Knowledge that Transforms

This study examines the impact of auditor quality on financial covenants in debt contracts. We conjecture that high‐quality auditors have two related effects on these debt covenants: (i) they encourage fewer and less restrictive covenants by providing assurance to lenders at contract inception and, consequently, (ii) they ensure a lower probability of eventual covenant violations. Consistent with the conjectures, we find that auditor quality is negatively associated with the intensity and tightness of financial covenants. Specifically, high‐quality auditors are associated with fewer covenants (especially performance covenants) and less binding covenants. Additionally, we find that auditor quality is negatively associated with the likelihood of covenant violations. In an ancillary test, we provide evidence that high‐quality auditors mitigate the detrimental effect of covenant violations on the cost of borrowing. Together, these findings highlight the important role of auditors in debt contracting.

This study examines the associations between four economic outcomes of the 2005 mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards ( IFRS ) and concurrent changes in two important accounting constructs, accounting comparability and reporting quality. My primary purpose is to evaluate the relative importance of cross‐country accounting comparability and firm‐specific reporting quality in explaining previously documented increases in Tobin's Q, stock liquidity, analyst forecast accuracy, and analyst forecast agreement following IFRS adoption. Given that improvements in both comparability and reporting quality are primary stated objectives of the International Accounting Standards Board ( IASB ), it is important to understand their relative roles in shaping the information environment of financial statement users following IFRS adoption. Using 1,861 first‐time adopters in 23 countries, I find that firms with a larger improvement in comparability have larger increases in Q, liquidity, forecast accuracy, and forecast agreement following adoption, relative to other adopters. In contrast, improvements in reporting quality around adoption appear to have only a second‐order effect that is generally limited to Q effects among those adopters with concurrent improvements in comparability. These results are robust to alternative design and variable specifications. Finally, I continue to find these results for samples restricted to countries with weaker pre‐adoption institutional environments and countries that did not initiate proactive financial statement reviews, indicating that strong institutions and regulatory improvements are not driving the results. Overall, my results suggest that improvements in cross‐country accounting comparability played an important role in the previously documented economic benefits that accrued to 2005 mandatory IFRS adopters.

Recent microstructure research finds that liquidity risk, in particular its information component, plays an important role in explaining the post‐earnings‐announcement drift ( PEAD ). We decompose liquidity risk into an accounting‐associated component and a nonaccounting‐associated component and examine their relative importance in explaining PEAD . Our research is motivated by recent findings that liquidity risk is a systematic risk and earnings quality is negatively associated with liquidity risk. We find that the accounting‐associated component is more strongly related to PEAD returns than is its nonaccounting‐associated counterpart. Further analyses reveal that the relation between accounting‐associated liquidity risk and PEAD returns is weaker for firms with greater analyst following. We also find that in a significant market downturn, the relation between accounting‐associated liquidity risk and PEAD returns becomes more pronounced. Our study is the first to document a liquidity risk‐based role of accounting quality in explaining the PEAD phenomenon. It parses out the PEAD risk premia associated with accounting versus nonaccounting sources and, by so doing, sheds light on the role of accounting quality in shaping the liquidity risk‐ PEAD returns relation.

While accounting research has demonstrated the role of a decision maker's own emotions during judgments, psychology research proposes that others’ emotions provide an informational signal to assess an opponent's limits, cooperativeness, and toughness during bargaining. We examine how a bargaining opponent's emotions provide information signals that can be used by a selling division manager during transfer pricing decisions and whether informal control system choices by corporate management to foster cooperation can create a context that influences how managers react to these signals. In an experiment, when informal controls to encourage cooperation were absent (less collaborative environment), managers’ selling price estimates were more conciliatory when the opponent was described as displaying negative emotions than when described as displaying positive emotions. However, when informal controls to cooperate were present (more collaborative environment), managers’ selling price estimates were more conciliatory when the opponent displayed positive rather than negative emotions. Path analyses suggest that managers’ perception of their opponents’ signals is the mechanism by which opponents’ emotions influence transfer‐price decisions. This study highlights the role of others’ emotions as information signals during accounting bargaining and provides insight into the context dependency of opponents’ emotions under various control system structures.

