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Contracts versus Salaries in Matching

American Economic Review 2012 102(1), 594-601
Firms and workers may sign complex contracts that govern many aspects of their interactions. I show that when firms regard contracts as substitutes, bargaining over contracts can be understood as bargaining only over wages. Substitutes is the assumption commonly used to guarantee the existence of stable matchings of workers and firms. JEL: C78, D86, J31, J41

Testing Models With Multiple Equilibria by Quantile Methods

Econometrica 2009 77(4), 1281-1297
This paper proposes a method for testing complementarities between explanatory and dependent variables in a large class of economic models. The proposed test is based on the monotone comparative statics (MCS) property of equilibria. Our main result is that MCS produces testable implications on the (small and large) quantiles of the dependent variable, despite the presence of multiple equilibria. The key features of our approach are: (1) we work with a nonparametric structural model of a continuous dependent variable in which the unobservable is allowed to be correlated with the explanatory variable in a reasonably general way; (2) we do not require the structural function to be known or estimable; (3) we remain fairly agnostic on how an equilibrium is selected. We illustrate the usefulness of our result for policy evaluation within Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes’s (AER, 1999) model.

Revisiting the Non-Parametric Analysis of Time-Inconsistent Preferences

Review of Economic Studies 2026 93(2), 926-937
We revisit the recent revealed preference analysis of sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic consumers by Blow et al. [(2021), “Non-parametric Analysis of Time-Inconsistent Preferences”, The Review of Economic Studies, 88, 2687–2734] (BBC). We show that BBC’s revealed preference test is too lax. There are non-rationalizable data that would pass their test. A basic problem with their test is that it requires finding a certain endogenous elasticity, without regard to the rationalizing utility. Their approach motivates a more stringent test, also based on first-order conditions, that would connect the endogenous elasticity and utility: We show that this test is also too lax. Aside from testing, we also discuss the possibility of recovering model parameters. We show that, even when discount factors are exactly identified, the approach followed in BBC allows for incorrect parameter values to lie in their identified set.

How to Control Controlled School Choice

American Economic Review 2015 105(8), 2679-2694
We characterize choice rules for schools that regard students as substitutes while expressing preferences for a diverse student body. The stable (or fair) assignment of students to schools requires the latter to regard the former as substitutes. Such a requirement is in conflict with the reality of schools’ preferences for diversity. We show that the conflict can be useful, in the sense that certain unique rules emerge from imposing both considerations. We also provide welfare comparisons for students when different choice rules are employed.

Is School Segregation Good or Bad?

American Economic Review 2006 96(2), 265-269
It has been well documented that segregation across schools — denying access to resources, inferior educational production functions, and so on — exacerbates racial differences in achievement. Using an individual measure of social connections within schools, we have shown that this form of segregation — Asian kids sitting together in the cafeteria — has a substantively unimportant relationship with academic achievement or social behavior in school or later in life. There are important caveats to our analysis: (a) our estimates of the relationship between within - school segregation and outcomes are not causal; and (b) friendships may not be the only relevant cross-race social interaction that occurs within a school.

The Money Pump as a Measure of Revealed Preference Violations

Journal of Political Economy 2011 119(6), 1201-1223
We introduce a measure of the severity of violations of the revealed preference axioms, the money pump index (MPI). The MPI is the amount of money one can extract from a consumer who violates the axioms. It is also a statistical test for the hypothesis that a consumer is rational when behavior is observed with error. We present an application using a panel data set of food expenditures. The data exhibit many violations of the axioms. Mostly, the MPI for these violations is small. The MPI indicates that the hypothesis of consumer rationality cannot be rejected.