motivated by persecution.

Many public policies create winners and losers, but it is unclear whether redistribution can support new political economy equilibria that raise aggregate welfare. We study policies that partially redistribute foreign aid for refugees to natives while allowing refugees to work and move freely. Cash grants to Ugandan and Kenyan natives, labeled as aid from the refugee response, substantially increase support for refugee integration. Information about existing redistribution has significant but smaller effects. In contrast, intergroup contact yields no persistent, measurable effects. Our results indicate that economic interventions can shape policy views even on issues influenced by cultural concerns, such as immigration.