Over the past decade there has been mixed evidence on the lead–lag relation between issuer-paid and investor-paid credit rating agencies. We investigate the lead–lag relationship for changes in bond ratings (BRs) and financial strength ratings (FSRs), for the US insurance industry, where FSRs impose market discipline. First, we find that changes in issuer-paid BRs are led by changes in investor-paid BRs, even over a period that issuer-paid agencies have improved their timeliness. Second, information flows in both directions between changes in issuer-paid BRs and FSRs. Third, issuer-paid FSRs are predictable by investor-paid BRs. Fourth, the lead effect of investor-paid downgrades is economically significant as it is associated with an unconditional, post-event, 30-day cumulative abnormal return of −4%. This return is a result of investor-paid downgrades in BRs, which predict more downgrades in the following 90days (same period return of −11%).

We investigate the risk choices of risk-averse CEOs. Following recent theoretical work, we expect CEO risk aversion to be more pronounced in firms with high leverage or high default probability. We find that the CEOs of these firms reduce firm risk, even in the presence of strong risk-taking incentives. Our results are robust to controls for the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price changes, firm risk determinants, the endogenous feedback effects of firm risk on CEO incentives, unobserved firm and market effects, and debt governance. The impact of CEO risk aversion is economically significant.

We investigate the lead-lag relationships between issuer-paid and investor-paid credit rating agencies (CRAs), after the regulatory reforms in the U.S. (2002–2006) also including outlooks. Over our sample period, ratings (but not outlooks) issued by issuer-paid agencies were certified by the SEC while investor-paid agencies were not certified at all. First, in the wake of the reforms, we find a weaker lead effect of investor-paid over issuer-paid CRAs: after 2002, causality turned bi-directional. Second, after the overhaul of the rating business, issuer-paid CRAs behave less conservatively when dealing with outlook changes than with rating changes, which is consistent with a more conservative approach to ratings than to outlooks, because of the effects of the SEC's certification. Third, investor-paid downgrades become associated with more negative, statistically significant abnormal stock returns, than issuer-paid downgrades are. These results support the hypothesis that issuer-paid CRAs improved the timeliness of their ratings because of the recently implemented, tighter regulations. However, differences in abnormal returns imply that investor-paid rating actions still carry superior information. Adding data from the post NRSRO status acquisition by Egan Jones Ratings, the investor-paid agency studied in our paper, does not radically affect our results and confirms that some of the previously observed differences in timeliness and market impact have been fading over time.

We find evidence consistent with risk mispricing in the eurozone sovereign credit market for crisis and non-crisis countries alike, using a novel variable of sovereign debt expansion (DE) that we construct. DE predicts increased default probability, but panel regressions from 2002 to 2017 show a negative association with risk premia, even when controlling for risk appetite and the known determinants of sovereign risk premia. As expected, the negative association was only briefly interrupted by the 2010 Deauville Summit, but it resumed by the onset of the 2011 eurozone crisis. The introduction of quantitative easing in 2015 mutes the negative association, raising the concern of what will happen once quantitative easing ends. Our finding is robust to several model specifications.

We investigate the relation between national cultural values and bank risk. Despite the rigid transnational regulatory oversight of systemic European banks, we find evidence of an economically significant association between cultural values and domestic bank risk. Specifically, we report a positive (negative) association between the cultural values of individualism and hierarchy (trust) and domestic bank risk-taking. Consistent with our predictions, this relation weakened during the recent financial crisis and does not hold for global banks, regardless of the period under investigation. Our findings are robust to endogeneity tests that mitigate concerns regarding reverse causality and confounding effects affecting our conclusions.

We conduct a comprehensive asset pricing analysis for the U.S. property/liability insurance industry using monthly data from 1988 to 2015. We find that state-of-the-art models such as the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model cannot explain the returns of property/liability insurance stocks in a satisfactory way. We adapt the model proposed by Adrian et al. (2015) for financial institutions and define an insurance-specific five-factor asset pricing model (INS5), which can explain the cross-section of property/liability insurance-stock returns better than competing models. The priced factors are the market return, the book-to-market ratio, return on equity, short-term reversal, and the spread between the property/liability insurance sector and the market return.

Using daily abnormal currency returns for the universe of countries with flexible exchange rates, we show local currency depreciations ahead of unscheduled, public sovereign debt downgrade announcements. Consistent with the private information hypothesis, the effect is stronger in lower institutional quality countries and holds after we control for concurrent public information and for publicly available rumors about the forthcoming downgrades. Our results persist when abnormal currency returns are adjusted for global carry and dollar risk factors, world equity and bond returns, as well as local stock market returns. Finally, the currency depreciations are permanent, providing evidence for a link between fundamentals and currency markets.

Rating agencies consult with local government officials several days prior to official announcements of sovereign debt rating changes, making information leakage likely. Using cross-country data from 1988 to 2012, we find evidence of information leakage. In particular, we find statistically and economically significant negative daily abnormal stock index returns prior to downgrade announcements. These effects are more pronounced in countries with lower institutional quality, and they persist during times with no downgrade rumors and no concurrent bad news in general. A mild post-announcement reversal consistent with overreaction to pre-event downgrade rumors highlights the adverse effects of such leakage and, thus, should be a policy concern for capital market regulators.

We develop a model where a firm has an optimal exposure to cyber risk. With rational, fully informed agents and with no hysteresis, a successful cyberattack should have no impact on a financially unconstrained target's reputation and post-attack policies. In contrast, when a successful attack involves the loss of personal financial information, there is a significant shareholder wealth loss, which is much larger than the attack's out-of-pocket costs. This excess loss is higher when the attack decreases sales growth more and lower when the board pays more attention to risk management before the attack. Further, an attack decreases a firm's risk appetite, as it beefs up its risk management and information technology and decreases the risk-taking incentives of management. Finally, successful cyberattacks adversely affect the stock price of firms in the target's industry. These results imply that successful attacks with personal financial information loss provide adverse information about cyber risk to target firms, their stakeholders, and their competitors.