Despite the increased frequency of analyst forecasts during earnings announcements, empirical evidence on the interaction between the information in the earnings announcement and these forecasts is limited. We examine the implications of reinforcing and contradicting analyst forecast revisions issued during earnings announcements (days 0 and +1) on the market response to unexpected earnings. We classify forecast revisions as reinforcing (contradicting) when the sign of analyst forecast revisions agrees (disagrees) with the sign of unexpected earnings. We document larger (smaller) earnings response coefficients for announcements accompanied by reinforcing (contradicting) analyst forecast revisions. Analyses of management forecasts suggest that analyst revisions and management forecasts convey complementary information. Cross-sectional tests show that investors react more to earnings announcements accompanied by analyst forecast revisions when there is greater consensus among analysts (lower dispersion) and that better earnings quality (higher persistence) mitigates the negative impact of contradictory analyst forecast revisions.

This study finds that investors price firms' greenhouse gas ( GHG ) emissions as a negative component of equity value, and this valuation discount does not differ between firms that voluntarily disclose to the Carbon Disclosure Project ( CDP ) and nondisclosing firms. We derive the GHG emissions for nondisclosers from an estimation model that incorporates firm characteristics and industry. The finding that investors view CDP amounts and estimates of emissions as equally value‐relevant suggests that equity values reflect GHG information from channels other than the CDP . An event study of investors' response to emission‐related information in firms' 8‐K filings further supports this finding. Economically, our results suggest that, for the median S&P 500 firm, GHG emissions impose a market‐implied equity discount of $79 per ton, representing about one‐half of 1 percent of market capitalization.

Prior research finds that investors respond more favorably to a disaggregated earnings forecast than to an aggregated one. The present study examines whether this initial favorable effect on investors’ decisions leads to investors giving management the benefit of the doubt, or backfires in the event of a subsequent earnings surprise announcement. The results of our experiment indicate a “backfire effect” consistent with Expectation Violation Theory. We find that investors’ negative reactions to an earnings surprise are stronger if they first observed a disaggregated forecast than if they first saw an aggregated forecast. The largest downward adjustment in investment interest occurs when the disaggregated forecast is later found to be overstated. This study provides evidence of the complexity of the effect of disaggregated earnings forecast and adds to the literature concerning the costs and benefits of accounting information disaggregation.

This paper examines the role of conservatism when an agent can manipulate upcoming earnings before all uncertainty is resolved. An increase in conservatism, by reducing the likelihood of favorable earnings, requires steeper performance pay to maintain the same level of incentives, which in turn increases the equilibrium earnings manipulation. Trade‐offs between inducing effort and curbing manipulation predict an interior level of conservatism as optimal. The optimal level of conservatism is positively associated with enforcement, economic profitability and earnings quality, and negatively associated with agency frictions. In particular, we show that more economically profitable firms choose to be more conservative. We also establish that the association between performance pay and manipulation identifies whether conservatism is optimally chosen or exogenously imposed. In an application to debt contracting, we show that optimal conservatism is negatively associated with borrowers’ bargaining power.

Governments’ net assets balances are viewed as a measure of fiscal health and have been linked to municipal credit ratings. This study explores the extent to which ambient socioeconomic factors are captured in aggregated restricted and unrestricted net assets balances (termed “liquid net assets”) to understand why such balances are relevant to credit analysts and others. We model liquid net assets balances using observable nonaccounting factors (e.g., unemployment rates) to learn whether they reflect such influences. We use panel data for fiscal years 2007–2011 so our results comprehend effects of recent economic fluctuations. We find that liquid net assets balances impound a rich array of influences, bearing a positive association with the mayor‐council form of government, community wealth, the incidence of property crimes, and increases in governments’ business‐type net assets. Liquid net assets balances bear a negative association with liabilities for postemployment benefits, unemployment, and violent crime. The results indicate that net assets balances capture noteworthy debt burden, administrative, and socioeconomic influences and, as such, have meaning beyond their basic accounting interpretation.

Managers frequently attribute the news in their earnings forecasts to various economic events. Using textual analysis, we identify the economic factors underlying earnings news from press releases. We document a wide range of industry‐wide shocks and firm‐specific actions to which the earnings news in management forecasts is attributed. As expected, earnings attributions significantly affect peer firms’ price reactions to the earnings news. Specifically, earnings news attributed to industry‐wide trends or firm structural changes leads to positive information transfers but earnings news attributed to firm competitive moves triggers negative information transfers. Information transfers are much stronger when each economic factor is mentioned the first time in a given industry‐year. Further analysis reveals that the strength of information transfers varies with firm‐level rivalry within the industry (i.e., similar business strategies, market position, and level of competition).