This paper studies how expected returns interact with product market competition. The model predicts that (1) competition erodes markups, such that firms are more exposed to systematic risk; (2) the threat of entry by new firms lowers exposure to systematic risk of incumbents; and (3) higher industry aggregate risk represents a barrier to entry, such that riskier industries become less competitive. We provide empirical evidence consistent with these three channels and for an overall negative relation between returns and competition. We also consider a sample selection correction for publicly listed firms and use it to construct an alternative concentration measure.

This paper quantifies the relative importance of labor-induced operating leverage at explaining the value premium. I extend a traditional variance decomposition methodology using labor shares to disentangle labor leverage from the value premium and from the value spread and from the variation in profitability levels and growth. My extended decomposition shows that labor leverage explains approximately 50% of the value premium, whereas profitability and growth-based mechanisms explain the other 50%. I propose a tractable production-based asset-pricing model that qualitatively and quantitatively explains this finding, as well as the relation between book-to-market ratios, discount rates, profitability, and future growth.

Labor mobility is the flexibility of workers to walk away from an industry in response to better opportunities. I develop a model in which labor flows make bad times worse for shareholders who are left with capital that is less productive. The model shows that firms face greater operating leverage by providing flexibility to mobile workers. I construct an empirical measure of labor mobility consistent with the model and document an economically significant cross‐sectional relation between mobility, operating leverage, and stock returns. I find that firms in mobile industries earn returns over 5% higher than those in less mobile industries.

This paper shows that product market competition has two opposing effects on asset returns. The first relates to the pro-cyclical nature of the value destruction from expansion of competitors, which lowers exposure to systematic risk in more competitive industries. The second is related to the narrower profit margins due to competition, which increase exposure to systematic risk. We find that the first effect dominates the second, so that firms in more competitive industries generally earn lower asset returns. Our results are robust to using five alternative measures of competition and to controlling for the sample selection bias of publicly-listed firms.

The relative size and inflexibility of labor expenses lead to a form of operating leverage, which we call labor leverage. We derive a set of conditions for the existence of labor leverage even when labor markets are frictionless. Our model provides theoretical support for the use of firm-level labor share as a measure of labor leverage. Using Compustat/CRSP and confidential Census data, we provide evidence for the existence and for the economic significance of labor leverage: high labor share firms have operating profits that are more sensitive to economic shocks and have higher expected returns.

We document that the aggregate hiring rate of publicly traded firms in the U.S. economy negatively predicts stock market returns and long-term cash flows, and positively predicts short-term cash flows. In addition, through a variance decomposition, we show that the time-series variation in the aggregate hiring rate is mainly driven by changes in discount rates and short-term expected cash flows, with no contribution from variation in long-term expected cash flows. We estimate a neoclassical dynamic model with labor market frictions and show that labor adjustment costs and time-varying risk are essential for the model to replicate the empirical patterns.