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Cronyism and capital controls: evidence from Malaysia
The onset of the Asian financial crisis in Malaysia reduced the expected value of government subsidies to politically connected firms, accounting for roughly 9% of the estimated 60 billion loss in their market value from July 1997 to August 1998. Firing the Deputy Prime Minister and imposing capital controls in September 1998 primarily benefited firms with strong ties to Prime Minister Mahathir, accounting for roughly 32% of these firms’ estimated 5 billion gain in market value during September 1998. The evidence suggests Malaysian capital controls provided a screen behind which favored firms could be supported.
Disease and Development: The Effect of Life Expectancy on Economic Growth
We exploit the major international health improvements from the 1940s to estimate the effect of life expectancy on economic performance. We construct predicted mortality using preintervention mortality rates from various diseases and dates of global interventions. Predicted mortality has a large impact on changes in life expectancy starting in 1940 but no effect before 1940. Using predicted mortality as an instrument, we find that a 1 percent increase in life expectancy leads to a 1.7-2 percent increase in population. Life expectancy has a much smaller effect on total GDP, however. Consequently, there is no evidence that the large increase in life expectancy raised income per capita.
Unbundling Institutions
This paper evaluates the importance of "property rights institutions," which protect citizens against expropriation by the government and powerful elites, and "contracting institutions," which enable private contracts between citizens. We exploit exogenous variation in both types of institutions driven by colonial history and document strong first‐stage relationships between property rights institutions and the determinants of European colonization strategy (settler mortality and population density before colonization) and between contracting institutions and the identity of the colonizing power. Using this instrumental variables approach, we find that property rights institutions have a first‐order effect on long‐run economic growth, investment, and financial development. Contracting institutions appear to matter only for the form of financial intermediation. A possible explanation for this pattern is that individuals often find ways of altering the terms of their formal and informal contracts to avoid the adverse effects of weak contracting institutions but find it harder to mitigate the risk of expropriation in this way.
Mixing family with business: A study of Thai business groups and the families behind them
How does the structure of the families behind business groups affect the group's organization, governance, and performance? We construct a unique dataset of family trees and business groups for 93 of the largest business families in Thailand. We find a strong positive association between family size and family involvement in the ownership and control of the family businesses. The founders’ sons play a central role in both ownership and board membership, especially when the founder of the group is dead. Greater involvement by sons is also associated with lower firm-level performance, especially when the founder is dead. One hypothesis that emerges from our analysis is that part of the decay of family-run groups over time is due to the dilution of ownership and control across a set of equally powerful descendants of the founder, which creates a “race to the bottom” in tunneling resources out of the group firms.
Determinants of Vertical Integration: Financial Development and Contracting Costs
We study the determinants of vertical integration in a new data set of over 750,000 firms from 93 countries. We present a number of theoretical predictions on the interactions between financial development, contracting costs, and the extent of vertical integration. Consistent with these predictions, contracting costs and financial development by themselves appear to have no effect on vertical integration. However, we find greater vertical integration in countries that have both greater contracting costs and greater financial development. We also show that countries with greater contracting costs are more vertically integrated in more capital‐intensive industries.
Population and Conflict
Medical innovations during the 1940s quickly resulted in significant health improvements around the world. Countries with initially higher mortality from infectious diseases experienced larger increases in life expectancy, population, and subsequent social conflict. This cross-country result is robust across alternative measures of conflict and is not driven by differential trends between countries with varying baseline characteristics. A similar effect is also present within Mexico. Initial suitability conditions for malaria varied across municipalities, and anti-malaria campaigns had differential effects on population growth and social conflict. Both across countries and within Mexico, increased conflict over scarce resources predominates and this effect is more pronounced during times of economic hardship (specifically, in countries with a poor growth record and in drought-stricken areas in Mexico). At least during this time period, a larger increase in population made social conflict more likely.
The value of connections in turbulent times: Evidence from the United States
The announcement of Timothy Geithner as nominee for Treasury Secretary in November 2008 produced a cumulative abnormal return for financial firms with which he had a prior connection. This return was about 6% after the first full day of trading and about 12% after ten trading days. There were subsequently abnormal negative returns for connected firms when news broke that Geithner’s confirmation might be derailed by tax issues. Personal connections to top executive branch officials can matter greatly even in a country with strong overall institutions, at least during a time of acute financial crisis and heightened policy discretion.
Corporate governance in the Asian financial crisis
The “Asian Crisis” of 1997–98 affected all the “emerging markets” open to capital flows. Measures of corporate governance, particularly the effectiveness of protection for minority shareholders, explain the extent of exchange rate depreciation and stock market decline better than do standard macroeconomic measures. A possible explanation is that in countries with weak corporate governance, worse economic prospects result in more expropriation by managers and thus a larger fall in asset prices.
The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth
The rise of Western Europe after 1500 is due largely to growth in countries with access to the Atlantic Ocean and with substantial trade with the New World, Africa, and Asia via the Atlantic. This trade and the associated colonialism affected Europe not only directly, but also indirectly by inducing institutional change. Where “initial” political institutions (those established before 1500) placed significant checks on the monarchy, the growth of Atlantic trade strengthened merchant groups by constraining the power of the monarchy, and helped merchants obtain changes in institutions to protect property rights. These changes were central to subsequent economic growth.