Advocacy groups have responded to the lack of political solutions to some of the greatest problems we face—from climate change to armed conflicts—by lobbying for securities regulation that increases corporate transparency. They aim to incentivize corporations to address problems that lack other political solutions. I discuss what we can (and cannot) learn about the efficacy of reporting mandates from the findings in Darendeli et al. (2022) and related papers that stakeholders respond to greater availability of corporate social responsibility information. I support my arguments with evidence from mandatory conflict mineral disclosures—to date, the only related US securities regulation. Although stakeholder responses are likely necessary to incentivize changes in corporate behavior, they are insufficient to justify a mandate. A convincing justification must explain how reporting mandates lead to socially beneficial real effects, are best overseen by the Securities and Exchange Commission, and are less costly than alternative policy instruments. So far, proponents of reporting mandates have, at best, provided incomplete justifications. These circumstances are problematic given the current push for mandatory reporting related to issues such as climate change and workplace diversity.

This study investigates the extent to which economic rents are shared among different types of workers within firms. We utilize administrative payroll records in order to estimate the elasticity of employee compensation with respect to the price of crude oil at petroleum extraction companies. We find that the elasticity of rent sharing is heterogeneous within firms and significantly higher for workers at the top of the earnings distribution. These results can be rationalized by a bargaining model in which insiders within a firm possess greater power to negotiate over wages.

We derive analytic solutions for the valuation, optimal investment, and optimal payout of a financially constrained firm. While marginal q and average q would be identically equal in the absence of financial constraints, they differ when financial constraints bind. We use analytic solutions to characterize the properties of regressions of investment on average q and cash flow. The coefficient on cash flow is positive, but does not isolate the impact of the financial constraint, since it also partially reflects the impact of persistent profitability. The coefficient on average q understates the impact of persistent profitability.

We examine how community banks respond to liquidity shocks created by natural disasters. We address community banks’ responses to liquidity shocks due to their focused geographic and economic presence, which coincide with their communities’ exposure to the disasters and the ability of the local banks to meet their needs. We find that community banks respond to liquidity shocks by managing their balance sheet, rather than any single balance sheet account. In particular, we find that they respond to the liquidity needs of their communities by increasing loans as deposits are withdrawn.

Using unique disclosures from the insurance industry, we identify instances where auditors plausibly allow clients to opportunistically utilize discretion in accounting estimates to manipulate losses to reported profits (i.e., auditor lenience). Auditing standards and SEC guidance state that auditors should consider whether a misstatement shifts a loss to a profit as a qualitative factor when evaluating the materiality of misstatements. We find that audit office lenience is positively associated with subsequent market share changes. The effect is driven by increases in the likelihood of keeping existing, non-manipulating clients. In generalizability tests, we find similar inferences in the banking industry when using bank-specific disclosures and across all industries when measuring auditor lenience using likelihood of issuing going-concern opinions. These results highlight settings where auditors may be rewarded for lenience, specifically when management values financial reporting discretion and auditors can avoid publicized audit failures.

Despite the prevalence of private equity (PE) buyouts of private firms, little is known about how these transactions create value. We provide evidence that PE acquirers disproportionately target private firms with weak operating profitability and those that have growth potential but are highly levered and dependent on external financing. Target firms grow rapidly post-buyout, especially those undertaking add-on acquisitions, and profitability increases for both profitable and unprofitable targets. Our evidence suggests that PE acquirers create value by relaxing financing constraints for firms with strong investment opportunities and improving the performance of weak firms, while financial engineering plays a limited role.

Active mutual funds supply liquidity when demanding it becomes uneconomical. They tilt toward cheaper buy trades after inflows deplete their trading ideas, when trading ideas in general run low, and when they have more stocks to supply liquidity to, and their cheaper trades perform worse. Their largest trades are more likely to supply liquidity, explaining why they were not broken up. Funds perform better when they pay more for their buys and perform worse when they pay more for their sells, consistent with the implied value of the trades and the correlation between what a fund trades and what it holds.

ABSTRACT Accounting rules require that certain R&D expenditures be capitalized, but academic research often states that all R&D expenditures must be immediately expensed. An accurate understanding of actual R&D accounting practices is critical because that understanding influences research questions and design choices. To examine the competing R&D accounting perspectives, we survey 184 experienced financial officers. Our survey reveals that R&D capitalization is common and extensive in practice. Over 90% of respondents indicate that their firm capitalizes at least some R&D expenditures, and our evidence shows that about 22% of annual R&D expenditures are capitalized. When facing an earnings shortfall, respondents indicate that firms are often willing to cut R&D expense. However, respondents also indicate an unwillingness to cut types of R&D expenses that cause long‐term harm—for example, laying off scientists or delaying the execution of trials—and they often redirect the freed‐up R&D resources to R&D expenditures that are capitalized. Using archival data, we also corroborate our survey finding about the pervasiveness of capitalized R&D, and we demonstrate its empirical implications. Our study helps to align the characterization of R&D accounting rules in the academic literature with the authoritative professional literature and provides a more nuanced understanding of firms’ R&D response to an earnings shortfall.

ABSTRACT This study examines how information about a corporation's tax minimization activities and primary operations jointly influence investor behavior. Prior research identifies fear of investor backlash as a primary curb on corporations' tax minimization. However, evidence for such reactions remains mixed. Drawing on the psychological framework of legitimacy theory, we predict and find that the interaction between operations‐level validity and tax‐level propriety influences investor behavior. For companies with lower perceived validity in their primary operations, perceived improper tax minimization elicits strong negative reactions from investors, while proper tax minimization partially compensates for a lack of validity. Conversely, companies with greater perceived operational validity are mostly insulated from negative reactions to tax strategies deemed improper. Thus, management concerns over the reputational risks of tax minimization may be misplaced in some contexts, as companies whose primary operations are more valued by society may be afforded more leeway in their tax strategies.

ABSTRACT This study examines whether credit default swap (CDS) trading initiation can serve as a disciplining mechanism for leading credit rating agencies. Specifically, we investigate whether rating agencies improve their rating quality when an alternative source of credit risk information from CDS threatens to expose inaccuracies in their ratings. Understanding potential drivers of credit rating quality is important given the prominence of credit rating agencies as debt market gatekeepers and perceptions that the agencies have underperformed in providing high‐quality credit risk assessments in recent decades. We hypothesize and find that the initiation of CDS trading improves the accuracy of issuer‐paid credit ratings. This evidence is robust to a number of sensitivity tests including alternative ways of measuring rating accuracy and correction for selection bias. We also find that the timeliness of credit ratings, watch list, and outlook placements improves post‐initiation—particularly for negative shocks to credit risk. This study contributes to the credit rating literature by documenting that CDS trading can help discipline rating agencies. It also contributes to the literature studying the implications of the CDS market.