Possible explanations are provided for two basic results in Kräussl's paper. First, rating effect may be stronger in emerging markets because they are less transparent. Transparency is interpreted in the context of Knightian uncertainty and institutional quality. Emerging markets have lower institutional quality ratings and present greater uncertainty than mature markets, therefore, they are more susceptible to rating agencies’ evaluations. Some empirical evidence on the correlations between institutional quality rankings and portfolio investment is presented. Second, sovereign credit downgrades generate a stronger market reaction than upgrades because decision makers value losses more than gains, as posited by cumulative prospect theory.

We estimate probabilities of bankruptcy for 5784 industrial firms in the period 1988–2002 in a model where common equity is viewed as a down-and-out barrier option on the firm's assets. Asset values and volatilities as well as firm-specific bankruptcy barriers are simultaneously backed out from the prices of traded equity. Implied barriers are significantly positive and monotonic in the firm's leverage and asset volatility. Our default probabilities display better calibration and discriminatory power than the ones inferred in a standard Black and Scholes [Black, F., Scholes, M., 1973. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. J. Pol. Econ. 81, 637–659]/Merton [Merton, R.C., 1974. On the pricing of corporate debt: the risk structure of interest rates. J. Finance 29, 449–470] and KMV frameworks. However, accounting-based measures such as Altman Z- and Z″-scores outperform structural models in 1-year-ahead bankruptcy predictions, but lose relevance as the forecast horizon is extended.

This paper examines the interplay among bank liquidity creation (which incorporates all bank on- and off-balance sheet activities), monetary policy, and financial crises. We find that: (1) high liquidity creation (relative to trend) – particularly off-balance sheet liquidity creation – helps predict crises, controlling for other factors; (2) monetary policy has statistically significant, but economically minor effects on liquidity creation by small banks during normal times, and these effects are even weaker during financial crises; (3) monetary policy has very little effects on medium and large bank liquidity creation during both normal times and crises. These findings suggest that authorities may wish to monitor bank liquidity creation closely in order to predict and perhaps lessen the likelihood of financial crises. They might also consider other tools to control bank liquidity creation, such as capital and liquidity requirements.

We propose a model in which banks are exposed to the risk of contagion through their portfolio of loans. We show that a solvency problem in one bank can be transmitted to another if they lend to the same borrower. The novelty is that the channel for the transmission involves banks’ monitoring incentives. The intensity with which all banks monitor a common borrower is reduced when one of the banks suffers a solvency shock. The reduced effort intensity affects the borrower's probability of success and creates a contagion (endogenous correlation) from the balance-sheet of the affected bank to the balance-sheet of the other banks lending to the same borrower. Banks hit by a solvency shock have lower incentives to monitor borrowers because less is left after paying depositors. Banks not hit by a solvency shock face borrowers’ risks entirely on their own, which increases the expected cost of lending. As a consequence, they respond by reducing the monitoring intensity for the common borrower. Bank equity can mitigate the risk of contagion.

Using data on bank holding companies in the United States and Europe, this paper analyses the impact of capital and liquidity on bank-lending-growth following the 2008 financial crisis, and the new measures inspired by the Basel III regulatory framework. We find that U.S. banks reinforce their risk absorption capacities when expanding their credit activities. Capital ratios have significant, negative impacts on bank-retail-and-other-lending-growth for large European banks in the context of deleveraging and the “credit crunch” in Europe over the post-2008 financial crisis period. Additionally, liquidity indicators have positive but perverse effects on bank-lending-growth, which supports the need to consider heterogeneous banks’ characteristics and behaviors when implementing new regulatory policies.

This paper analyzes various channels of shock transmission in an economy subject to financial frictions, by incorporating liquidity and default effects on asset prices. We develop a framework in which we can assess financial stability policy by introducing a simplified model of exchange and financial intermediation that captures the effects of shocks on financial and real sectors of the economy. The model allows us to explain essential mechanisms and interactions of financial and real economic variables in a comprehensive, yet intuitive fashion. Our results suggest that liquidity and default in the credit markets should be analyzed contemporaneously when financial, monetary and productivity shocks affect financial stability as well as the real economy.

This paper investigates the use of debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing by firms reorganizing under Chapter 11. A model is developed in which there is asymmetric information between the creditors of a distressed firm and its management. In this context, it is demonstrated that reliance on DIP financing resolves informational asymmetries regarding the true economic value of distressed firms. The model's conclusions are empirically supported in the paper and by results of extant research. The signaling role of DIP financing is evidenced both by the positive stock price reaction to DIP announcements and the fact that firms employing DIP financing have more successful reorganizations.

Following the Supreme Court decision in the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission case of 2010, which removed restrictions in relation to firms’ political spending, and building on the growing debate over whether voluntary political spending disclosure (VPSD) provides valuable information, we examine the effect of political spending on the cost of public debt and the role of VPSD on this effect. Based on a measure of VPSD that became available in 2012 and a large dataset on US firms’ actual political spending, manually extracted from different filings, we provide novel evidence that, in the post-Supreme Court decision period, political spending increases the cost of public debt. This is consistent with the uncertainty associated with political spending. Moreover, we find that the level of voluntary disclosure weakens the positive association between political spending and the cost of public debt. These results hold across multiple specifications as well as when we use a sudden release of firms’ political spending as an exogenous shock to political spending.

The China Accounting and Finance Review (CAFR) was jointly established in 1999 by the Hong Kong Polytechnic University and Tsinghua University. Over the past 22 years, CAFR has published original papers in accounting and finance with a focus on China-related research. In this article, we review the journal’s publishing patterns and the impactful articles it has published, with the aim of better understanding past research on China-related issues and recent publication patterns and trends as well as developing new insight that may inspire future submissions. We divide past CAFR articles by topic into six groups: (i) information disclosure; (ii) auditing; (iii) corporate governance; (iv) market efficiency; (v) corporate finance; and (vi) miscellaneous. We use these categories as the basis of our review for articles published before 2020. We also summarize articles by their regional setting, research methodology, and authors’ university affiliation. We then highlight the contributions of a few impactful CAFR articles that are actively cited in both the Chinese and English literature. We complement the literature review by going over China’s financial stability research in JFS. We also compare CAFR with other major accounting and finance journals in the Asia-Pacific region. CAFR stands out by welcoming research using a diversity of regional settings and research topics. Finally, we discuss the new editorial strategies that began in 2020. Under the new editorial policy, CAFR now publishes more non-China and more cross-disciplinary studies than it used to. We review several recent publications to demonstrate the change. Going forward, we intend to call for the publication of more high-quality papers in accounting and finance that are not restricted to a region, area, or methodology providing new insights into accounting and finance.

Using an integrated model to control for simultaneity, as well as new risk measurement techniques such as Adapted Exposure CoVaR and Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), we show that the aggregate systemic risk exposure of financial institutions is positively related to sovereign debt yields in European countries in an episodic manner, varying positively with the intensity of the financial crisis facing a particular nation. We find evidence of a simultaneous relation between systemic risk exposure and sovereign debt yields. This suggests that models of sovereign debt yields should also include the systemic risk of a country's financial system in order to avoid potentially important mis-specification errors. We find evidence that systemic risk of a country's financial institutions and the risk of sovereign governments are inter-related and shocks to these domestic linkages are stronger and longer lasting than international risk spillovers. Thus, the channel in which domestic sovereign debt yields can be affected by another nation's sovereign debt is mostly an indirect one in that shocks to a foreign country's government finances are transmitted to that country's financial system which, in turn, can spill over to the domestic financial system and, ultimately, have a destabilizing effect on the domestic sovereign debt market.