Knowledge that Transforms

Stocks that are expensive to borrow underperform significantly and for long periods of time. Every share must be held by an investor who does not lend it out and, hence, loses money. I find no evidence that investors hold these stocks in anticipation of lending them in the future. Instead, investors appear to hold these stocks for short-term trading. When turnover is high, high-fee stocks are overpriced and underperform. When turnover is low, high-fee stock prices are low, and they earn positive returns. More Robinhood investors hold shares when turnover is high than when it is low.

We show that banks use industry knowledge acquired through corporate lending in mortgage lending, a phenomenon we refer to as the “industry expertise channel.” Specifically, banks that specialize in particular industries expand their mortgage lending activity in regions where those industries are concentrated. The impact of industry expertise increases with information asymmetry and borrower risk. In addition, mortgages originated from this channel contain more soft information and perform better. The effect of the channel increases after unexpected industry distress and the 2008 financial crisis, suggesting that the effect is likely causal.

Using model-free skewness measures that exploit the asymmetry in semivariances and option data from the over-the-counter currency market, we find that buying currencies with a high skewness risk premium (SRP) and selling currencies with a low SRP generates high returns and a Sharpe ratio. Asset pricing tests—which control for omitted variables and measurement errors—show that a SRP factor enters the currency pricing kernel and is central to the pricing of risks inherent in a broad currency cross section of 60 portfolio excess returns. These results imply that skewness risk is a strong and priced source of currency risk.

This article examines how the entry of commercial lenders (CLs) transforms microfinance markets, focusing on borrower outcomes and market-wide spillovers. Using detailed credit registry data, we show that increased competition improves loan terms for both graduating and staying borrowers, generating sustained benefits. Our setting also allows us to document what happens when entry fails and entrants retreat following a crisis. Despite increasing defaults, borrowers who graduate to banks experience long-term gains, particularly through lower borrowing costs. Our findings highlight the broader benefits and risks of fostering competition in microfinance, providing valuable insights for policymakers and financial inclusion initiatives.

We argue that cross-ownership increases the amount of private information in stock prices, enhancing the ability of stock prices to provide feedback to managers. Consistent with this argument, we find greater cross-ownership heightens a firm’s investment- q sensitivity. This effect is stronger for firms with a lower propensity for voluntary disclosure and for firms whose managers hold less private information. Furthermore, we find that cross-ownership is negatively associated with the sensitivity of a firm’s investment to its peers’ stock prices. Additionally, cross-ownership has a stronger impact on the investment- q sensitivity when measured among investors who trade more actively in the firm’s shares. By using financial institution mergers as an identification strategy, we strengthen the causal inference. Overall, our results suggest that cross-ownership helps increase revelatory price efficiency (RPE), potentially leading to more efficient corporate decisions.

We explore an overlooked phenomenon in mortgage markets: repayment of underwater mortgages. Using a sample of mortgages terminated between 2007 and 2016, we show that such repayment indeed occurs, and that it is affected by the same factors commonly used in studies of default: the magnitude of home equity and the borrower’s credit score, which captures default cost as well as liquidity. A novel insight is that underwater repayers, unlike most defaulters, are not liquidity constrained, providing a much cleaner environment to study default costs. We estimate lower bounds on these costs. Our results indicate that default costs are substantial.

We document significant time-series and cross-sectional momentum in 28 equity option factors. Factor momentum is distinct from a static factor portfolio, and prominent option factor models cannot fully explain its returns. Despite high autocorrelation, factor momentum profits are mainly driven by high and persistently different mean factor returns in the case of longer formation periods. Option factor momentum fully subsumes option momentum, but not vice versa. Our findings are robust over time, across various market states, and for alternative momentum strategy constructions.

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We document two distinct mutual fund strategies: “Swinging for the Fences” (SF), in which managers hold stocks with extreme style-adjusted returns on either tail of the return distribution, and “Batting for Average” (BA), in which managers seek stocks with consistently moderate performance. We provide evidence that these strategies are persistent and deliberate. Existing measures of active management and known asset-pricing factors do not explain the strategies. SF attracts more flow, particularly when funds mention specific stock holdings in shareholder reports. SF funds charge higher fees and hold riskier portfolios; yet, they fail to deliver higher risk-adjusted returns. In falsification tests, SF strategies are not present in passive funds, supporting our conclusion that SF and BA are intentional strategies.

Applying a rich model of individuals’ life-cycle utility maximization, I comprehensively evaluate retirement saving plans. Across a range of individual characteristics, access to basic plans with constant expected payouts and no or full annuitization leads to individual utility gains of up to 5.07% of initial wealth and lifetime income ($43,800 in present value terms), and almost all individuals prefer full annuitization and a target-date fund investment strategy. With flexible plans allowing for partial annuitization and non-constant expected payouts, utility gains go up to 5.81%, and most individuals prefer a high degree of annuitization and expected payouts being increasing through retirement.