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Corporate payout policy

Journal of Financial Economics 1988 22(1), 61-82
Theories of corporate payout policy do not explain the observed form of distributions to shareholders. Although open-market repurchases appear to have tax advantages, cash dividends are overwhelmingly chosen. We argue that there are costs associated with open-market-repurchase programs, since they provide managers with opportunities to use inside information to benefit themselves at stockholders' expense. We offer evidence suggesting that bid-ask spreads widen around repurchase announcements, as predicted by our analysis. Since these costs of repurchases do not arise with cash dividends, our analysis implies that repurchases do not dominate cash dividends for making distributions to shareholders.

On financial contracting

Journal of Financial Economics 1979 7(2), 117-161
With risky debt outstanding, stockholder actions aimed at maximizing the value of their equity claim can result in a reduction in the value of both the firm and its outstanding bonds. We examine ways in which debt contracts are written to control the conflict between bondholders and stockholders. We find that extensive direct restrictions on production/investment policy would be expensive to employ and are not observed. However, dividend and financing policy restrictions are written to give stockholders incentives to follow a firm-value-maximizing production/investment policy. Taking into account how contracts control the bondholder- stockholder conflict leads to a number of testable propositions about the specific form of the debt contract that a firm will choose.

Transactions Demand for Money with a Stochastic, Time-Varying Interest Rate

Review of Economic Studies 1989 56(4), 623
This paper considers a stochastic, time-varying interest rate in a continuous-time, inventory-theoretic model of the demand for money. The problem of minimizing expected, discounted cash-management costs is ascribed to an agent. An optimal cash-management policy exists and is of a familiar target-threshold form. Closed-form expressions for the forward-looking, time-varying targets and thresholds are derived in special cases and implications for the dynamics of the cash balance are described.

A Dynamic Baumol-Tobin Model of Money Demand

Review of Economic Studies 1986 53(3), 465
This note considers a stochastic version of the Baumol-Tobin model of the demand for money. A dynamic demand function is derived for the case in which independent variables change to new, steady-state values. The (S, s) inventory policy is shown to give rise to an aggregate, partial-adjustment equation with a variable adjustment speed. The methodology is that introduced to target-threshold models by Milbourne, Buckholtz, and Wasan (1983) in their study of the Miller-Orr model.

Death and Taxes: The Market for Flower Bonds

Journal of Finance 1987 42(3), 685-698
Certain U.S. Government securities, known as flower bonds, can be redeemed at par plus accrued interest for the purpose of paying estate taxes, if held at the time of death. Thus, a flower bond, selling at a discount, is like a straight bond plus a life insurance policy. An equilibrium derived from a rational flower bond pricing model implies the existence of clienteles: individuals with the highest death probabilities hold the deepest discount flower bonds. The empirical implication, that bonds with the deepest discount should be redeemed at the fastest rate, is tested and the results support the proposition.

The Interdependence of Individual Portfolio Decisions and the Demand for Insurance

Journal of Political Economy 1983 91(2), 304-311
We analyze the individual's demand for insurance as a special case of general portfolio hedging activity. The demand for insurance contracts is determined simultaneously with the demands for other assets in the portfolio. We demonstrate that when the payoffs of the policy are correlated with the payoffs to the individual's other assets, the demand for insurance contracts is generally not a separable portfolio decision. We argue that this separability condition is not generally met because of significant interdependence of claims across different insurance policies. Furthermore, our generalizations can reverse the standard prediction that wealthier individuals will demand less insurance.

The Interdependence of Individual Portfolio Decisions and the Demand for Insurance

Journal of Political Economy 1983 91(2), 304-311
We analyze the individual's demand for insurance as a special case of general portfolio hedging activity. The demand for insurance contracts is determined simultaneously with the demands for other assets in the portfolio. We demonstrate that when the payoffs of the policy are correlated with the payoffs to the individual's other assets, the demand for insurance contracts is generally not a separable portfolio decision. We argue that this separability condition is not generally met because of significant interdependence of claims across different insurance policies. Furthermore, our generalizations can reverse the standard prediction that wealthier individuals will demand less insurance.

Corporate voting: Evidence from charter amendment proposals

Journal of Corporate Finance 1994 1(1), 5-31
Some argue that managers effectively control corporate voting: hence the process is meaningless. Others contend that shareholder voting motivates managers to maximize firm value. We provide evidence on this debate by analyzing the results from a large sample of management-sponsored anti-takeover amendments. Our results do not support the extreme form of either hypothesis. The evidence suggests that shareholder voting is important and indicates the circumstances where voting is most likely to constrain managers. Our results also have implications for the use of voting in political and other non-corporate contexts.