We estimate and trace a credit demand curve for households that recently experienced damage to their homes from a natural disaster. Our administrative data include over one million applicants to a federal recovery loan program for households. We estimate extensive‐margin demand over a large range of interest rates. Our identification strategy exploits 24 natural experiments, leveraging exogenous, time‐based variation in the program's offered interest rate. Interest rates meaningfully affect consumer demand throughout the distribution of rates. On average, a 1 percentage point increase in the interest rate reduces loan take‐up by 26%. We find a large impact of applicants' credit quality on demand and evidence of monthly payment targeting. Using our estimated demand curve and information on program costs, we find that the program generates an average social surplus of $2900 per borrower.

How do collateral requirements impact consumer borrowing behavior? Using administrative loan application and performance data from the U.S. Federal Disaster Loan Program, we exploit a loan amount threshold above which households must post their residence as collateral. Our bunching estimates suggest that the median borrower is willing to give up 40% of their loan amount to avoid posting collateral. Exploiting time variation in the threshold, we estimate collateral causally reduces default rates by 36%. Finally, we structurally estimate households' attachment to their homes, net of any equity, and find a median value of $11,000. Attachment creates a wedge between lender and borrower valuation of collateral of 15%. Our results explain high perceived default costs in the mortgage market, and document the importance of collateral for reducing moral hazard in consumer credit markets.

Abstract We examine the effects of a severe climate event on local firms. Our data include 8,218 business credit reports and a detailed survey of 273 businesses in the area affected by Hurricane Harvey. Delinquent credit balances doubled in areas with the worst flooding, although nonflooded areas also had significant credit impairments. Only independent businesses showed signs of distress; subsidiaries of larger firms did not. Firms were largely uninsured and often were denied credit postdisaster. Many funded recovery informally, such as through friends and family. Our findings suggest that several financial frictions compound the challenges posed by a severe climate event.