Low-fit brand extensions, while often presenting profitable opportunities for existing brands, are known to meet with varying levels of consumer acceptance. This research identifies conditions in which low-fit extensions can succeed. Specifically, the authors show that the extent to which consumers consider the context in forming judgments (i.e., they are context dependent) determines their acceptance of low-fit extensions. Across four studies, the authors examine the combined effects of context (in)dependence and type of information. Context-dependent consumers form their evaluations on the basis of the type of brand extension information provided, such that providing benefit-based information enhances the evaluations of low-fit extensions, whereas providing attribute-based information leads to a reliance on extension fit and subsequent unfavorable evaluations of low fit extensions. In contrast, context-independent consumers are more likely to base their judgments on extension fit regardless of whether they receive attribute- or benefit-based information. Acceptance of high-fit extensions is unaffected by context (in)dependence and type of information. These findings provide a two-step strategy (i.e., sensitize consumers to context and providing benefit-based extension information) to managers for launching low-fit extensions and leveraging existing parent brand equity.

We critically reassess the notion that high liquid asset holding by firms faced with weak investor protection is evidence of managerial rent extraction. We show that firms facing agency problems may establish tight controls over management through concentrated ownership. Using data on Belgian listed firms between 1991 and 2006, we find a strong positive association between ownership concentration and cash holding. This indicates a precautionary motive on the part of the controlling shareholders who highly value control. We also find that firm market valuation is positively affected by the amount of cash held by firms. On the other hand, managerial ownership has no impact. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms' owners are pursuing a rational strategy to mitigate agency costs in the face of weak investor protections.

We use a sample of banks from 24 European countries to investigate whether the adoption of the Basel II Capital Accord in 2008 affects the market valuation of discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLPs). Although Basel II lowers the incentives of internal ratings-based (IRB) banks to recognize income-increasing DLLPs in an opportunistic manner, it has no such impact on the remaining banks, which adopt the Standardized methodology. We use this setup in a difference-in-difference (DiD) design, where Standardized banks act as a control group. Our evidence supports the three hypotheses that, for IRB relative to Standardized banks, Basel II is associated with (i) less income-increasing DLLPs and (ii) less income-smoothing via DLLPs, which enhances the informational content of DLLPs about future loan losses and leads to (iii) higher market valuation of DLLPs. Our findings are timely and have policy implications for future regulatory developments in the banking industry.

With a 41-society sample of 9990 managers and professionals, we used hierarchical linear modeling to investigate the impact of both macro-level and micro-level predictors on subordinate influence ethics. While we found that both macro-level and micro-level predictors contributed to the model definition, we also found global agreement for a subordinate influence ethics hierarchy. Thus our findings provide evidence that developing a global model of subordinate ethics is possible, and should be based upon multiple criteria and multilevel variables.