Many decision situations involve two or more of the following divergences from subjective expected utility: imprecision of beliefs (or ambiguity), imprecision of tastes (or multi‐utility), and state dependence of utility. This paper proposes and characterizes a model of uncertainty averse preferences that can simultaneously incorporate all three phenomena. The representation supports a principled separation of (imprecise) beliefs and (potentially state‐dependent, imprecise) tastes. Moreover, the representation permits comparative statics separating the roles of beliefs and tastes, and is modular: it easily delivers special cases involving various combinations of the phenomena, as well as state‐dependent multi‐utility generalizations covering popular ambiguity models.

Despite the increasing importance of multiple priors in various domains of economics, choice-based incentive-compatible multiple-prior elicitation remains an open problem. This paper develops a solution, comprising a preference-based identification of a subject’s probability interval for an event, and a method for eliciting it. The method applies under weak decision-theoretic assumptions, with no need for probabilistic sophistication. To demonstrate its feasibility, we implement it in three incentivized experiments on artificial and natural sources of uncertainty. Intervals elicited by our method are sensitive to the direction and amount of information and are typically consistent with “objective” probabilities where available. We find a predominance of non-degenerate probability intervals, with intervals being wider when there is less information or predictability. The probability intervals elicited with our method are similar to those stated by subjects on aggregate, suggesting that the method can provide behavioural foundations for the use of stated probability-interval techniques in the field.

Our research addresses the importance of state fiscal policies on the probability of retirement using a panel of individual tax return data. Results indicate that a one percentage point increase in the income or sales tax rate reduces the probability of retirement by about 8.7 percent. The evidence suggests that state spending might also affect retirement decisions but magnitudes are inconclusive. In general, the results suggest that the income effect dominates; that is, higher tax rates at the state-level reduce disposable income and decrease the probability of retiring. Results are similar in models examining single and married filers separately.

We propose and operationalize normative principles to guide social decisions when individuals potentially have imprecise and heterogeneous beliefs, in addition to conflicting tastes or interests. To do so, we adapt the standard Pareto principle to those preference comparisons that are robust to belief imprecision and characterize social preferences that respect this robust principle. We also characterize a suitable restriction of this principle. The former principle provides stronger guidance when it can be satisfied; when it cannot, the latter always provides minimal guidance. (JEL D71, D81)