International relative prices across industrialized countries show large and systematic deviations from relative purchasing power parity. We embed a model of imperfect competition and variable markups in a quantitative model of international trade. We find that when our model is parameterized to match salient features of the data on international trade and market structure in the United States, it can reproduce deviations from relative purchasing power parity similar to those observed in the data because firms choose to price-to-market. We then examine how pricing-to-market depends on the presence of international trade costs and various features of market structure. (JEL F12, F14, F31)

Recent years have seen substantial prog? ress in our understanding of pricing decisions at the micro level. Access to large-scale data sources on prices of individual products has given us rich information on how frequently prices change, by what magnitude, and how the aggregation of price changes in individual firms maps into aggregate inflation (see, among many others, Mark Bils and Peter J. Klenow 2005). These facts about price movements are a key input in recent quantitative models of the aggre? gate effects of nominal rigidities (e.g., Mikhail Golosov and Robert E. Lucas 2007). In this paper, we use both the new facts and the new quantitative models to revisit an old question, namely, that of quantifying the welfare benefits of low inflation. Our model includes two

We study the implications for international relative prices of a simple Ricardian model of international trade with imperfect competition and variable markups, providing a tractable account of firm-level and aggregate prices. We show that both trade costs and imperfect competition with variable markups are needed to account for pricing-to-market at the firm and aggregate levels. We also show that international trade costs are essential, but pricing-to-market is not, to account for a high volatility of tradeable consumer prices relative to the overall CPI-based real-exchange rate.

We examine the quantitative impact of policy-induced changes in firms’ innovative investment on growth in aggregate productivity and output in a model that nests several of the canonical models. We isolate two statistics, the impact elasticity of aggregate productivity growth with respect to aggregate innovative investment and the degree of intertemporal knowledge spillovers in research, that shape the model’s predicted dynamic response to a change in the innovation intensity of the economy. Given measures of these statistics, there is only modest scope for increasing aggregate productivity and output over a 20-year horizon with uniform innovation subsidies to firms’ investments in innovation of a reasonable magnitude, but the welfare gains may be substantial.

What are the consequences of international trade on the skill premium? We incorporate skill-intensity differences across firms and sectors into a standard model of international trade. Reductions in trade costs reallocate factors toward a country's comparative advantage sectors, increasing the skill premium in countries with a comparative advantage in skill-intensive sectors and decreasing it elsewhere. Reductions in trade costs also reallocate factors toward more productive and skill-intensive firms within sectors and toward skill-intensive sectors in all countries, increasing the skill premium in all countries. Quantitatively, we find that trade liberalization increases the skill premium in almost all countries.

We present a unified treatment of how welfare responds to changes in budget sets or technologies with taste shocks and nonhomothetic preferences. We propose a welfare metric that ranks production possibility frontiers that differs from one that ranks budget sets and characterize it using a general equilibrium generalization of Hicksian demand. This extends Hulten’s theorem, the basis for constructing aggregate quantity indices, to environments with nonhomothetic and unstable preferences. We illustrate our results using both long- and short-run applications. In the long run, we show that if structural transformation is caused by income effects or changes in tastes, rather than substitution effects, then Baumol’s cost disease is twice as important for our preferred measure of welfare. In the short run, we show that standard chain-weighted deflators understate welfare-relevant inflation for current tastes. Finally, using the COVID-19 recession, we illustrate that chain-weighted real consumption and real GDP are unreliable metrics for measuring welfare or production when there are taste shocks.

We present a general equilibrium model of the decisions of firms to innovate and to engage in international trade. We use the model to analyze the impact of a reduction in international trade costs on firms ’ process and product innovative activity. We first show analytically that if all firms export with equal intensity, then a reduction in international trade costs has no impact at all, in steady-state, on firms ’ investments in process innovation. We then show that if only a subset of firms export, a decline in marginal trade costs raises process innovation in exporting firms relative to that of non-exporting firms. This reallocation of process innovation reinforces existing patterns of comparative advantage, and leads to an amplified response of trade volumes and output over time. In a quantitative version of the model, we show that the increase in process innovation is largely offset by a decline in product innovation. We find that, even if process innovation is very elastic and leads to a large dynamic response of trade, output, consumption, and the firm size distribution, the dynamic welfare gains are very similar to those in a model with inelastic process innovation.

Management know-how shapes the productivity of firms and can be reallocated across countries as managers acquire control of factors of production abroad. We construct a quantitative model to investigate the aggregate consequences of the international reallocation of management know-how. Using aggregate data, we infer the relative scarcity of this form of know-how in a sample of developing countries. We find that developing countries gain, on average, 12% in output and 5% in welfare (with wide variation across countries) when they eliminate policy barriers to foreign control of domestic factors of production.

Consumer surplus, the area between the demand curve and the price, plays a key role in many models of trade and growth. Quantifying it typically requires estimating and extrapolating demand curves. This paper provides an alternative approach to measuring consumer surplus by focusing on firms as consumers of inputs. We show that the elasticity of a downstream firm's marginal cost to supplier additions and separations measures the downstream firm's consumer surplus relative to its input costs. Using Belgian data and instrumenting for changes in supplier access, we find that for every 1% of suppliers gained or lost, the marginal cost of downstream firms falls or rises by roughly 0.3%. Our estimates are directly informative about the strength of love‐of‐variety effects and the gains from movements along quality ladders. We use our microeconomic estimates of consumer surplus to assess the macroeconomic importance of supplier additions and separations in a growth accounting framework. We find that supplier churn plausibly accounts for about half of aggregate productivity growth.

The money metric utility function is an essential tool for calculating welfare-relevant growth and inflation. We show how to recover it from repeated cross-sectional data without making parametric assumptions about preferences. We do this by solving the following recursive problem. Given compensated demand, we construct money metric utility by integration. Given money metric utility, we construct compensated demand by matching households over time whose money metric utility value is the same. We illustrate our method using household consumption survey data from the United Kingdom from 1974 to 2017 and find that real consumption calculated using official aggregate inflation statistics overstates money metric utility in 1974 pounds for the poorest households by around 0.5% a year and understates it by around a third of a percentage point per year for the richest households. We extend our method to allow for missing or mismeasured prices, assuming preferences are separable between goods with well-measured prices and the rest. We discuss how our results change if the prices of some service sectors are mismeasured.