Abstract This paper shows robust effects of trade shocks on within-firm wage inequality through changes in firm hierarchies. It uses two distinct research designs—one considering firm-level shocks to foreign demand and transportation costs, the other analyzing the Muslim boycott of Danish exports after the 2006 “cartoon crisis.” Consistent with knowledge-based and incentive-based hierarchy models, trade shocks affect organizational choices through production scale. Adding a hierarchy layer increases inequality throughout the organization, particularly widening the 90-50 wage gap and pay differences between top and bottom layers. Delayering after the boycott leads to wage compression through wage cuts, demotions, and employee turnover.

Abstract In this article, we quantify the effects of nurses on health care delivery and patient health in the context of an unintended and policy-induced nurse shortage. Our empirical strategy takes advantage of a parental-leave program in Denmark, which offered any parent the opportunity to take up to one year’s absence per child aged 0–8. Combining the policy variation with administrative employer–employee match data, we document substantial program take-up among nurses, who could not be replaced on net despite public education and immigration expansion efforts to mitigate the employment effects. We find that the parental leave program reduced hospital and nursing home nurse employment by 15% and 10%, respectively. Using detailed patient health records, we find detrimental effects on hospital-care delivery as indicated by a large increase in 30-day readmission rates among acute myocardial infarction patients. We find no evidence for an increase in hospital mortality. In nursing homes, we estimate a large increase in mortality.

We study how firms respond to an unexpected demand shock, exploiting the 2006 boycott of Danish products after publication of Muhammad caricatures. On average, affected firms lose the majority of their exports to Muslim countries and experience a significant decrease in total sales. However, firms with low financial leverage redirect sales to new and existing product-destination markets in non-Muslim countries, which allows them to fully offset their losses. In contrast, high-leverage firms do not enter new markets and instead actively downsize. Our results highlight the importance of financial flexibility in times of crisis, consistent with declarations of practitioners.