Nearly a quarter-century after Paul Volcker’s declaration of war on inflation on October 6, 1979, Alan Greenspan declared that the goal had been achieved. Drawing on the extensive historical record, I examine the views of Chairmen Volcker and Greenspan on some aspects of the evolving monetary policy debate and explore some of the distinguishing characteristics of the disinflation.

The nature of monetary policy during the 1970s is evaluated through the lens of a forward-looking Taylor rule based on perceptions regarding the outlook for inflation and unemployment at the time policy decisions were made. The evidence suggests that policy during the 1970s was essentially indistinguishable from a systematic, activist, forward-looking approach such as is often identified with good policy advice in theoretical and econometric policy evaluation research. This points to the unpleasant possibility that the policy errors of the 1970s occurred despite the use of a seemingly desirable policy approach. Though the resulting activist policies could have appeared highly promising, they proved, in retrospect, counterproductive.

This paper examines the magnitude of informational problems associated with the implementation and interpretation of simple monetary policy rules. Using Taylor's rule as an example, I demonstrate that real-time policy recommendations differ considerably from those obtained with ex post revised data. Further, estimated policy reaction functions based on ex post revised data provide misleading descriptions of historical policy and obscure the behavior suggested by information available to the Federal Reserve in real time. These results indicate that reliance on the information actually available to policy makers in real time is essential for the analysis of monetary policy rules. (JEL E52, E58)

We present a theory of rational behavior in which individuals maximize a set of stable preferences over goods with unknown addictive power. The theory is based on three fundamental postulates: that consumption of the addictive good is not equally harmful to all, that individuals possess subjective beliefs concerning this harm, and that beliefs are optimally undated with information gained through consumption. Although individual actions are optimal and dynamically consistent, addicts regret their past consumption decisions and regret their initial assessment of the potential harm of the good. Addict-prone individuals who believe "it could not happen to them" are most likely to be drawn into a harmful addiction.

We present a theory of rational behavior in which individuals maximize a set of stable preferences over goods with unknown addictive power. The theory is based on three fundamental postulates: that consumption of the addictive good is not equally harmful to all, that individuals possess subjective beliefs concerning this harm, and that beliefs are optimally undated with information gained through consumption. Although individual actions are optimal and dynamically consistent, addicts regret their past consumption decisions and regret their initial assessment of the potential harm of the good. Addict-prone individuals who believe "it could not happen to them" are most likely to be drawn into a harmful addiction.

Abstract The estimation of dynamic no-arbitrage term structure models with a flexible specification of the market price of risk is beset by severe small-sample problems arising from the highly persistent nature of interest rates. We propose using survey forecasts of a short-term interest rate as an additional input to the estimation to overcome the problem. To illustrate the methodology, we estimate the 3-factor affine-Gaussian model with U.S. Treasury yields data and demonstrate that incorporating information from survey forecasts mitigates the small-sample problem. The model thus estimated for the 1990–2003 sample generates a stable and sensible estimate of the expected path of the short rate, reproduces the well-known stylized patterns in the expectations hypothesis tests, and captures some of the short-run variations in the survey forecast of the changes in longer-term interest rates.

The frequency of foreign conflict initiations in the United States is found to be significantly greater following the onset of recessions during a president's first term than in other periods. We develop an economic theory of the political use of wars which links the election cycle, war decisions, and economic performance consistent with the observed relationships among these events. An incumbent leader with an unfavorable economic performance record may initiate a war to force the learning of his war leadership abilities and thus salvage, with some probability, his reelection. This obtains despite voter rationality and informational symmetry.

The frequency of foreign conflict initiations in the United States is found to be significantly greater following the onset of recessions during a president's first term than in other periods. The authors develop an economic theory of the political use of wars which links the election cycle, war decisions, and economic performance consistent with the observed relationships among these events. An incumbent leader with an unfavorable economic performance record may initiate a war to force the learning of his war leadership abilities and thus salvage, with some probability, his reelection. This obtains despite voter rationality and informational symmetry. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.

We present a general equilibrium model of conflict to investigate whether the prevalence of democracy is sufficient to foster the perpetual peace hypothesized by Immanuel Kant and whether the world would necessarily become more peaceful as more countries adopt democratic institutions. Our exploration suggests that neither hypothesis is true. The desire of incumbent leaders with unfavorable economic performance to hold on to power generates an incentive to initiate conflict and salvage their position—with some probability. An equilibrium with positive war frequency is sustained even if all nations were to adopt representative democratic institutions and even in the absence of an appropriative motive for war.

To assess the importance of inflation risk for nominal Treasury yields, a novel quadratic term structure model with time-varying inflation risk is estimated using survey-based inflation uncertainty. The resulting yield decomposition captures very diverse macroeconomic dynamics of inflation and real risk premiums (large and positive during the 1980s but small and negative post-2008) and generates sensible high-frequency estimates of expected inflation and real short rates over a long sample. The explicit link between the model-implied factors and macro fundamentals reveals that short- but not long-run fluctuations are unspanned by yields, consistent with an interest rate policy unresponsive to transient inflation shocks.