This study explores the influence of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enforcement on corporate green innovation, as measured by green patent counts and citations. Our findings show that EPA-enforced firms experience a substantial uptick in green innovation outputs. This boost can be attributed to enhanced green innovation efficiency and increased hiring of green inventors. Moreover, this effect is more pronounced for firms headquartered in states with stronger environmental enforcement intensity, firms with higher institutional ownership, and firms with fewer financial constraints. Finally, we find that green innovations help enforced firms avoid future EPA enforcements and reduce toxic chemical releases. Taken together, these results imply that EPA enforcement actions can indeed foster positive impacts on corporate green innovation.

This paper studies the effect of board reforms on stock liquidity using data from 37 countries. We document that board reforms significantly increase stock liquidity: the effective spread on average decreases by 12.7% after a board reform. As information asymmetry is a key determinant of stock liquidity, we further find that board reforms decrease information asymmetry, and the treatment effect of board reforms on stock liquidity is stronger for firms with ex ante higher information asymmetry. Finally, board reforms facilitate healthy stock market development, with the effect being stronger for countries with lower aggregate stock market liquidity prior to reforms. (JEL G14, G15, G18)

Using a sample of 2198 completed M&A transactions between 1994 and 2010 in which both target and acquirer are public US firms supplemented with hand-collected data for target CEO retention, we uncover a significantly negative relation between target CEO retention and takeover premiums received by target shareholders. Further, when the target CEO was not retained, we document a significantly negative relation between the relative importance of the severance pay received by the target CEO and takeover premium. Taken together, our findings, which hold in various robustness tests, suggest that target CEOs bargain shareholder value for personal benefits during corporate takeovers. Our findings have important policy implications for takeover disclosures.

ABSTRACT We develop an agency model in which managerial information manipulation creates pooling and entails ex post costs internal and/or external to the firm. We examine the implications of the strategic interactions between shareholders (who set internal governance and managerial incentive compensation), the manager (who exerts effort and reports on its outcome), and an external regulatory authority or RA (who investigates for fraud and levies penalties ex post). When the RA cannot pre-commit to an ex post investigation strategy, a fraudulent equilibrium obtains if the firm's internal governance costs are sufficiently high. Consistent with (so far fairly scant) post-SOX empirical evidence, but the opposite of the implications of signal-jamming models and equilibria with pre-commitment, the model implies an increase in minimum internal governance standards or ex post fraud penalties (as with SOX) results in decreased equilibrium pay-for-performance sensitivity and firm performance.

This paper examines corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A) outcomes under lender scrutiny. Using the unique shocks of U.S. supervisory stress testing, we find that firms under increased lender scrutiny after their relationship banks fail stress tests engage in fewer but higher-quality M&A deals. Evidence from comprehensive supervisory data reveals improved credit quality for newly originated M&A-related loans under enhanced lender scrutiny. This improvement is further evident in positive stock return reactions to M&A deals financed by loans subject to enhanced lender scrutiny. As companies engage in fewer but higher-quality deals, they also experience higher returns on assets. Our findings highlight the importance of lender scrutiny in corporate M&A activities.

Although many studies show that the presence of institutional investors facilitates the incorporation of accounting information into financial markets, the evidence of informed trading by institutions is rather limited in the extant literature. We address these inconsistent findings by proposing PC _ NII , percentage changes in the number of a stock's institutional investors, as a novel informed trading measure. PC _ NII is better able to detect informed trading than are changes in institutional ownership ( Δ IO )—the measure commonly used in previous studies—because (i) entries and exits are usually triggered by substantive private information and (ii) only a small fraction of institutions have superior information. As conjectured, PC _ NII subsumes the information content of Δ IO and other institutional trading and herding measures in the forecast of stock returns, and its strong predictive power for stock returns reflects mainly its close correlation with future earnings surprises. We also show that PC _ NII helps address empirical issues that require a reliable measure of institutional informed trading.

This paper studies how the COVID-19 shock affects the CDS spread changes and abnormal stock returns of U.S. firms with different levels of debt rollover risk. We use the COVID-19 crisis as a quasi-natural experiment of adverse cash flow shock that increases the default risk of firms facing an immediate liquidity shortfall. We find that the COVID-19 shock significantly increased the CDS spread and decreased the shareholder value for firms facing higher debt rollover risk. The effect is stronger for non-financial firms, for firms that are financially constrained, and for firms that are highly volatile. Moreover, we find that firms with immediate refinancing needs suffered more than firms with distant refinancing needs during the COVID-19 shock, which further confirms that firms’ debt rollover risk is indeed a key factor that drives the heterogenous reactions to the shock. The paper provides fresh insights into the role of firms’ debt rollover risk during the COVID-19 health crisis.

We show that state right-to-work (RTW) laws significantly encourage corporate innovations in terms of patent grant and citation count. Consistent with the conjecture that the RTW-treated firms conduct more innovations due to their decreased financial distress risk, we find that the RTW adoption also significantly decreases treated firms' financial distress risk ex post, and its treatment effect on innovation outputs is stronger for treated firms that are ex ante more likely to experience financial distress. Further analysis indicates that treated firms intensify research and development expenditures and, likely due to their improved innovations, enhance their competitiveness in product markets.

This article studies whether knowledge protection affects shareholder value and firms’ investment in knowledge assets using the staggered adoptions and rejections of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) by U.S. state courts as exogenous changes in the level of knowledge protection. We find positive (negative) abnormal stock returns around the IDD adoption (rejection) day for firms headquartered in the state, and we uncover a positive IDD treatment effect on firms’ investment in knowledge assets. Moreover, the effects on stock returns and knowledge assets investment are stronger in more knowledge-oriented industries and firms. Finally, enhancing knowledge protection does not discourage local entrepreneurial activity.

Using options-implied variance, a forward-looking measure of conditional variance, we revisit the debate on the idiosyncratic risk-return relation. In both cross-sectional (for individual stocks) and time-series (for the market index) regressions, we find a negative relation between options-implied variance and future stock returns. Consistent with Miller’s (1977) divergence of opinion hypothesis, the negative relation gets stronger (1) for stocks with more stringent short-sale constraints or (2) when shorting stocks becomes more difficult. Moreover, the negative correlation of realized idiosyncratic variance or analyst forecast dispersion with future stock returns mainly reflects their close correlation with our conditional idiosyncratic variance measure.