I. Introduction, 331. — II. The traditional systems, 333. —III. Impact of the new economic era, 335. — IV. The case of West Germany, 339; background of labor-management institutions, 339; recent economic changes, 340; the wage drift, 341; the shifting center of gravity in labor relations, 344; unions and work councils, 345; union and employer views on plant agreements, 348; recent strikes experience, 350; the condition of the union movement, 352; the problem of wage policy, 354; conclusion, 358.

Introduction: scope of the paper, 263. — I. Unionism and earnings, 1933–45: the data, 264; analysis of relative wage movements, 267. — II. Alternative hypotheses: differences in skill, 274; urban and rural industries, 275; proportion of women, 276; degree of monopoly, 277; expanding and contracting industries, 277; summary of these considerations, 279. — III. Unionism and earnings, 1890–1926: Douglas' data, 280; appraisal of the indexes, 281; a more fundamental objection, 282. — IV. Implications, 284.

HE career of the Steel Industry Fact-Finding Board's Report and Recommendations, which were issued on September IO, I949, has been a curious one. The Board recommended that the steelworkers withdraw their demand for a general wage increase, and that a system of private retirement benefits, supplementary to those afforded under the Security Act and financed entirely by employers, as well as against death, disability, and hospital and surgical expenses, be established throughout the industry by collective bargaining between employers and the Union. The recommendations were immediately accepted by the Union and the Report was widely hailed in the public press as a statesmanlike document. The steel industry, after an ill-conceived and hopeless show of resistance on behalf of employee as well as employer contributions, surrendered on the basis of the Bethlehem pension settlement, the terms of which were somewhat more generous than those recommended by the Board. Meanwhile Ford Motor Company had concluded its pension settlement with the auto workers, and it had become clear that retirement benefits would be the main issue in collective bargaining during I949 and I950. The reasoning which led the Board to its recommendations was simple: Retirement benefits and social insurance are necessary; government has not made adequate provision; therefore negotiated plans be incorporated in collective bargaining agreements. Social insurance and pensions, the Board said, should be considered a part of normal business costs to take care of temporary and permanent depreciation in the human 'machine', in much the same way as provision is made for depreciation and insurance of plant and machinery. This obligation be among the first charges on revenues . . . So long as Government fails to provide an adequate amount, industry take up the slack. This was the extent of the Board's general appraisal of a private, companyby-company social security system. Whether, in view of customary claims of human dignity, the analogy between man and machine provides a satisfactory ethical basis for social protection is perhaps not too important. But whether private industry is in a position to offer such protection that is, whether industrial retirement and insurance plans can measure up to the need is highly important and is a question to which the Board did not address itself. The inherent weaknesses of private pensions will be reviewed at a later point in this article, which is limited to the retirement problem. It will be shown that even on the most optimistic assumptions the majority of the gainfully employed will not be covered by industrial retirement plans of the type which the Board has sponsored; that among those theoretically covered, the majority will receive no benefits, or partial ones at best; and that among those receiving benefits, many will pay the price of remaining on jobs which have become unsuitable. Clearly these are not the characteristics of a sound retirement system. And yet it may well be that the Report of the Daugherty Board, and the subsequent union-management agreements such as those at Ford and Bethlehem, are playing a crucial role as catalysts in social politics. In the months following the issuance of the Report, the basic inadequacies of private plans were often noted. Moreover, inasmuch as pensions payable under recent agreements are net of Old Age and Survivors Insurance benefits under the Security Act, employers were given a strong motive to press for larger and more inclusive OASI benefits. Promises to modernize the Act had been reiterated in Republican and Democratic campaign platforms for many years, and proposals to that effect had long been shunted about in Congress. Now redoubtable adversaries of the Welfare State joined with union leaders in seeking immediate

I. Introduction, 254. — II. Recent research on the interindustry wage structure, 255. — III. The original level of earnings, 257. — IV. Degree of organization, 266. — V. Changes in employment, 269. — VI. Other influences, 277. — VII. Conclusions, 278.