Given the complex and controversial nature of short-selling regulation, we review the academic literature and provide insights for policy makers and academics. We organize the complex history of short-selling regulation into three areas: trading restrictions, securities lending regulations, and disclosure requirements. We identify, analyze, and discuss 45 distinct regulations promulgated from 1896 to 2021, primarily by reviewing the academic literature and the data sources employed. We provide several insights regarding the effectiveness of regulatory approaches and the wider impact of short-selling regulation on markets. (JEL G2, G12, G14, G15, G34)

We estimate the longer-run effects of attending an effective high school (one that improves a combination of test scores, survey measures of socioemotional development, and behaviors in ninth grade) for students who are more versus less educationally advantaged. All students benefit from attending effective schools, but the least advantaged students experience larger improvements in high school graduation, college going, and school-based arrests. Test score value-added understates the long-run importance of effective schools, particularly for less advantaged populations. Patterns suggest that this may, in part, reflect less advantaged students being relatively more responsive to non-test-score dimensions of school quality.

We make use of rich U.S. data to show that debt overhang significantly reduces firm asset-, capex-, and employee-growth. We show these contractions are likely driven by firm decisions as opposed to the result of credit constraints or changes in investment opportunities. Our measure of overhang – liabilities to cash flow — aligns with traditional theory and focuses on the importance of a firm’s debt servicing capacity. It further allows us to capitalize on the COVID-19 shock as a quasi-natural experiment to confirm the impact of overhang on firm investment and growth.

Parole was eliminated for many US offenders by Truth-in-Sentencing (TIS) laws in the 1990s. I exploit the introduction of TIS in Arizona to explore its impact on offenders before, during, and after incarceration. TIS Offenders were assigned significantly shorter sentences, largely eliminating the intended increase in punishment. These offenders reduced their rehabilitative effort while incarcerated, with rule infractions increasing by 22% and education enrollment falling by 24%. Finally, TIS offenders became 23% more likely to return to prison for a new conviction. I argue these effects were driven by TIS removing parole incentives, given that time served remained largely unchanged.

Basel I introduced capital requirements for undrawn commitments, but only for revolvers with an original maturity greater than one year. We use this regulatory discontinuity to estimate the impact of capital regulation on the cost and composition of credit. Following Basel I, short-term commitment fees declined relative to long-term commitments and issuance of short-term facilities increased. Our results highlight the sensitivity of credit provision to capital regulation, particularly for banks with less capital. We are able to infer that low-capital banks are willing to forego twice as much income from fees to reduce required regulatory capital by a dollar.

Managers are required to disclose material climate risk in Form 10-K, but their decision whether or not to disclose is confounded by the lack of consensus on whether climate risk is material to the firms, as well as uncertainty about enforcement of disclosure regulations. Using the SASB Materiality Map™ to proxy for market expectations of climate risk materiality, we test whether the association between disclosing climate risk in 10-Ks and firm risk (proxied by cost of equity (COE)) varies with market expectations of climate risk materiality. Using S&P 500 firms’ decisions whether to disclose climate risk in Form 10-K for 2008 to 2016, we find that disclosing firms’ COE is 27 bps lower than nondisclosing firms’ COE. In industries where the market expects climate risk to be material, disclosing firms’ COE is 50 bps lower than nondisclosing firms’, while in industries where the market does not expect climate risk to be material, disclosing firms’ COE is 23 bps lower than nondisclosing firms’. Our results indicate that markets use expectations of climate risk materiality to infer the credibility of managers’ climate risk disclosure decisions. Our research contributes to policy-making on climate risk disclosures in regulatory filings and informs the debate around the costs and benefits of the SEC’s current proposal to enhance climate risk disclosures.

We examine whether performance reporting leads to inconsistent enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In a sample of over 13,000 SEC enforcement actions, we show that SEC staff respond to performance-reporting pressures and file more enforcement actions in September, the final month of the SEC's fiscal year, than in any other month. The increase in case volume in September is not fully explained by staff filing more procedural cases or accelerating case filings. Instead, SEC staff pursue less complex cases and agree to more lenient financial and non-financial sanctions to increase case volume in September. We attempt to rule out alternative explanations for our results, including natural SEC workflow and resource constraints. Overall, our findings suggest that performance reporting creates agency conflicts that lead to regulatory inconsistency within the fiscal year.