According to endogenous growth theory, permanent changes in certain policy variables have permanent effects on the rate of economic growth. Empirically, however, U. S. growth rates exhibit no large persistent changes. Therefore, the determinants of long-run growth highlighted by a specific growth model must similarly exhibit no large persistent changes, or the persistent movement in these variables must be offsetting. Otherwise, the growth model is inconsistent with time series evidence. This paper argues that many AK-style models and R&D-based models of endogenous growth are rejected by this criterion. The rejection of the R&D-based models is particularly strong.

Disclosures , Annual earnings release, Trading volume, Information content

This paper examines empirically the effects of domicile and SEC registration and reporting requirements on information asymmetry. We compare the adverse-selection component of the relative bid–ask spread (our measure of information asymmetry) for three samples of Nasdaq NMS companies that trade in different home markets and are subject to different standards of disclosure: registered U.S. companies, registered non-Canadian foreign companies, and unregistered non-Canadian foreign companies covered by the information-supplying exemption of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. We find that the adverse-selection component is not significantly larger for the two foreign samples, and it is not reliably different for the registered and unregistered foreign samples. Therefore, we are unable to document that less stringent SEC registration and reporting requirements for foreign companies are associated with greater information asymmetry among investors for non-U.S. securities traded on Nasdaq.

This paper studies how public information regarding a firm’s riskiness affects investors’ incentives to acquire information about the firm and the firm’s ability to learn decision-useful information from its price. I find that risk information complements investor learning by informing investors of when it is most lucrative to investigate the firm, thereby reducing liquidity. Furthermore, risk information causes the firm’s price to contain more information when the firm’s investment decisions have the greatest impact on its value, thereby improving real efficiency. Extensions of the model suggest that the impact of risk information on real efficiency may deteriorate when the firm’s manager is excessively exposed to idiosyncratic risk, when the firm’s shareholders are excessively averse to such risk, or when the disclosure concerns a “downside risk.” In sum, my analysis suggests that information regarding firms’ expected values and information regarding firms’ risks significantly differ in their effects on the capital market.

From the beginning of federal regulation of combination there has been an insistent demand on the part of the farmers for the exemption of their organizations. The political history of the past thirty years is full of party promises to the farmers, but the laws on the statute books reveal a rather niggardly performance of the promises made.

This paper analyzes the relation between agency conflicts and risk management. In contrast to previous contributions, our analysis incorporates not only stockholder-debtholder conflicts but also manager–stockholder conflicts. We show that the costs of both underinvestment and overinvestment are essential in determining the firm's hedging policy. In particular, firms that derive more of their value from assets in place (lower market-to-book ratios), although having lower costs of underinvestment, generally display larger costs of overinvestment. Thus, they may be more likely to hedge to control these overinvestment incentives. Our analysis explains why large profitable firms with fewer growth opportunities tend to hedge more (Bartram et al., 2004). It also provides a number of new predictions relating the benefits associated with risk management to various dimensions of the firm's economic environment.

This paper examines impacts of childhood health on socioeconomic status (SES) outcomes observed during adulthood: levels and trajectories of education, family income, household wealth, individual earnings, and labor supply. The analysis is conducted using panel data that collect these SES measures using a sample who were originally children and are now well into their adult years. Since all siblings are in the panel, unmeasured family and neighborhood background effects can be controlled for. With the exception of education, poor childhood health has a quantitatively large effect on all of these outcomes. Moreover, these estimated effects are larger when unobserved family effects are controlled.

We compare institutional execution costs across the major U.S. exchanges using a sample of institutional equity orders in firms that switch exchanges. Execution costs including commissions are essentially indistinguishable across these exchanges. We also find the fraction of trading volume from momentum traders is greater on the NYSE than either the Nasdaq or AMEX and that orders are more likely to be worked by an institution's trading desk on the NYSE than on the Nasdaq. These results suggest that institutions actively manage execution strategies, taking into account characteristics of the markets in which they trade.

The employment to population rate of high school–aged youth has fallen by about 20 percentage points since the late 1980s. One potential explanation is increased competition from substitutable labor, such as immigrants. I demonstrate that the increase in the population of less educated immigrants has had a considerably more negative effect on employment outcomes for native youth than for native adults. At least two factors are at work: there is greater overlap between the jobs that youth and less educated adult immigrants traditionally do, and youth labor supply appears more responsive to immigration-induced wage changes.