This paper examines the pricing performance of the valuation equation for American call options on stocks with known dividends and compares it with two suggested approximation methods. The approximation obtained by substituting the stock price net of the present value of the escrowed dividends into the Black-Scholes model is shown to induce spurious correlation between prediction error and (1) the standard deviation of stock return, (2) the degree to which the option is in-the-money or out-of-the-money, (3) the probability of early exercise, (4) the time to expiration of the option, and (5) the dividend yield of the stock. A new method of examining option market efficiency is developed and tested.

Both the Roll and the Geske equations for the valuation of the American call option on a stock with known dividends are incorrectly specified. This note presents the corrected valuation formula, explains the misspecifications and provides a numerical example.

This study tests Chicago Board Options Exchange efficiency by examining option price behavior in the weeks surrounding a firm's quarterly earnings announcement. The evidence presented here suggests that a first-order autoregressive seasonal process describes quarterly earnings behavior and demonstrates that the information content of an earnings announcement is fully incorporated in option prices by the end of the announcement week.

This paper reviews the theory of futures option pricing and tests the valuation principles on transaction prices from the S&P 500 equity futures option market. The American futures option valuation equations are shown to generate mispricing errors which are systematically related to the degree the option is in‐the‐money and to the option's time to expiration. The models are also shown to generate abnormal risk‐adjusted rates of return after transaction costs. The joint hypothesis that the American futures option pricing models are correctly specified and that the S&P 500 futures option market is efficient is refuted, at least for the sample period January 28, 1983 through December 30, 1983.

In rational, efficiently functioning markets, the returns on stock index and stock index futures contracts should be perfectly, contemporaneously correlated. This study investigates the time series properties of 5-minute, intraday returns of stock index and stock index futures contracts, and finds that S&P 500 and MM index futures returns tend to lead stock market returns by about five minutes, on average, but occasionally as long as 10 minutes or more, even after stock index returns have been purged of infrequent trading effects; however, the effect is not completely unidirectional, with lagged stock index returns having a mild positive predictive impact on futures returns.

This study focuses on the ex-dividend stock price decline implicit within the valuation of American call options on dividend-paying stocks. The Roll (1977) American call option pricing formula and the observed structure of CBOE call option transaction prices are used to infer the expected ex-dividend stock price decline as a proportion of the amount of the dividend. The relative decline is shown to be not meaningfully different from one, confirming some recent evidence from studies which examined stock prices in the days surrounding ex-dividend.

Recent empirical work by Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) documents abnormally large risk-adjusted returns for small firms listed on the NYSE and the AMEX. The strength and persistence with which the returns appear lead both authors to conclude the single-period, two-parameter capital asset pricing model is misspecified. This study (1) confirms that total market value of common stock equity varies inversely with risk-adjusted returns, (2) demonstrates that price per share does also, and (3) finds that transaction costs at least partially account for the abnormality.

The procedure for opening stocks on the NYSE appears to affect price volatility. An analytical framework for assessing the magnitude of the structurally induced volatility is presented. The ratio of variance of open-to-open returns to close-to-close returns is shown to be consistently greater than one for NYSE common stocks during the period 1982 through 1986. The greater volatility at the open is not attributable to the way in which public information is released since both the open-to-open return and the close-to-close return span the same period of time. Instead, the greater volatility appears to be attributable to private information revealed in trading and to temporary price deviations induced by specialist and other traders. The implied cost of immediacy at the open is significantly higher than at the close. Other empirical evidence in this article documents the volume of trading at the open, the time delays between the exchange opening and the first transaction in a stock, the difference in daytime volatility versus overnight volatility, and the extent to which volatility is related to trading volume.