ABSTRACT We extend the literature on earnings management through real operating decisions by providing insight into the types of expenditures (core versus noncore and operating versus non-operating activities) affected by earnings management. We partition a sample of California nonprofit hospitals based on their earnings management incentives. We find that expenditures on non-operating and non-revenue-generating activities appear to decrease in hospitals with incentives to engage in such behavior, while core patient care activities remain unchanged. We also find evidence of earnings management in non-core operational expenses. Second, we analyze real earnings management related to pay-for-performance incentives and find that hospitals with stronger performance incentives exhibit a significant incremental decrease in expenditures. Finally, we examine two different kinds of behavior to discriminate between earnings management and good operational decisions and provide weak evidence to support opportunism rather than good management. Together, these results provide evidence of the use of real operating decisions to manage earnings.

ABSTRACT: This study reports the result of an experiment examining two aspects of the audit context that auditors likely do not suspect can influence audited account balances: the magnitude of an audit difference and the presence of a prior client concession. Negotiation theory shows that negotiators’ initial positions (e.g., clients’ unaudited balances) as well as feelings of reciprocity created by prior negotiations serve to create expectations for the current negotiation and, in turn, affect the outcomes of such negotiations. Our results show that the magnitude of an audit difference involving an estimate (i.e., difference between client’s account balance and the auditor’s independent estimate) as well as the presence of a prior client concession influence auditors’ negotiation expectations. Specifically, auditors proposed smaller adjustments when the magnitude of the audit difference was high and when the client conceded on an audit issue prior to resolving the difference in estimates. These manipulations similarly influence the negotiated outcome, and this influence is fully mediated by the auditor’s initial negotiation position.

This article presents the report of the Committee on Doctoral Programs in Accounting. The committee made various recommendations on how to improve the Doctoral programs. It suggested that the doctoral program is the principal educational process for preparing students both for university teaching and for basic research in accounting. Hence the primary objective of the study program for the doctorate should be to develop in the student original and incisive thinking and to create an attitude conducive to study and research. As wide variations in the backgrounds of doctoral students call for individually designed programs of course work, instruction in methods of teaching and familiarity with the learning process should be a part of the doctoral program. At the end of the study program the doctoral candidate should demonstrate proficiency in accounting and a reasonable understanding of economics, statistics, the functional areas of business, the behavioral sciences, and mathematical methods. And finally the demand for college teachers of accounting should not be an excuse for lowering the standards for the doctoral program.

Hypothetical referenda have been proposed as an incentive‐compatible mechanism that can be used to obtain social valuations of environmental resources. We employ experimental methods to test the hypothesis that such referenda are indeed incentive compatible. Our results lead us to reject that hypothesis.

ABSTRACT We study managerial incentive provision under moral hazard when growth opportunities arrive stochastically and pursuing them requires a change in management. A trade‐off arises between the benefit of always having the “right” manager and the cost of incentive provision. The prospect of growth‐induced turnover limits the firm's ability to rely on deferred pay, resulting in more front‐loaded compensation. The optimal contract may insulate managers from the risk of growth‐induced dismissal after periods of good performance. The evidence for the United States broadly supports the model's predictions: Firms with better growth prospects experience higher CEO turnover and use more front‐loaded compensation.

ABSTRACT This paper examines how cultural differences influence the returns of momentum strategies. Cross‐country cultural differences are measured with an individualism index developed by Hofstede (2001) , which is related to overconfidence and self‐attribution bias. We find that individualism is positively associated with trading volume and volatility, as well as to the magnitude of momentum profits. Momentum profits are also positively related to analyst forecast dispersion, transaction costs, and the familiarity of the market to foreigners, and negatively related to firm size and volatility. However, the addition of these and other variables does not dampen the relation between individualism and momentum profits.

ABSTRACT We use hand-collected data to analyze submission-to-acceptance (STA) times in the top-tier accounting journals relative to other top-tier business journals from 1993 through 2021. We find that, vis-à-vis other business disciplines, STA times at top-tier accounting journals were shorter in the first half of our sample period and significantly longer thereafter. We also observe shorter STA times for articles with authors from more highly ranked institutions; this effect exists only in top-tier accounting journals and has increased over time. In additional analyses, we find that our primary inferences are unchanged when considering maturity of initial journal submissions, journal-level democratization, and review process improvements related to paper quality. Our results should be of interest to researchers, journal editors, reviewers, provosts, deans, and tenure and promotion committees. Data Availability: The data used in this study are available from the sources indicated herein.

ABSTRACT Agents often inflate measured performance by distorting operating decisions (e.g., real earnings management) and/or reporting decisions (e.g., accruals management). Across four studies, we find that public judgments of distortion’s acceptability largely reflect assessments of how harmful and norm-violating the distortion is. Judgments of operating distortion primarily reflect assessments of harm, whereas judgments of reporting distortion primarily reflect assessments of norm violation. These results are consistent with the Theory of Dyadic Morality (Gray, Waytz, and Young 2012; Schein and Gray 2018). We also find that those who perceive an accounting system as more unfairly withholding an agent’s bonus assess distortion (especially reporting distortion) to be less norm-violating. Those who perceive the performance measure as less appropriate for capturing the value of performance to stakeholders assess distortion (especially operating distortion) to be more harmful. Assessments of distortions’ harm and norm violation explain a substantial portion of the variation in acceptability judgments.

ABSTRACT We predict that a firm's greater accounting comparability with its industry peers facilitates its learning from those peer firms' research and development (R&D) investments, allowing that firm to have greater innovative efficiency. We estimate accounting comparability using pro forma capitalized R&D earnings that link lagged R&D expenditures to future profitability employing the Almon (1965) distributed lag model. We find that greater accounting comparability leads to enhanced ability to predict future cash flows generated by R&D investments of peer firms. In the cross-section, we observe that the relation between accounting comparability and innovative efficiency is stronger if peer firms exhibit higher accounting (accrual) quality and are themselves successful innovators. In sum, this study shows that a shared qualitative characteristic of accounting, namely, accounting comparability, is positively associated with innovative efficiency. JEL Classifications: G12; G14; O32.

ABSTRACT Despite the importance placed on professional skepticism by the accounting profession and regulators, the failure of auditors to exercise an appropriate level of skepticism continues to be a global issue. We experimentally test a potential barrier to skepticism. We find that outcome knowledge biases supervisors' evaluations of skeptical behavior. Holding a staff member's skeptical judgments and acts constant, superiors on the engagement team evaluate the staff's skeptical behavior based on whether the staff's investigation of an issue ultimately identifies a misstatement. Our evidence suggests that evaluators penalize auditors who employ an appropriate level of skepticism, but do not identify a misstatement. Although consultation with their superiors while exercising skepticism improved staff auditors' performance evaluations, consultation did not effectively mitigate the outcome effect on their evaluations. Last, we observe that auditors in the field anticipate that their superiors will be influenced by outcome knowledge when they evaluate their skeptical behavior. Collectively, our results depict an evaluation system that may inadvertently discourage skepticism among auditors in the field. Data Availability: Contact the authors.