This article studies how ESG and conventional mutual funds trade stocks during the COVID-19 crash. Both fund types trade individual stocks similarly: Net purchases of ESG stocks are less sensitive than other stocks to fund flows pre-crash, but sensitivities increase for all stocks during the crash. In contrast, ESG funds’ aggregate net purchases are less sensitive than those of conventional funds during the crash. This difference is due to ESG funds’ portfolio tilt toward the less flow-sensitive ESG stocks. There is no evidence of an ESG clientele effect in trading decisions, as both fund types trade individual stocks similarly

Socially responsible (SR) institutions tend to focus more on the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance and less on quantitative signals of value. Consistent with this difference in focus, we find that SR institutions react less to quantitative mispricing signals. Our evidence suggests that the increased focus on ESG may have influenced stock return patterns. Specifically, abnormal returns associated with these mispricing signals are greater for stocks held more by SR institutions. The link between SR ownership and the efficacy of mispricing signals only emerges in recent years with the rise of ESG investing, and is significant only when there are arbitrage-related funding constraints

We examine the effect of private equity buyouts on the environmental performance of U.S. fossil fuel power plants. Output-scaled CO 2 emissions are, on average, 4.2% lower after buyouts, predominantly because of fuel-saving improvements in production efficiency. Emission intensities decline more significantly following buyouts backed by pro-ESG private equity because of not only greater efficiency gains but also enhanced emission control. Our results suggest that while private equity firms are effective at implementing environmentally beneficial operational changes that also increase profitability, they do not have strong incentives to undertake environmentally beneficial changes that are privately costly, except for those with pro-ESG preferences

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We examine whether free-speech protections influence corporate environmental performance. Using the staggered enactment of U.S. anti-SLAPP statutes in a stacked difference-in-differences design from 1990 to 2019, we find that these laws significantly reduce firms’ toxic emissions without curbing economic activity. Anti-SLAPP enactments also promote environmental investment through green innovation, abatement spending, and waste reduction management, and strengthen governance via improved sustainability oversight, ESG-linked executive pay, employee training, and supply chain management. The effects are stronger when stakeholder monitoring is stronger and when managerial incentives embed sustainability goals. Overall, free-speech protections generate powerful environmental benefits

Firms falling short of earnings expectations are more likely to cite stakeholder-focused objectives in their public communications following earnings announcements. This behavior is consistent with managers preferring to be evaluated by subjective stakeholder-based performance criteria when falling short on objective shareholder-based measures. This increased use of stakeholder language is most evident among firms narrowly missing earnings estimates and appears unrelated to a firm’s actual environmental, social, and governance (ESG)-related activity. Stakeholder language appears to influence the evaluation of CEOs; turnover–performance sensitivity is lower for managers citing stakeholder value. Collectively, our findings are consistent with concerns that stakeholder objectives reduce managerial accountability for poor performance

Firms with more competitive threats from the product market are less likely to commit violations and pay lower penalties. These findings are robust to alternative measures, specifications, and subsamples, as well as different attempts that mitigate endogeneity concerns. Further analyses reveal that the disciplining effect of competition is more pronounced when managers have greater incentives to shirk and when internal governance is weaker, and that violations are associated with poor product market performance only in the presence of competitive pressure. Firms under competitive pressure are more likely to adopt ESG-related incentives in executive compensation contracts and exhibit better worker safety practices. Overall, our evidence suggests that product market threats reduce managerial slack in combating misconduct by increasing the expected damage of violations