We define an intertemporal tax discontinuity (ITD) as a circumstance in which different tax rates are applied to gains realized at one point in time versus some other point in time. We study the effects of ITDs on market behaviors at the time of disclosures of firm performance, assuming that all investors who trade firm equities are subject to tax. The results of our paper suggest that relative to an economy in which ITDs are absent, ITDs may dampen trading volume and amplify price changes at the time of disclosure.

Cost allocation, Sharpley value, Preferences, Risk

We study when it is appropriate to add a convex component such as stock options to an optimal, managerial compensation contract. We show that convexity is introduced when managers have moderate levels of relative risk aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion. In addition, we study how convexity is affected as the distribution of outcomes becomes more skewed toward low outcomes. Here we show that while convexity increases when skewness is increased without regard to the effect on mean stock price, the opposite effect results when increases in skewness leave the mean stock price unchanged.

In this paper we examine whether and how accounting information about a firm manifests in its cost of capital, despite the forces of diversification. We build a model that is consistent with the Capital Asset Pricing Model and explicitly allows for multiple securities whose cash flows are correlated. We demonstrate that the quality of accounting information can influence the cost of capital, both directly and indirectly. The direct effect occurs because higher quality disclosures affect the firm's assessed covariances with other firms' cash flows, which is nondiversifiable. The indirect effect occurs because higher quality disclosures affect a firm's real decisions, which likely changes the firm's ratio of the expected future cash flows to the covariance of these cash flows with the sum of all the cash flows in the market. We show that this effect can go in either direction, but also derive conditions under which an increase in information quality leads to an unambiguous decline in the cost of capital.

This paper models effects of short-sale constraints on the speed of adjustment (to private information) of security prices. Constraints eliminate some informative trades, but do not bias prices upward. Prohibiting traders from shorting reduces the adjustment speed of prices to private information, especially to bad news. Non-prohibitive costs can have the reverse effect, but this is unlikely. Implications are developed about return distributions on information announcement dates. Periods of inactive trade are shown to impart a downward bias to measured returns. An unexpected increase in the short-interest of a stock is shown to be bad news.

This paper analyzes a general equilibrium model of a competitive security market in which traders possess independent pieces of information about the return of a risky asset. Each trader conditions his estimate of the return both on his own private source of information and price, which in equilibrium serves as a ‘noisy’ aggregator of the total information observed by all traders. A closed-form characterization of the rational expectations equilibrium is presented. A counter-example to the existence of ‘fully revealing’ equilibrium is developed.

We empirically examine standard agency predictions about how performance measures are optimally weighted to provide CEO incentives. Consistent with prior empirical research, we document that the relative weight on price and non-price performance measures in CEO cash pay is a decreasing function of the relative variances. Agency theory speaks to the weights in total compensation (annual total pay and changes in the CEO's equity portfolio value), however, and we document that very little of CEOs' total incentives come from cash pay. We also document that variation in the relative weight on price and non-price performance measures in CEO total compensation is an increasing function of the relative variances. The conflicting results using total compensation indicate that existing findings on cash pay cannot be interpreted as evidence supporting standard agency predictions. Based on our results, we suggest approaches for future research on performance measure use in CEO total compensation.

This paper analyzes the valuation of a compensation contract from a manager's perspective. This perspective is appropriate, for example, in research on the incentive effects of a compensation plan, because such effects are determined by how the manager's actions affect his valuation of his compensation. In contrast, in a study of the cost-effectiveness of a compensation plan, the shareholders' perspective is appropriate. Measuring the value to a manager of his compensation is difficult because some of the diverse components of compensation packages (e.g., executive stock options and restricted stock) have payoffs that are uncertain when the compensation is granted. In most empirical studies, each component is valued independently (without consideration of the structure of the compensation package as a whole), and these values are summed. Moreover, the values are frequently determined using formulas for publicly traded securities with similar payoff structures (i.e., from the perspective of security market participants). Market imperfections create divergence between managers' and shareholders' valuations of a component of a compensation scheme. In particular, moral hazard and adverse selection issues cause shareholders to tie

Prior literature predicts a positive relation between firms' expected pre-tax rates of return and investor-level capital gains tax rates. We show that this relation is more nuanced than suggested by prior literature and that in three circumstances the relation can actually be negative. The first circumstance is when a firm's systematic risk is very high. The second circumstance is when the market risk premium is very high. The third circumstance is when the risk-free rate of return is very low. The circumstances arise because, in addition to reducing investors' expected after-tax cash proceeds, capital gains taxes reduce the risk that investors associate with the expected after-tax cash proceeds.

Prior literature predicts a positive relation between firms' expected pre-tax rates of return and investor-level capital gains tax rates. We show that this relation is more nuanced than suggested by prior literature and that in three circumstances the relation can actually be negative. The first circumstance is when a firm's systematic risk is very high. The second circumstance is when the market risk premium is very high. The third circumstance is when the risk-free rate of return is very low. The circumstances arise because, in addition to reducing investors' expected after-tax cash proceeds, capital gains taxes reduce the risk that investors associate with the expected after-tax cash proceeds.