We review the accounting literature on innovation, focusing on the economic attributes of innovation that collectively differentiate innovation from other assets: novelty, nonrivalry, and partial excludability. These attributes help innovation drive economic growth but create unique information-based challenges that accounting information and researchers are well suited to address. We discuss the definition and measurement of innovation and highlight common mistakes researchers make when measuring innovation and when using sources of plausibly exogenous variation. We then review the accounting literatures on the disclosure, management, financial reporting, taxation, and contracting and financing of innovation. For each of these literatures we identify challenges and opportunities for future research

Glaeser and Lang (2024; GL) reviews the accounting literature on innovation, which has increased substantially in recent years. GL makes an important contribution to accounting research by bringing into the literature the implications of Romer's Nobel Prize winning endogenous growth theory and by explaining how accounting research addresses questions related to innovation. We contribute to accounting research by building on GL's foundation to suggest three main paths forward for future innovation research. First, focus on innovation's three defining attributes: novelty, nonrivalry, and partial excludability. Second, determine the needs of various users of information about a firm's innovation activities and how to meet those needs; we focus on the needs of investors. Third, address questions our discussion highlights as potentially important for future research on financial reporting and innovation, including the crucial question of an innovation's identifiability

We examine whether the structure of compensation for the divisional CEO is related to subsequent innovative activity within the division, and whether the divisional CEO's compensation is structured as a function of the expected innovation opportunity set facing the division. Both the expected innovation opportunity set and the divisional executive's compensation contract are treated as endogenous variables by adopting a simultaneous equation approach. We find modest evidence that the proportion of total compensation tied to long-term components has a positive relation with future innovation, but no evidence that this proportion has a positive relation with the expected innovation opportunity set

We study how biases in financial reporting affect managers' incentives to develop innovative projects and to make appropriate investment decisions. Conservative reporting practices impose stricter verification standards for recognizing good news, and reduce the chance that risky innovations will lead to favorable future earnings reports. Holding all else constant, more conservative reporting therefore weakens the manager's incentive to work on innovative ideas, consistent with informal arguments in the extant literature. However, all else does not stay constant because the manager's pay plan will change in response to changes in the accounting system. We show that under optimal contracting, more conservative accounting does not stifle innovation in organizations, but rather increases incentives for innovation, as long as conservatism reduces the risk of an overstatement

Diversified corporations have been widely criticized as being inefficient innovators with an orientation to maximizing short-term profits. This study investigates this criticism by testing whether the number of new products introduced per R&D dollar is lower among more diversified firms. We find no statistically discernible effect of diversification on innovative efficiency in a sample of 706 research-intensive firms in the 1981–1988 period. This suggests that diversified organizations are rationally designed to minimize incentive and communication problems which may hinder innovation. Consistent with this view, we find that diversified firms are more likely to have separate research and development centers

We study a setting wherein a divisional manager undertakes personally costly effort to improve the profitability of an investment project. The manager's choice of innovation effort is subject to a holdup problem because of the ex post opportunism on the part of headquarters. We analyze and contrast the performance of centralized and delegated forms of investment decision-making. We find that delegation improves the manager's innovation incentives. We identify conditions for each of the two organizational forms to emerge as the optimal choice, and relate these conditions to characteristics of firms' investment opportunity sets

We examine the effects of accounting standards and regulatory enforcement on entrepreneurial innovation and social welfare. When the entrepreneur issues a financial report that violates the accounting standards, a regulatory agency may detect the violation and bring charges. We find that when regulatory penalties are relatively insensitive to the magnitude of the violation, optimal standards are sufficiently low that they induce full compliance, and increase as the intensity of enforcement increases. In contrast, when regulatory penalties are sensitive to the magnitude of the violation, optimal standards induce non-compliance and decline as the intensity of enforcement increases

This paper explores the potential role of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) in long-term value creation. Using a change in the legal environment in Delaware as an exogenous event, we document that a subset of firms with a relatively longer term focus (innovative firms) benefit from ATPs. Particularly, these firms experience an increase in Tobin's Q following a state law change in Delaware that increases the effectiveness of ATPs in defending against hostile takeovers. This increase is greater than that for non-innovative firms in Delaware as well as for innovative firms outside Delaware. Furthermore, the innovative firms in Delaware experience a stronger positive market reaction around the state law change dates, relative to other firms. Finally, in a cross-sectional setting we find that innovative firms with above-average takeover protection outperform other firms and are less likely to engage in harmful real earnings management. Taken together, these results provide empirical evidence of potential benefits of ATPs and help explain why such protection continues to be prevalent in the United States

We study contingencies written in firms' material product market contracts, focusing on the theoretical prediction of uncertainty as an important determinant. We identify contract contingencies from firms’ public regulatory filings and examine the effects of general business uncertainty and specific innovation-related uncertainty. To enhance causal inference, we utilize two major business shocks (i.e., the 2008 Financial Crisis and the COVID pandemic) and the diffusion of 29 disruptive innovation shocks (Bloom et al., 2021). We also explore the effects of re-negotiation costs and writing costs. Overall, our empirical results are consistent with predictions from dynamic models of incomplete contracting